



Money matters

An evaluation of the use of
cash grants in UNHCR's
voluntary repatriation and
reintegration programme
in Burundi

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Table of contents

1. Introduction.....	1
2. Needs assessment and programme design.....	7
3. Impact on reintegration.....	15
4. Impact on decisions to return.....	27
5. Wider impact.....	31
6. Efficiency, effectiveness and monitoring.	35
7. Conclusion.....	43
Annex I: Terms of Reference.....	47
Annex II: Map.....	51
Annex III: Evaluation itinerary.....	52
Annex IV: List of interviewees.....	54
Annex V: Survey form.....	55
Annex VI: How the 1993 group spent the cash grant, according to the household survey.....	62

1. Introduction

Background

1. The voluntary repatriation of almost half a million refugees from Tanzania to Burundi since 2002 constitutes one of the most significant refugee return movements of the past decade and is an important indicator of progress in the transition from conflict to greater stability in the Great Lakes region. For a country less than a tenth of the size of France, and with an estimated population of 8.7 million, this large-scale population movement has had a profound impact, particularly in the southern and eastern regions where return movements have been concentrated.

2. The programme of organized voluntary repatriation from Tanzania is now drawing to a close. In early 2007, there were still eight camps in northwestern Tanzania hosting Burundian refugees who had fled the civil war of 1993. Today there is just one – Mtabila, holding just 41,000 refugees and designated for closure in 2009. The voluntary repatriation of some 55,000 refugees from the ‘old settlements’ whose families left Burundi in 1972, which began in 2008, is expected to be completed this year.

3. Since July 2007, the assistance package for returnees from Tanzania has included a cash component. Each returnee was given 50,000 Burundian francs, or around \$41 at today’s exchange rates. The cash grant was distributed through a micro-lending banking cooperative that has 86 branches throughout the country. After subtracting bank fees of around 6,600 Burundian francs per account, the average family of five received a total of around 243,000, or \$205.

4. With the start of organized repatriation from the old settlements in March 2008, the cash grant was also extended to this group (the ‘1972 group’). Notably, the cash grant was introduced as a supplement, not a substitute for the existing return package, which consisted of a range of food and non-food items, seeds and tools, as well as the provision of transport. A more limited cash and transport-only package was initially adopted for the 1972 group, but by April 2009 this had been expanded to include the same food and non-food assistance for all returnees from Tanzania.

Purpose

5. There has been growing interest in recent years in the use of cash grants as a humanitarian assistance and social protection tool. A three year research project carried out by the Humanitarian Policy Group concluded in early 2007 that ‘a strong body of evidence is starting to emerge to indicate that providing people with cash or vouchers works.’¹ A number of aid agencies and donors have now developed operational guidelines on the use of cash grants.² Cash has also been used in

¹ P. Harvey (2007) Cash-based responses in emergencies, HPG Report 24, London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

² Creti and Jaspars (2006) Cash transfer programming in emergencies: a practical guide, Oxford: Oxfam; IFRC (2007) Guidelines for cash transfer programming, Geneva: International Red Cross and Red

UNHCR operations for many years, most notably in Cambodia in the early 1990s,³ in voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan since 1992,⁴ and most recently, in urban refugee programmes in Jordan and Syria.⁵

6. The evaluation seeks to contribute to the broader body of research examining the impact of cash assistance in humanitarian settings, and to UNHCR's own thinking on the use of cash transfers. It builds upon the findings of a 'lessons learned' workshop examining the use of cash in voluntary repatriation operations hosted by UNHCR's Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES) and Division of Operational Services (DOS) in April 2008. It also forms part of a series of evaluations of UNHCR return and reintegration operations, and builds on an independent evaluation commissioned by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) of its own support to reintegration in Burundi, much of which was provided through UNHCR, published in 2008.⁶

7. The purpose of this evaluation is to analyse the impact of the cash grant on the reintegration of its recipients and on the communities to which they returned. It examines the role which the cash grant played in refugee decision-making, and the extent to which it enabled them to meet the immediate needs they encountered and contributed to their sustainable reintegration. It looks at the mechanisms put in place for distributing and monitoring the cash grant, and seeks to analyse whether it formed an appropriate response to the specific needs of potentially vulnerable returnees such as the landless and unaccompanied minors. More broadly, it seeks to draw lessons which may inform the use of cash grants by UNHCR in similar operations in the future.

Methodology

8. The evaluation was conducted by a mixed team consisting of an international consultant as team leader (Katherine Haver), a national consultant (Felicien Hatungimana) and a PDES staff member, Vicky Tennant. An evaluation focal point at UNHCR Bujumbura, Andreas Kirchhof, played a key role in defining the evaluation questions, developing the methodology, and coordinating logistical and other support for the evaluation. The evaluation was part-funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and was peer-reviewed by an independent expert on cash transfers.

Crescent Movement; SDC (2007) Cash workbook: a practical users' guide for the preparation and implementation of cash projects, Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development

³ 'Review of the Cambodia Repatriation Operation' Jeff Crisp and Andrew Mayne, UNHCR, September 1993.

⁴ UNHCR (2008) The use of cash grants in UNHCR voluntary repatriation operations, report of a 'lessons learned' workshop, Geneva: Policy Development and Evaluation Service; UNHCR (1996) Repatriation Under Conflict: A Review of the Encashment Programme for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation Reports. A further evaluation of the use of cash grants in the Afghanistan voluntary repatriation and reintegration operation will be published in 2009.

⁵ UNHCR (2009) Surviving in the city: a review of UNHCR's recent experience in relation to Iraqi refugees in urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, July 2009.

⁶ Impact Evaluation of PRM Humanitarian Assistance to the Repatriation and Reintegration of Burundi Refugees (2003-08), Terra P. Group Inc, September 2008. Available on <http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/pubs/2009/121591.htm> (last downloaded 24 June 2009)

9. Following a document review and development of the methodology, the evaluation process incorporated three main elements:

- (i) A quantitative component based on a survey of 299 returnees from the 1993 group in six communes (Busoni, Cendajuru, Gisuru, Gitega, Giteranyi and Muyinga) located in five provinces (Kirundo, Cankuzo, Ruyigi, Gitega and Muyinga), half of whom received the cash grant and half of whom did not. The survey was conducted by staff of Ligue Iteka, the national NGO working with UNHCR on returnee monitoring, with oversight and support from the evaluation team. The survey tools were finalized during a workshop and testing phase facilitated by the two consultants, and the survey carried out between 28 April and 07 May 2009. Heads of household were targeted (72% of respondents fell into this category), whilst striving to achieve a gender-balanced sample (45% of respondents were female, 55% male). Key survey findings are incorporated in the main body of this report.⁷
- (ii) A series of twelve discussions with focus groups of between ten and fifteen participants, each lasting an average of an hour to an hour and a half. Using an age, gender and diversity mainstreaming methodology, and working with Kirundi interpreters, the focus groups included returnees from both the 1993 and 1972 groups, cash grant and non-cash grant recipients, members of resident communities and traders. These took place during the main evaluation mission to Burundi from 19 to 29 May 2009, during which the team visited Bujumbura, Ruyigi and Makamba provinces, including several collines of return, one temporary accommodation centre, one 'integrated rural village' for landless returnees (also referred to as a 'peace village') and a repatriation transit centre, where the team had the opportunity to observe the reception of a convoy of 1993 group returnees.
- (iii) More than forty individual interviews with key stakeholders, including returnees, local residents, government representatives and public servants, NGOs, UN agencies and other partners, donors, and UNHCR staff either currently or formerly based in Tanzania and Burundi. The majority of interviews were conducted in person in Geneva or Burundi, and a small number by telephone.

10. The evaluation process was greatly facilitated by the support provided by UNHCR staff in Bujumbura, Ruyigi, Muyinga and Makamba in suggesting suitable interviewees, providing information, scheduling interviews and focus group discussions, and providing logistical and other assistance. The team also benefited from useful discussions on the initial evaluation findings during de-briefings in Bujumbura and Geneva on 28 May and 03 June 2009. It should be noted that the survey was conducted in provinces accessible from the Ruyigi and Muyinga offices, and so only targeted returnees from the 1993 group. This was balanced by ensuring that a relatively larger proportion of the focus group discussions targeted 1972 returnees.

⁷ Full survey results are available upon request from HQPD00@unhcr.org.

Context

11. Burundi has experienced recurring socio-political crises and large-scale displacement for over thirty years. In 1972, more than 150,000 refugees fled to neighbouring countries following inter-ethnic massacres, and displacement also occurred on a smaller scale in 1988. During the civil war in 1993, a further 400,000 fled, mainly to Tanzania. An additional 880,000 civilians were reported to be displaced internally within Burundi at the height of the crisis.⁸

12. All but two of the parties to the conflict signed the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000. Protocol IV to that agreement provided for the right to return for all 'sinistrés' (a term which includes both refugees and other displaced persons) and made provision for the restoration of their rights and property. 2001 saw significant spontaneous return movements, and organized repatriation commenced in 2002 following the conclusion of a Tripartite Agreement between the governments of Tanzania and Burundi and UNHCR in May 2001.

13. The next five years saw significant progress towards a more stable and inclusive political settlement, marked by elections and the adoption of power-sharing constitution in 2005, and the declaration of a ceasefire in September 2006 by Palipehutu-FNL, the last rebel group remaining outside the democratic process.⁹ Against this background, the voluntary repatriation process acquired significant momentum, with an estimated 340,000 refugees returning (78% with UNHCR assistance) between 2002 and 2006. In June 2006, UNHCR announced a shift from a policy of facilitation to promotion of return.

14. In 2006, however, the number of returns (44,915) was less than half the number in 2004 (90,327). By the beginning of 2007 the rate of return had dropped even further, and the planned figure of 80,000 returns in 2007 was revised downwards to 65,000. By late April 2007, just 2,822 refugees had returned that year, with some 150,000 remaining in camps in Tanzania. Whilst a low number of returns was usual in the early part of the year (repatriation was largely seasonal, with the highest number of returns taking place from July to September, after the end of the school year), April 2007 marked the lowest number of returns in a single month since the voluntary repatriation operation had begun in 2002.

15. Part of the backdrop to the slowdown in returns was an extremely challenging socio-economic situation. Burundi has the lowest gross national per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa (\$105). With 90% of the population dependent on agriculture, the population density on arable land in Burundi is extremely high, resulting in reduced land fertility due to over-exploitation and a high incidence of land conflicts. Periodic food crises and ongoing banditry in some regions has also

⁸ IDPs tended to settle close to urban centres and military positions in search of protection from rebel groups. Others (mainly Hutu) were forced into regroupement camps by the armed forces in the second half of the 1990s, ostensibly to provide them with protection, but perceived by many as a means of depriving rebels of local support. The most recent estimate (in 2006) put the number of remaining IDPs at 100,000. The majority of these are located within the same commune as their previous homes, and many continue to farm their original land. (See J. Vorrath (2008), *From refugee crisis to reintegration crisis? The consequences of repatriation to (post-)transition Burundi*, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs Annuaire 2007-08.)

⁹ Palipehutu-FNL converted formally into a political party in April 2009. Some of its former combatants will be integrated into the security forces, whilst the rest, along with others associated with the FNL (around 16,000 persons) will receive reintegration support.

persisted. The primary education system has also come under massive strain since 2005, when the introduction of free schooling led to a tripling in the number of pupils with no clear strategy for additional resourcing.

16. The assistance package for returnees already in place aimed to provide initial support as they re-established themselves upon return, in particular during the period until the first harvest. Families received a package of non-food items including blankets, sleeping mats, fabric for women to use as clothing, soap, plastic sheeting, jerry cans, buckets, a kitchen set, mosquito nets, tools and sanitary materials for women. Seeds were provided by FAO and education materials by UNICEF.

17. Returnees received a three month food ration provided by WFP (which was later increased to four months in April 2007 and to six months in August 2007). Returnees were transported, with up to 50kg baggage,¹⁰ from the camps to transit centres inside Burundi, where the non-food items (NFIs) and food rations were distributed. They were then transported to the commune (district centre), with most then being left to arrange their own transport to their home colline. A revision of the Tripartite Agreement in 2005 extended the same NFI and food assistance to spontaneous returnees.

18. UNHCR had also engaged in an extensive programme of community-based reintegration support in areas of return, focusing until 2005 on the rehabilitation and (re)construction of infrastructure for basic services such as health, education, water and sanitation. These activities had been scaled back in 2006, partly in response to the urging of donors as other agencies began to expand their field presence in the aftermath of the 2005 elections. In 2006 and 2007 UNHCR began to re-shape its engagement on reintegration to pursue an extensive shelter programme, engagement and capacity building on land issues, protection monitoring, and supporting the coordination of reintegration assistance through government structures.

19. By 2006, the increasingly slow rate of returns was contributing to significant uneasiness on the part of the Government of Tanzania. Tanzania had gone from hosting relatively small numbers of refugees to struggling to cope with the arrival of more than one million Rwandan and Burundian refugees in the mid 1990s. By 2003, signs of fatigue with the Burundian refugee presence were beginning to show.

20. Administrative restrictions on freedom of movement beyond four kilometres from camp perimeters began to be more rigorously applied, and restrictions on farming and professional activities outside the camps were also enforced. Popular rhetoric in Tanzania began to blame the refugees for security problems and petty crime, including animal poaching. Concerns on the part of both the Government of Tanzania and donors about the slow pace of returns intensified after the 2005 elections failed to bring about the expected increase in numbers, and the Burundian representatives came under pressure in Tripartite meetings to speed up the pace of returns. One UNHCR staff member described the situation in early 2007 as 'very tense', an opinion echoed by many of those interviewed.

¹⁰ In practice, the baggage allowance was not strictly applied, and many returnees returned with much larger quantities of baggage.

21. Against this backdrop, the UNHCR offices in Tanzania and Burundi began to explore options for encouraging returns through additional support to address unmet reintegration needs. Cash grants had been used in certain UNHCR repatriation programmes for some years, and their effectiveness in humanitarian programmes was also becoming increasingly recognised. The immediate inspiration for the introduction of cash grants in Burundi nonetheless came from a documentary, 'En route to Baghdad' about the life of Sergio Vieira de Mello.

22. Whilst the UNHCR Special Envoy in Cambodia in the early 1990s, de Mello organised the repatriation of 370,000 refugees in part through giving \$50 cash grants, an unconventional but successful approach that was credited with enabling large numbers of people to return in the thirteen-month period before the May 1993 elections.¹¹ Inspired by this example, it was thought that a cash grant for Burundian refugees might both jump start the return process and meet reintegration needs that, as was becoming increasingly clear, the current assistance package could not.

¹¹ Sergio Vieira de Mello: En Route to Baghdad [DVD] [2005] See also 'Review of the Cambodia Repatriation Operation' Jeff Crisp and Andrew Mayne, UNHCR, September 1993.

2. Needs assessment and programme design

The assessment process: 1993 group

23. The decision to introduce a cash grant for the 1993 returnees in addition to the existing return package, whilst prompted by the need to develop a managed response to the critical slowdown in repatriation, nonetheless emerged from a comprehensive needs assessment process in early 2007. An earlier Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) conducted in Tanzania in 2006 had contributed to a decision to downgrade non-essential assistance in the camps, resulting in the termination of income-generating activities and the announcement that secondary schools would not re-open in September 2007. The Tanzania JAM recommended that a JAM also be undertaken in Burundi, examining food security and other assistance requirements for returnees.

24. Building on this, an assessment of reintegration needs in Burundi began in late 2006 and early 2007 with a study of 4,807 returnee households carried out by the Institut des Statistiques et d'Etudes Economiques du Burundi (ISTEEBU). Their report, issued in April 2007, covered issues such as economic activity, education, nature of identity documents, health status, shelter, perceptions of security, food security, agricultural activity, reasons for return and relationships with the receiving community.¹²

25. It cited a number of reasons for the slowdown in repatriation: the food crisis (notably a weak first harvest in 2006); limited progress in the negotiations with FNL; and significant socio-economic challenges in return areas. However, it was noted that the second half of 2006 had started well, with a better second harvest, the conclusion of an agreement with the FNL, and the establishment of the Commission Nationale des Terres et Autres Biens (CNTB) with a mandate to address land-related disputes.

26. Despite having as one of its stated objectives an analysis of the use of the return package, this issue was not addressed in the ISTEEBU survey, other than in respect of the food component. The survey found that whilst relatively few returnees claimed to have sold part of the food package (11%), there was significant pressure on returnees to share food with the receiving communities. Almost 16% of returnees reported sharing between one quarter and one half of the food they had received, and 82% reported sharing up to one quarter. For 62% of returnees, the food package was lasting less than two months, as opposed to the three months envisaged.

27. The ISTEEBU study was followed by a JAM to areas of refugee return between 07 and 11 May 2007. This was led by UNHCR and WFP, but included forty participants from UN agencies (FAO, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA), donors and partners (ECHO, USAID, PRM, Cooperation Belge), representatives of the Burundian government, and GTZ.

¹² Institut de Statistiques et d'Etudes Economiques du Burundi (ISTEEBU), WFP, UNHCR and other agencies (2007), Enquête d'évaluation de la réintégration durable des rapatriés Burundais, Résultats Définitifs, Bujumbura, April

28. The JAM highlighted significant challenges to the reintegration process, describing the initial reintegration of returnees as 'satisfactory' but concluding that the possibilities of its being durable were extremely low. It highlighted pressure on land, inadequate services and non-agricultural employment opportunities as critical problems. Nonetheless, it found that despite some experiences of discrimination and difficulties in recovering land, the protection problems they encountered, such as difficulties in accessing identity cards,¹³ and sexual and gender-based violence, were also common to the receiving population. In general, it was concluded that returnees found themselves on an equal footing to other members of the community within a year or so.

29. The report nonetheless highlighted a number of immediate needs which returnees struggled to meet in the early phase of return. The first of these was transport: the majority of returnees were taken only as far as the main village of the commune and had to make their own arrangements to transport themselves and their belongings to their home collines. Many also were unable to cover the costs of health care and secondary education.

30. Whilst fee waivers for returnees had been granted for three months and two years respectively for these services, in practice the implementation of these provisions had been problematic, and in the case of medical services, public services were not always available, causing returnees to have to rely on private facilities. Other needs included food items not included in the food rations, such as palm oil and perishable items such as vegetables. And whilst shelter kits were provided through the shelter programme, returnees had to find the means (water and labour) to produce bricks.

31. In April 2007 a concept note was developed jointly by the UNHCR offices in Dar es Salaam and Bujumbura setting out a proposal for the introduction of a cash grant of \$50 to be paid to each returnee. The amount finally agreed on was 50,000 Burundian francs per person or around 250,000 (\$205 at current exchange rates) for an average family of five. This was conceived as a time-bound measure, with an initial budget of \$350,000 using existing funds drawn from the UNHCR Tanzania budget. The note made reference to the concerns of donors and the Government of Tanzania regarding the slowing pace of returns, but highlighted that sustainable peace should be measured not in terms of the number of returns, but in the sustainability of the reintegration process.

32. The cash grant was presented as a means of bridging critical gaps in the early stages of the reintegration process, enabling basic needs, such as health, education and transport, to be met without having to sell or barter parts of the return package.¹⁴ Importantly, the cash grant was seen as a supplement to the current return package and reintegration support, and not a substitute. On the whole, the objectives were relatively modest, with the cash grant seen as a flexible means of providing a cushion during the initial return period, and not as the solution to long-term reintegration. As noted above, the food component of the return package was also increased to six months in August 2007, and a system put in place for monthly

¹³ From 2005 identity cards have been issued free to all returnees.

¹⁴ The following additional needs which could be met by cash were also cited in the concept note: clothing, school uniforms, fertilizer and additional seeds and tools, and the rent or purchase of land.

distribution in the communes of return rather than as a one-time package, which had incurred costly transport costs for some returnees.

33. The level of the cash grant was fixed through consideration of a number of factors. The concept note assessed the total value of the food and non-food components of the return package as \$56, and noted that the value of the cash grant would be roughly equivalent to this. Together, the cash and non-cash components were estimated as amounting to around one half of the value of the camp-based assistance required to maintain a refugee in Tanzania for one year.

34. Interviews with programme staff and a review of successive drafts of the concept note, together with other documents, have shown that an important source for consideration in fixing the level of the cash grant was a Rural Livelihoods and Labour Markets Study conducted by WFP in partnership with the University of Burundi in 2007.¹⁵ This highlighted the seasonality of labour opportunities and food stocks. In particular, there was most need for food when household stocks were low in the spring, and most need for cash in late summer and early autumn when labour opportunities were low and the school year started.

35. As most returnees came back during the summer, there was a need for cash to compensate for the lack of wage-earning opportunities during that period. The \$50 figure was therefore calculated with reference to a) compensation for loss of wage-earning income for two months, b) compensation for arrival expenditures (representing transport to colline and the percentage of the return package assessed through the ISTEERU survey as being shared with host families) and c) estimated cost of purchase of health and education services.

36. As an indication of the value of the grant, a primary school teacher's salary is reportedly currently 56,000 Burundian francs per month¹⁶; the median monthly income of a returnee household is 9,000 Burundian francs;¹⁷ and the average rate for daily wage labour at 500 Burundian francs.¹⁸ Thus for the average returnee household, the cash grant was quite sizeable—the equivalent of over two years' income, or almost 500 days of wage labour. Interviews have also confirmed that an additional consideration was the desire not to pitch the amount too high in order to avoid creating inequity or triggering resentment from receiving communities.

37. The programme design also took into account the risks attached to the use of cash, in particular as regards fraud and security. The use of biometric fingerprinting and photographs to verify the identity of refugees as they registered for repatriation was seen as an important tool in detecting and preventing potential 'recycling'.¹⁹ The design of the 20-80 percent distribution mechanism was prompted by the desire to avoid security problems by not making returnees a target for theft. A

¹⁵ Rural Livelihoods and Labor Markets Survey, WFP and University of Burundi presentation to partners, April 2007

¹⁶ Interviews with key informants.

¹⁷ Evaluation survey.

¹⁸ Institut de Statistiques et d'Etudes Economiques du Burundi (ISTEERU), WFP, UNHCR and other agencies (2007), *Enquête d'évaluation de la réintégration durable des rapatriés Burundais*, Résultats Définitifs, Bujumbura, April, p.10.

¹⁹ It should nonetheless be noted that the accuracy and effectiveness of biometrics as a verification mechanism in refugee settings has not yet been comprehensively evaluated. The use of biometrics may also have data protection and privacy implications. These issues were beyond the scope of this report.

rapid review was also conducted after the first few days of the operation, to analyse how it was working and check for any unforeseen consequences.

38. For the 1993 group, the introduction of the cash grants was therefore based on an extensive, evidence-based and forward-looking assessment of gaps in existing reintegration support. This process was aided by the fact that the return operation had already been ongoing for some five years, and so the analysis was based directly on the experiences of those who had already returned.

The assessment process: 1972 group

39. For the 1972 group, the situation was very different. UNHCR had been absent from the old settlements of Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba since 1985, and the first UNHCR/Government joint visit took place only in June 2007. Prior to the commencement of UNHCR-facilitated voluntary repatriation from the old settlements in April 2008, only a small number of the 1972 group had returned with UNHCR assistance (the 2007 JAM noted that some 4,000 refugees from 1972 had returned from the new camps, encountering problems arising from their lack of links with their home areas).

40. Nonetheless, an increasing number of spontaneous returns, coupled with a desire to achieve lasting solutions for this group, led to a decision by the Tripartite Commission to commission a study on the dimensions and profile of the 1972 population, with a view to developing a comprehensive solutions strategy including naturalization and (for those who desired it) voluntary repatriation. In the course of this study and a registration exercise, some 218,000 were registered, of whom 46,000 (a figure later revised upwards, to 55,000) expressed their desire to return to Burundi.

41. There was some suggestion in the course of the evaluation that the return of this group was not supported as whole-heartedly by donors as that of the 1993 group. There were some fears that the return process could become politicised in the run-up to the elections foreseen in 2010, and the occupation and illegal sale of land vacated by these refugees was viewed as a highly problematic and potentially destabilizing issue in the main areas of return in the south of the country.

42. There was real concern that promoting return could lead to suggestions that the international community was complicit in fuelling land disputes, and indeed, UNHCR's policy remained one of facilitation only. Some interviewees also noted that because these refugees had the choice of naturalization, they had a wider range of options than the 1993 group and thus investment in supporting return was less of a priority. On the other hand, the availability of the repatriation option was a key component of the comprehensive solutions strategy for this group, and underpinned the new openness of the Tanzanian government to local integration.

43. A study carried out in the old settlements and presented to the Tripartite Commission in December 2007 appeared to support the view that a more limited return package would be sufficient for this group. This study found that the old settlements were 'thriving agrarian communities'²⁰ and that 'These refugees, unlike

²⁰ SA3 (2007), 'Study of Tanzania's Old Settlements Hosting the 1972 Burundian Refugees', final draft, 7 December, p.2.

many camp-dwelling populations, have acquired a fuller range of life skills such as farming, trades and engagement in various life sustaining activities.²¹ Refugees in the old settlements were found to be 'materially and financially better off than the surrounding communities'²², and it was even feared that if they suddenly relocated elsewhere there could be immediate food shortages in the area.

44. While simultaneously noting the better situation of old settlement residents as compared with their 1993 counterparts and surrounding Tanzanians, the study also stated clearly (albeit not in the executive summary) that 'the 1972 refugees are seen as having poorer prospects for reintegration in Burundi than those who fled subsequent waves of violence in the mid-1990s'.²³

45. It highlighted three factors that might prove a hindrance: the length of time they had been out of Burundi, which gave rise to intermarriage and language differences; land issues, noting that it would be very difficult to recover land titles after being out of the country for 30 years²⁴; and the fact Tanzanian government policies of the 1970s had greatly contributed to the group's current prosperity. Indeed, these factors turned out to play a deciding role in this group's reintegration experiences.

46. There was however only limited analysis of the specific reintegration challenges this group was likely to face in Burundi, and the difficulties they were likely to encounter in re-establishing themselves after more than three decades in exile. Some 82% of those registered in the old settlements had been born in exile, and, located far from the border, they had largely lost touch with their home communities, were out of reach of Burundian radio, had been educated in the Tanzanian school system and sometimes spoke Kiswahili rather than Kirundi.

47. Most significantly, unlike the 1993 group, they had experienced the institutionalized deprivation of their land, which was frequently confiscated by the government or sold fraudulently by family members. Accordingly, many of the current occupants held official land titles, making it much harder to achieve settlements which allowed the 1972 group to recover their land whilst securing equitable outcomes for those who had remained.

48. Some returnees (the 'sans références') did not know where their families originated from. In a country where access to arable land is critical to survival, landlessness is a key marker of vulnerability. This consideration nonetheless appears not to have been taken into account in the initial design of the return package for this group, although support to address land issues was significantly reinforced as part of the broader reintegration programme, as described in paragraph 76 below.

49. The study recommended an increased baggage allowance for this group, cash assistance on a par with those choosing to naturalise, and coordination of repatriation with the timing of the agricultural season.²⁵ It did not make specific recommendations with regard to how the assistance package should compare to that

²¹ *ibid*, p.1.

²² *ibid*, p.3.

²³ *ibid*, p.7.

²⁴ *ibid*, p.7.

²⁵ SA3 (2007), 'Study of Tanzania's Old Settlements Hosting the 1972 Burundian Refugees', final draft, 7 December.

of the 1993 group, i.e. saying that they should receive more or less, or different kinds of assistance. Arguably, from the conclusion that their reintegration prospects were poorer than the 1993 group, it could have been assumed that more assistance would be required. It was nonetheless decided to give this group only the 50,000 Burundian Franc cash grant, on the assumption that they could monetise their crops and so did not need the food or NFI package.²⁶ In accordance with the recommendations of the study, provision was nonetheless made for a 100kg baggage allowance.

50. When determining the return package for returnees from the old settlements, UNHCR and others (such as the government, donors, and WFP) focused on the fact that this group was currently much better off than others in Tanzania and than the 1993 camp-based refugees. Lacking was a dynamic analysis of how this group might fare in a new, more resource-constrained context. The many challenges posed by the naturalisation option, which was chosen by almost 80% of Old Settlement residents, and the overall wealth of the 1972 refugees, may have distracted attention from such questions.

51. It became apparent from the beginning of the repatriation process that this group would need significantly more assistance than had hitherto been appreciated. Whilst many in the first convoys came with large amounts of luggage, particularly wood, furniture and bicycles, they had little food, having left in a period between harvests. The extent of the land-related problems also became apparent very quickly, and by the summer large numbers of returnee were being accommodated in transit centres and temporary accommodation centres, unable to return to their collines of origin.

52. Recommendations were made to slow down the pace of repatriation to give UNHCR time to catch up and to find solutions for those who had no land.²⁷ But less attention was focused on finding ways to immediately increase the assistance package to include food and NFIs.²⁸ As the deficiencies in the return package became apparent, it was nonetheless decided that the six-month food ration should be provided to vulnerable families.

53. By September, UNHCR had started to distribute a limited NFI package of mosquito nets and plastic sheets, and logistically difficult retrospective distributions were also undertaken. In the December 2008 Tripartite Commission meeting, by which time 30,500 1972 group refugees had returned, it was decided to extend the entire food and NFI package to refugees from the 1972 group returning after that date. At the same time, repatriation for this group was suspended until April 2009, to enable more comprehensive preparations for the next return season.

54. For the 1972 group, the assessment upon which the return package was based was arguably flawed. Whilst it is difficult to separate knowledge acquired in retrospect from evidence which was available at the time, it nonetheless appears that

²⁶ In an initial draft of the UNHCR Supplementary Budget for the 1972 group, both cash and NFIs were reportedly included in the return package; however, the NFIs were later removed, in part due to concerns over the large size of the budget.

²⁷ 'Donor mission to Tanzania and Burundi - 28 June-04 July 2008' (2008) mission report, p.2.

²⁸ A recommendation was made in the July 2008 donor mission report (see above reference), but it is the last one listed and is phrased hesitantly: 'Examine the possibility of providing the same return package to 1972 and 1993 returnees', whereas the others are more direct, e.g. 'Slow down the pace of the 1972 repatriation'.

insufficient consideration was given to evidence of the reintegration challenges 1972 refugees were likely to face when designing the return package. Whilst the assessment that these refugees had largely achieved self-reliance and had acquired assets in Tanzania was correct, the most critical asset in Burundi is one which is not moveable—land. Without this, 1972 returnees were destined to encounter serious problems in re-establishing livelihoods, given that non-agricultural options for making a living are very limited in Burundi. The smaller cash-only return package was to prove insufficient to provide the extensive bridging support needed by this group.

Programme design

55. The programme design was shaped by the 2007 concept note. A comprehensive registration (including photographs and biometric fingerprinting, using UNHCR's PROGRES software) had already been undertaken for the 1993 group prior to the introduction of cash grants, and was later also undertaken for the 1972 group. Those opting for return had their identity verified against the PROGRES database and were issued with a Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRF).

56. Returnees and their luggage were then transported by UNHCR (by truck from the camps, and by a combination of train and truck for the 1972 group) across the border to transit centres in Burundi, where returnee households received 20% of the total cash grant together with their NFI packages. UNHCR Burundi via its partners then provided onward transportation for returnees to their home 'commune', and returnees were expected to use the first part of the cash grant for transport to their final destination, usually a smaller 'colline' (meaning 'hill' in French).

57. The remaining 80% of the cash grant was then later withdrawn by the returnee from the local COOPEC branch all at once or over any number of instalments. It was hoped that returnees would be encouraged to retain their accounts and that some would avail themselves of opportunities for micro-finance available to COOPEC account-holders.

58. The accounts were in the name of the 'head of household', usually a man, but this could be changed at the family's request; a woman could also retrieve the money on behalf of her family if in possession of the head of household's identification card. With funding from UNHCR, a local NGO, Ligue Iteka, carried out extensive monitoring of the impact of the cash grant; UNHCR's frequent contact with returnees through other activities also allowed for additional oversight.

3. Impact on reintegration

Assessing impact

59. Assessment of the impact of the cash grant was facilitated by several factors. The timing of the evaluation, just under two years into the programme, was such that implementation was well under way. Both returnees who received the cash grant and those who did not could remember their experiences without difficulty. Many key UNHCR staff members were also still in-country. Second, unlike many other return contexts, the vast majority of returnees to Burundi have returned to rural settings, with remarkably little urbanisation occurring. Of 299 returnee households surveyed from the 1993 group, for example, just three had a family member who had moved to Bujumbura. Possible explanations for this include a lack of economic opportunities in other sectors and a cultural attachment to farming and rural life.

60. Several factors complicated the assessment of the impact of the cash grant. Unlike the ideal but usually infeasible set-up of randomised trials, the cash grants were given to all returnees at the same time. Comparisons between those who received the cash and those who did not must therefore take into account the fact that the latter group has been back in Burundi longer, and (presumably) were better reintegrated as a result.

61. As previously noted, unlike other contexts, cash grants were not used to substitute for other kinds of assistance, but as a way to increase the overall package. Furthermore, at around the same time, the food ration was significantly increased: from three to four months in April 2007, then again to six months in August 2007, meaning that almost everyone who received the cash grant also received a significantly larger food package than those who did not. Comparing the experiences of people is therefore a bit like comparing apples and oranges. It is essential to take into account the overall boost in the quantity of assistance, as well as changes in its quality.

62. A final complicating element is the difference in the return packages given to returnees from the 1972 group and those who fled in 1993. As already noted, from the start of the facilitated return of the 1972 group in March 2008, until December 2008, this group was given the cash grants but no food or non-food assistance.

63. In assessing the impact of the cash grant on the reintegration of this group, it is therefore important to take into account not only their differing socio-economic characteristics upon arrival in Burundi, but also the smaller return package they received, as compared with 1993 group returnees coming back at the same time. All of these factors point to the need, well expressed by the returnees themselves, not to look at cash in isolation, but as one part of an overall package.

A tool well-suited for return and reintegration

64. Nearly without exception, those interviewed—returnees, community members, Burundi government representatives, UNHCR and other aid agency staff—spoke very positively about the cash grant. A handful of people questioned

whether the amount was sufficient to make a difference, or lamented the fact that cash was not combined with other assistance (especially for the 1972 group), but still felt that the approach was a good one. The fact that one hundred percent of stakeholders expressed positive views towards the cash grant is a testament to how well the mechanism 'fits' the needs of people reintegrating into their country after a long absence. Among the 150 returnees surveyed from the 1993 group who received the cash, 78% said that it was the most valuable part of the return package.

65. As described above, the cash grant had two, inter-connected objectives: to encourage people to return and to help them successfully reintegrate once they did. The former is discussed in section 4 on 'Impact on decisions to return'. Because the impact of the cash grants in promoting reintegration differed considerably for the 1993 and the 1972 group, this report treats the two groups separately. This was also done to make full use of the data collected by the household survey, which covered the 1993 group only.

66. For both groups, the cash grant was designed to facilitate reintegration in two ways. First, to help meet immediate needs upon return, such as transport to one's home 'colline', complementary food, shelter, clothing, health care, school costs and contributions to host families. And second, to help people develop basic sustainable livelihoods, mainly through buying a small plot of land, seeds, fertilizer or other agricultural inputs.²⁹

67. Unlike the way cash has been used in some emergency contexts, it was not intended to give people a way to purchase their primary food supply, since returnees either received food rations (in the case of the 1993 group) or were presumed to be able to cover their basic food needs (the 1972 group). Rather, the cash was intended in part as way to protect the food and non-food items, by allowing families to have cash on hand to pay for additional basic needs, as well as longer-term investment.

68. To understand the impact of the cash grant, the most important question is what people purchased with the money they received.³⁰ Given that the cash grant was designed not only to help meet immediate needs but also to stimulate investment in livelihoods, it is necessary to find out whether people were indeed able to make longer-term purchases with the cash received. This in turn requires understanding whether the cash had to be used to access services, such as health care and education, or perhaps to cover debts.

69. All of this requires judging whether the amount received was sufficient, understanding how cash interacted with other forms of assistance, what role cash might have played in encouraging onward migration or return to Tanzania, and what other impacts it might have in terms of promoting dignity or increased flexibility. It also involves knowing whether the money was used for inappropriate or 'anti-social' uses, such as alcohol (although alcohol can sometimes serve a social purpose) or cigarettes. Gender issues and questions of broader social and economic impact are covered in Section 5 on 'Wider impact'.

²⁹ UNHCR (2007), 'Concept paper on cash grants for returning refugees to Burundi', June, p.4.

³⁰ See Annex VI for a summary of the survey data on how respondents spent the cash grant.

The 1993 group: livelihoods

70. For the 1993 group, the cash grant, in conjunction with other assistance, had a very positive impact in helping people to reintegrate. Returnees were able to use the cash not only to help meet basic needs but also to establish sustainable livelihoods, by buying seeds, tools, fertilisers, small plots of land and livestock, for example. This success was a function of the relatively sizeable amount of money given, as well as its complementarity with non-food and (increased) food assistance. In other words, the combination of in-kind and cash assistance was itself important, in addition to the overall volume of assistance.

71. While it is possible that broadly similar outcomes could have been achieved with only an increased food and NFI package (and no cash), returnees consistently expressed appreciation for the empowering effects of receiving a sizeable sum of cash all at once. Cash is also a much more efficient way to help returnees develop sustainable livelihoods, since no money is lost in the transaction of selling food or NFIs. The fact that extensive assessments of actual reintegration experiences were carried out beforehand helped to ensure that the return package was designed to meet these relevant needs.³¹

72. For most Burundians, access to at least some fertile land is crucial for achieving minimum food security. Focus groups and the household survey indicated that some form of all agriculture activity was one of the most common categories of spending. All 150 survey respondents who received the cash grant reported using it for at least one of the following: seeds or fertilisers (67% of all respondents) buying a plot of land (31%), renting a plot of land (27%), agricultural tools (17%) or labour for farming (15%).

73. A large number of focus group participants in Ruyigi province confirmed having bought small parcels of land. Prices for plots of land seemed to vary widely by region and it was not possible to determine the average price per hectare, but it is worth noting that the average plot size in Burundi is only 200 hectares.³² In addition, 15% of all respondents reported purchasing animals, such as goats or chickens--a sharp increase from the only 2% of returnees who reported bringing animals back with them from Tanzania. Focus group interviews confirmed that the cash grant was used for productive investments. As one woman in Ruyigi said, 'the money helped a lot, and it is still helping, because I bought things that are still being used.'

74. According to the household survey, those who returned after July 2007 (and received the cash grant) were significantly less likely to have access to land to farm (rented or owned) upon their return, compared with those who returned earlier: 17% of the non-cash group at first had no access to land, compared with 37% of the cash group. This could indicate that those with the strongest ties and livelihood prospects in Burundi were most likely to return first. But when asked if they had access to land

³¹ See for example, UNHCR-WFP (2007) 'UNHCR-WFP Joint assessment mission of Burundian refugees', 07-11 May 2007; UNHCR (2007) 'Enquete d'évaluation de la réintégration durable des rapatriés Burundais', Bujumbura, April; and UNHCR (2005) 'Rapport de mission evaluation du processus de réintégration au Burundi, 24 octobre - 19 décembre 2005'.

³² Institut de Statistiques et d'Etudes Economiques du Burundi (ISTEEBU), WFP, UNHCR and other agencies (2007), *Enquête d'évaluation de la réintégration durable des rapatriés Burundais*, Résultats Définitifs, Bujumbura, April, p.10.

now (at the time of the survey), 13% of the cash grant recipients stated that they were still without access, compared with 9% of the non-cash group—a 4% difference instead of a 20% one.³³ In other words, those who received the cash were still slightly less likely to own land, but they had made major strides to catch up with their counterparts who had returned earlier and did not receive the cash.

75. The cash grants seemed to have little impact on the type of livelihoods pursued. Echoing the heavy reliance on subsistence farming in Burundi, the vast majority of returnees surveyed (93%) said that agriculture was one of their two main sources of income. This percentage was the same for those who received the cash grant and those who did not. Other studies have shown that cash crops are common as a supplement to agriculture for consumption, but that not many households are able to engage in large-scale cash crops due to the high population density.³⁴

76. The evaluation did not specifically examine whether those who received the cash grant were more likely to grow cash crops. This seems unlikely, however, since (where it was used to buy land) the cash grant was mainly as a way for returnees to 'catch up' with receiving communities in terms of basic agricultural production. The second most common income source was day labour (usually working on someone else's field), engaged in by 44% of all respondents. Only 7% were engaged in small business as a main source of income, 7% in livestock, 3% in 'other' type of work, 2% in a trade (such as carpentry or tailoring) and 1% as salaried employees. The proportions among those who received the cash grant and those who did not were similar.

77. Although they were often able to be used for productive investments, the cash grants were spent relatively quickly on average. Most people took between one and three months to spend all the money. A moderately high inflation rate in Burundi (24.5% in 2008) may have prompted people to spend the cash grant more quickly.³⁵ Less than 20% said they took longer than that to spend it and less than 20% said they took less than one month.

78. A little over half (57%) of people surveyed reported taking out the money all at once; this contrasts slightly with FENACOBU staff, who estimated that around 80% of people took out all their money at once (no statistics had been collected). Interestingly, returnees voiced strong support for the '20-80' system whereby they received 20% at the transit centre and the rest upon returning to their commune. In addition to security benefits (discussed below), people said this gave them time to consider how to spend the money without the pressure of people asking for favours or loans.

79. The data revealed no obvious correlations between the month (season) in which the 1993 group returnees received the cash grants and the kinds of purchases they made. For example, it was not the case that those who returned in time for planting season were more likely to purchase seeds, tools or fertilisers, or that those who arrived later were more likely to purchase food. However, a larger dataset may have revealed trends that this data was not able to.

³³ Rounded numbers mean that differences do not add up perfectly.

³⁴ WFP (2004) *Burundi: Food security and vulnerability analysis report*, conducted in July-August, Rome, December, p.13.

³⁵ ISTEERU report, April 2009 cited in *Burundi's Q1 average inflation rises to 19.8%* Reuters, 30 April 2009.

80. Despite the generally productive uses to which the cash grant was put, returnees said it would have been helpful to have had more guidance on other options for investing the money, including help with organising in groups to obtain credit for livelihoods projects. Information provided to the refugees in Tanzania and upon their return to Burundi only covered the basics of the distribution procedures, and it is possible that more interactive types of sensitisation or organisation could have helped to maximise the use of the cash.

Shelter

81. Focus group discussions and the household survey indicated that shelter was another common type of expenditure for the 1993 group. All 150 survey respondents reporting spending at least some the money on shelter. Returnees bought material to construct a house, such as concrete, roofing material and bricks (37% of all respondents), paid for labour to help them construct a house (36%), bought a plot of land specifically for their house (26%), or paid rent or made a contribution to a host family (12%).

82. In this way, the cash grant proved to be a good complement to the UNHCR shelter programme, which has financed the construction of homes for over 70,000 families between 2002 and 2008, or around 70-80% of all returnees. The shelter programme provides technical assistance and some of the more expensive materials, including windows, doors, roofs and concrete, while returnees provide bricks and labour. In focus groups, returnees explained that they would sometimes build a small temporary house that could be later made into an adjoining kitchen, after they had received help from UNHCR to build their larger, permanent house. It is important for UNHCR to be aware that a significant amount of the cash grant seems to be being used to invest in shelter, alongside the agency's own direct contribution.

Food

83. Another common expenditure was food, with 69% of survey respondents reporting that they spent some of the money this way. Because the survey did not ask for a precise breakdown of how much was spent on each item, it is not possible to say whether this represents a small or a large proportion of total expenditure. However, over 30% of people receiving the cash grant reported not spending any money on food, whereas no respondents reported not spending any of the money on agriculture or shelter. In focus groups, returnees reported using the cash to buy complementary foodstuffs such as meat, fish, salt, palm oil (to replace or complement the vegetable oil in the food ration) and vegetables, or using it to pay for grinding the whole grain maize found in the food ration.

84. The cash clearly allowed more people not to have to sell their food ration: 28% of those who did not receive the cash reported selling all or part of their ration, compared with only 16% of those who received the cash. Returnees consistently reported that the cash helped 'protect' their food, keeping them from having to sell maize at exploitative prices, for example. When asked what things their household needed most upon return, the most common answer among both those who received the cash grant and those who did not was 'food'. However, 90% of the non-cash group reported needing food, compared with 77% of the cash group. Better meeting

the most basic need for sustenance seems to have freed people to concern themselves with higher needs: when those who received the cash reflect on their major needs during the first three months of return, 45% list 'clothing', compared with 33% of those who did not receive the cash. And 33% listed 'need to buy a field', compared with only 20% of the non-cash group. However, this last difference also likely reflects the fact that a larger proportion of the cash group did not have access to land upon arrival.

Access to services

85. Another important way to spend the cash was health care, with 19% of survey respondents spending money on this. Although efforts were underway to implement a commitment by the Burundian government to provide free care for returnees for 3 months after their return, and 6 months for those with a chronic condition, this has not been consistently applied, in particular from 2006 to late 2008 when international financing was not available. This commitment also does not apply to private clinics, which sometimes are the closest place of care. Since 2005, all children under five years old receive free care at public and church-based clinics, which presumably also helped to reduce the overall need for returnees to spend the cash grant on health care.

86. Only two people out of 150 (1%) reported spending the cash grant on school fees. Primary schooling is free for all Burundians, and there is a provision for waiver of secondary school fees for returnees for two years, although previous monitoring had suggested that this was not being consistently applied. This finding may therefore mean either that the waiver of secondary school fees is now working more effectively, or that returnees chose not to invest in education for adolescents. In focus groups, some people said the cash grants allowed them to pay for their children's uniforms or notebooks when there was a delay in the free distributions.³⁶

Other purchases

87. Only 1% of people reported buying 'furniture or kitchen items' with the cash, perhaps indicating that returnees brought some these things back with them or were able to get them from the non-food item package. Indeed, 94% of both cash and non-cash recipients reported bringing kitchen utensils back with them from Tanzania, though only 5% brought back furniture. From this, it can be surmised that furniture may not have been deemed a priority among competing needs.

88. Despite the fact that many returnees seem to have already owned kitchen utensils, there was unanimous appreciation in focus groups for the kitchen set ('casserole') and other non-food household items, such as buckets, floor mats and plastic sheeting (which plays a key role in setting up rudimentary housing). When asked if they would prefer the cash equivalent in lieu of the NFI, returnees resoundingly said no, because the items had value in and of themselves. They said

³⁶ School materials have been provided by UNICEF both in conjunction with and separately from the repatriation assistance program. See A. Telyukov and M. Paterson (2009), *Impact Evaluation of PRM Humanitarian Assistance to the Repatriation and Reintegration of Burundi Refugees*, Evaluation Report, Vol.1: The Zero-sum Game: Analyses, Findings and Conclusions of the Evaluation Study. Gaithersburg, MD: Terra P Group, Inc., p.173.

they would not necessarily have purchased the items otherwise, given longer-term priorities, and that in some cases items of the same quality were not available on the market. Women in particular said that the NFIs guaranteed that at least something of value remained, in the worst case scenario where an investment failed or a husband spent the money on alcohol. It should be noted that, in some contexts, cash has been found to be an effective alternative for NFI packages.³⁷ This was not the case in Burundi, but it should not be assumed that NFIs will be necessary in other contexts.

89. Despite the appreciation for NFIs, selling them remained quite common. People who received the cash grant were as likely as those who did not receive the cash to report selling all or part of their NFI kit. But the cash group was less likely to have sold 'more than half' of their NFIs: 7% did so, compared with 17% of the non-cash group. Perhaps the cash grant allowed people to sell only those items which they did not need.

90. Other purchases fell into a variety of categories: 29% of people reported spending some money on clothing, 10% on transport, and only 3% on social purposes, such as helping other people or paying for funerals, dowries or community taxes. The low number of people who reported spending any cash on transport is surprising, given that many interviewees and focus groups reported using the cash to move themselves or their belongings to the 'colline'. Earlier monitoring reports also identified this as a major purchase.³⁸

91. Given that the questionnaire consisted of an open-ended question of 'How did you spend the money?', it may be that people were more likely to remember the major purchases, and transport was omitted because it constituted a small percentage of the overall amount, a long time had passed, or simply because the purchase did not result in a tangible output. Lastly, it is worth noting that 15% of all respondents reported spending money on 'other' items, not captured by the survey categories.

Credit and debt

92. Only 1% of returnees surveyed from the 1993 group reported using the cash grant to pay off debts. Focus groups also did not mention this as a major use of cash. This finding is interesting given that 36% of those surveyed reported owing money, almost all of them to an individual as opposed to a microcredit institution. The median amount of money owed was 10,000 Burundian francs, or around \$8. Given that the average cash grant amount received per household was around 240,000 Burundian francs, it is unclear why people chose not to pay off their debts. Perhaps their creditors were back in Tanzania or in another part of Burundi and/or were not exerting pressure to repay.

93. Interestingly, those who received the cash grants were slightly more likely to owe money: 40% versus 32% for the non-cash group. It could be surmised that those who received the cash were more recently returned, and hence had more debt than those who had been established longer. However, in examining the group of 81

³⁷ P. Harvey (2007), *Cash-based responses in emergencies*, HPG Report 24, London: Overseas Development Institute.

³⁸ UNHCR (2008) 'Monitoring report: Impact and use of cash grants for returnees in Burundi', 1 April - 15 June, p.2.

people who returned in 2005 and 2006, there was no difference found in the percent who owed money in the earlier versus the later year. Another explanation could be that those who received the cash grant were generally less well-off to begin with—in line with the finding that they were less likely to have access to land upon their return—and hence more likely to be in debt. Or, from a more positive angle, the cash grants could have allowed people to re-enter credit markets and obtain informal loans, perhaps to enable large purchases such as parcels of land or livestock.

94. Obtaining microcredit was quite uncommon among returnees from the 1993 group, with only one person out of 299 surveyed reporting having borrowed money from a microcredit institution. Although FENACOBU and UNHCR hoped that returnees would be encouraged to take on microcredit loans after opening an account with COOPEC, very few did so. When asked why, over a third of survey respondents said they had never heard of the opportunity, indicating a need for more information and sensitisation. Others did not know how to do so, needed more information, or simply did not have a specific project in mind.

Migration and movement

95. Overall, very few returnees have returned to Tanzania or moved to Bujumbura. Among those surveyed, a slightly higher percentage of those who received the cash grant reported having relatives living separately: 16% versus 12% for the non-cash group. This could indicate that the cash allowed people to build houses to live apart, or it could reflect that people who have recently returned are more likely to have relatives who are still in Tanzania.

96. Despite the struggles faced by returnees, remarkably few people express the intention to leave Burundi or even their current location. Over 94% of returnees surveyed from the 1993 group indicate their intention to stay in their 'colline', and those who received the cash grant did not differ much from their non-cash counterparts in this regard. This was echoed in the focus group discussions, where returnees of all ages expressed a strong sense of identity and attachment to their home collines.

Experiences of the 1972 group

97. The lack of food and NFI assistance for the 1972 group and their complex profile (as described in Section 2) meant that the initial reinsertion process was substantially more difficult than for the 1993 group, and the impact of the cash grant upon reintegration was more limited. Focus groups and interviews with key informants revealed that the cash grant was largely spent on immediate essentials such as food, blankets, clothing, transport, health care and groceries, rather than longer-term investments.

98. A few were able to rent small parcels of land, or to pay the judicial fees necessary to recover their land. But on the whole, people felt frustrated that they were not able to take full advantage of the cash grant the way other returnees did. Many had taken a major step down in their standard of living by returning, some having had access to dozens of hectares of land in Tanzania, an almost unthinkable amount in densely populated Burundi.

99. They also claimed to have been given the impression by both the Burundian government and UNHCR that they would receive the same assistance as the 1993 returnees, and upon returning felt cheated. They stated that they had been informed by government representatives that they would receive houses and land. Interestingly, they compared their experience unfavourably with the many years of assistance their parents had received as refugees, and indeed, seemed to view themselves essentially as refugees in their own country.

100. Returnees from 1972 also had a harder time because of social factors. Having been gone over 30 years, most having been born in Tanzania, and not having listened to Burundian radio like the 1993 group, they retained few ties and were sometimes seen as 'outsiders'. Some children spoke only Swahili or English, making integration into the Burundian school system in Kirundi and French difficult. Their land had often been occupied, resulting in arbitration processes that sometimes provoked conflict with their neighbours.

101. In one area, residents threw stones at the returnees upon their arrival, saying they would steal their land, but tensions eventually tied down. Perhaps one inadvertently positive aspect of the smaller package given to the 1972 group was that other local residents were less likely to feel jealous and more likely to take pity on the returnees. At the same time, the influx of tens of thousands of people has undoubtedly caused strain, especially by overcrowding schools and reducing the amount of available land.

102. The commissioned study of the old settlements did not analyse the socio-economic characteristics of the group who decided to repatriate as compared with the whole. So it is possible that those with decreased economic prospects in Tanzania were more likely to opt for repatriation. However, when asked this question, returnees said that 'all kinds' of people, both rich and poor, had decided to repatriate, so it is unclear whether this kind of data collection would have made any difference. It seems more likely that their difficult experiences have been due mainly to their lack of land ownership in Burundi.

103. It should nonetheless be noted that UNHCR has engaged in extensive strategic work to address the complex land issues hindering the reintegration of the 1972 group. Technical expertise provided by UNHCR contributed to the development of a national land policy in September 2008, and a strategy paper on durable solutions for the landless through the creation of 'integrated rural villages' was approved on 4 August 2008 by the Integrated Commission for Return and Reintegration.

104. Four villages have been established since 2008, and construction of up to eleven further villages is envisaged in 2009. As part of this strategy, UNHCR is contributing to joint efforts by the Government and other UN agencies for the provision of shelter, access to agricultural land and livelihoods and basic services for landless families, most of whom are returnees from the 1972 group. UNHCR also provides support to NGOs conducting dispute resolution in areas of return, and to the Government's Land and Property Commission (Commission Nationale des Terres et Autres Biens, CNTB).

105. As such, the weaknesses of the return package have been to a large extent balanced by broader strategic engagement to address the problems of landlessness,

working with a range of other actors. The experiences of the 1972 group have also demonstrated that cash grants should not be seen as a panacea to address all needs. Even had the cash grant been supplemented from the beginning by the same food and NFI package as for the 1993 group, it is likely that the 1972 group would ultimately have found themselves facing the same complex challenges upon return, albeit equipped with more means to support themselves in the interim period as they struggled to find their feet.

Differences between the 1993 and 1972 groups

106. What is striking from the above is the variety not only among returnees in terms of types of expenditure with the cash grant, but also the variety within individual families. Each of the households surveyed reported purchasing an average of over four things, and it is likely that this number is actually higher, assuming that not all purchases were mentioned to the surveyor.

107. This flexibility is certainly one of the major benefits of the cash grant. The cash grant also promoted autonomy and dignity. Young men and women were sometimes given their portion of the cash to use at their discretion, which could allow them to move out of their parents' house, for example. The cash sometimes promoted dignity in smaller ways, such as allowing parents to buy their children new foods that are common in Burundi, like sweet potatoes or kolokaze.

108. For the 1993 group in the provinces surveyed (Ruyigi and Muyinga), the amount of the cash grant seems to have been broadly sufficient. Recipients were able not just to cover basic needs but also to make longer-term productive investments. Returnees surveyed reported earning an average cash income of only around 9,000 Burundian francs per month, or \$8, and the overwhelming majority had brought no cash with them from Tanzania. This means that the cash grant, at an average of 233,000 Burundian francs per family, represented a sizeable injection of income, around 26 times their monthly cash income. On the other hand, it was not enough to provoke significant tensions with long-time residents, as described in the sub-section headed 'Social and economic impact' below.

109. It seems that prices may differ significantly in some provinces, however, particularly for crucial purchases such as land, animals and bricks. In Makamba, some returnees from the 1972 group felt that they would not have been able to purchase land even had they received the food and NFI rations. The need to purchase (rather than make) bricks in some parts of Makamba also seemed to be a major impediment to receiving shelter assistance. Inflation (as previously discussed) may have also contributed to poorer outcomes of the 1972 group, since this group started returning seven months after the cash grants were first introduced. The devaluation of the Burundian Franc also depreciated the overall value of the grant, from \$46 at its inception to \$41 as of May 2009.

110. While most people surveyed reported being able to find everything they needed on the local markets, a sizeable percentage (33%) was not satisfied. This is true for some communes more than others: only one person out of 55 was unsatisfied in Cendajuru and Gitega communes, compared with 35 out of 53 people in Gisuru and Busoni communes. Focus groups were only conducted in areas where the markets were functioning well, so there could be pockets where certain items are not

available. It can be surmised that this was not a major dissatisfaction, however, since the same people who reported not being able to find everything on the local market also said that the return packet helped them to restart their life: all 54 people in Gisuru and Busoni communes replied 'yes' to this question. Nonetheless, it may be useful to gather additional monitoring data on this question.

111. Two major factors played a role in the success of the cash grant among the 1993 returnees. First, almost everyone from the 1993 group who received the cash grant also received a NFI package and a 6-month food ration. This complemented the cash grant in crucial ways, in a sense 'protecting' the cash from having to be spent only on immediate needs like food and basic household items. Second, due both to their proximity to the border and the shorter time that had passed, the 1993 group maintained more social and economic ties with Burundi. They still spoke Kirundi, some of them travelled back and forth, and they were more likely to be able to access their land. Lacking the economic and social ties and not receiving as much assistance, the 1972 group faced double obstacles to reintegration, as discussed above.

Conclusions

112. The cash grant had a very positive impact on the reintegration of approximately 145,000 returnees—from all years—who have come back from Tanzania between July 2007 and mid June 2009. Most, around 105,000 from the 1993 group, benefited from a sufficient package of food and non-food items that allowed them to use the cash for productive investments in long-term livelihoods, such as agriculture or livestock.

113. The cash proved to be a critical ingredient in an overall package, but—as reflected in the experience of approximately 30,000 returnees from the 1972 group who returned during 2008—it was not sufficient by itself. The 50,000 Burundian francs per person given to the 1972 group was not enough to enable them to restart their livelihoods, and many are still struggling to get by on a daily basis.

114. For those who received it as part of a broader return package, the cash grant was cited as the most important component. Seventy-eight percent of the cash grant recipients surveyed stated this, as opposed to 17% who saw food as the most important part. None of the cash grant recipients cited NFIs as most important. For the non-cash group, 70% cited food as most important, 10% the NFIs, and 19% shelter. Only 1% of the cash grant recipients saw shelter as most important, possibly owing to the fact that as more recent returnees, they may not yet have received shelter assistance.

115. Returnees nonetheless emphasised in the focus group discussions that whilst cash was the most important component, the food and NFIs were also extremely valuable to them. When asked if they would prefer to have had the NFIs and food substituted by cash of equal value, the answer was a resounding 'no'. The items distributed were seen as useful and of a higher quality than might be locally available, and the food was also viewed as an essential commodity, as can be seen by the relatively low proportion of the food package reported as being sold. Returnees were firmly of the view that the most effective return package was a balanced one, incorporating a range of components, and that the package should be seen as a whole, and not as consisting of 'core' and 'non-core' items.

4. Impact on decisions to return

116. Encouraging refugees from the 1993 group to decide to return home was a key aim of the cash grants. As described above, the Tanzanian government was concerned at the slowing pace of repatriation and UNHCR sought to show that it was taking serious action. Within UNHCR, this second aim is sometimes downplayed in favour of emphasising its importance for reintegration, but other national and international actors widely acknowledge that increasing the pace of return was also an important objective, if not the primary one. The two aims are not exclusive, of course, but are linked, in that people who are able to reintegrate well are more likely to encourage their peers back in Tanzania to also make the leap.

117. Instituting a cash grant to encourage returns is nonetheless not without dilemmas. 'Incentivising return' can all too quickly become 'purchasing return' if it generates return movements when broader conditions are not conducive to return, and particularly where it is combined with pressure in the country of asylum. Nonetheless, incentivising return, in the sense of tipping the balance in individual decision-making, is in itself is not inherently wrong, provided that the incentive it provides is an effective component of a broader strategy to address genuine reintegration needs.

118. It has been usefully noted that incentives for refugees to remain in Tanzania also existed, in the form of continued assistance with food, health and education, for example, in the camps. And several extensive assessments had shown that the type and level of repatriation assistance being provided to returnees was not really sufficient. In any voluntary decision, people have a range of options and incentives to consider. The goal should be to make sure that people who do choose to return are able to do so with the dignity afforded by an adequate cushion of support.

119. The introduction of the cash grant was widely perceived to have stimulated increases in return figures. Its introduction in July 2007 coincided with a significant increase in the number of returns, but this is widely acknowledged to have been mostly seasonal, as people prefer to return in June, July and August. At this time, school has finished, crops have been harvested and the dry season has begun, allowing for the construction of houses.

120. The announcement that secondary schools in the camps would not re-open in September 2007 is also likely to have had an impact on returns during this period. The much higher number of returnees in 2008 overall as compared with 2007, however, is widely viewed as being caused at least in part by the cash grant. Whereas around 40,000 Burundians returned in 2007, around 95,000 did so in 2008, a 139% increase. The repatriation of the 1972 group, beginning in March 2008, was a major contribution to this upsurge, however. If one looks at 1993 group alone, the increase was have been 65%--still sizeable, but not as large.

121. The household survey and focus group interviews indicate that people decide to repatriate when they do based on a number of factors. Undoubtedly, the overarching reason is the return of peace and security in Burundi. Over three quarters of surveyed 1993 group returnees mentioned this when asked why they

came back, a finding which was echoed in focus groups. But many other factors also played a role: the sensitisation of the Burundian authorities and 'go and see' and 'come and talk' visits; the closure of the camps, reduction of services and limitations on movement or harassment by the Tanzanian authorities; and the influence of friends and family.

122. Poor weather led to droughts in parts of Burundi in 2005 and 2006, which likely contributed in part to people's reluctance to return in 2006 and 2007. There may also be a kind of 'tipping point' phenomenon whereby people decide to go when it seems clear that is what everyone (or nearly everyone) is doing so. Other people were likely influenced by purely personal factors. Over ten percent of survey respondents mentioned that 'other' reasons impacted their decision, perhaps reflecting this.

123. Where does the cash grant fall within all of these factors? In two separate focus groups, respondents laughed at the question of whether they decided to return in part because of the cash grant. This may have been an attempt to show visitors from UNHCR that the amount given was really not sufficient, in hopes of securing more assistance in the future.

124. But it also seems to speak to the complexity of the return decisions and the humour of imagining that such a decision could be made for some Burundian francs, even if a relatively significant sum. That said, just a third of survey respondents from the 1993 group admitted to being influenced at least in part by the cash grant in deciding when to return. Several respondents suggested that the cash may have played a more important role for larger families, for whom the cash grant represented a more sizeable sum.

125. Returnees from the 1972 and 1993 groups differed in their motivations for returning. In focus groups, both sets of returnees emphasised the desire to break with the refugee status and reclaim their Burundian citizenship. For the 1993 group in particular, this was exacerbated by experiences of increasing prejudice and restrictions on freedom in Tanzania. The 1993 group was also more likely to mention the improved security conditions in Burundi as a main reason.

126. By contrast, the 1972 group was more motivated by what they claimed were unfulfilled promises of assistance made by the Burundian authorities and UNHCR. Several groups mentioned a proverb offered up by Burundian government representatives to the effect of, 'The cow that comes to the water source first, drinks the pure, clean water.' Burundi government officials, they said, told them they would have a house and would be able to regain their land.

127. There is certainly some evidence that messages regarding assistance given by government representatives visiting the settlements in the early days of the process were over-zealous, and in some instances misleading, and many 1972 refugees who returned in the early phases of the operation expected to receive a much more extensive food and NFI package, as well as land and shelter. A donor mission in June-July 2008 noted that refugees from this group seem 'to receive

information from different sources (sometimes contradictory), and... to be under the wrong impression that they will receive extensive assistance in Burundi.’³⁹

128. Whilst these messages were later counteracted as information filtered back to the settlements from those who had returned, this was too late for many in the 1972 group, who had not benefited from the same level of ongoing contact with Burundi and access to information on conditions in return areas as the 1993 group. One focus group said that if they had been aware of the true level of assistance that would be provided, they still would have come back, but they would have delayed a bit longer in order to prepare themselves.

129. The cash grants were conceived of as a ‘temporary time-bound incentive’.⁴⁰ Pamphlets and information were distributed by UNHCR to this effect. But if cash is an appropriate and highly effective part of an overall return package, which this evaluation concludes, should some returnees benefit and not others? Differing packages were found to be the source of tensions between groups of returnees, particularly those who returned earlier (and did not receive the cash) and those who returned later (and did). Should cash grants have been introduced earlier, perhaps with the beginning of facilitated returns in 2002, or the start of promotion in 2006?

130. Some have expressed the fear that UNHCR could be put in a difficult position if security problems arose after they had given incentives to return. But others have more convincingly pointed out that the grants should not primarily be considered as an incentive, but rather as a key component of an appropriate return package. From this perspective, cash is not really that different from other forms of assistance, and should be introduced (when possible given security and logistical constraints) alongside other forms of in-kind assistance.

131. It was announced earlier this year in Mtabila, the remaining camp in Tanzania hosting mostly 1993 refugees, that only those who registered to return by 30 April 2009 would be eligible for the cash grants. Interestingly, the announcement did not result in a rush of registrations, as anticipated, which is in itself indicative that cash alone is not determinative in shaping decisions to return. The deadline has passed, and the grants have been quietly continued. Although a practical balance will have to be struck, with the grants eventually ending at some point, it would seem wise not to prevent the latest round of returnees from benefiting from an appropriate assistance package which includes cash.

³⁹ ‘Donor mission to Tanzania and Burundi – 28 June-04 July 2008’, mission report, p.2.

⁴⁰ UNHCR (2007) ‘Concept paper on cash grants for returning refugees to Burundi’, June, p.2.

5. Wider impact

Social and economic impact

132. The relations between returnees and the receiving community were generally reported to be good. Some local residents reported that returnees had brought new skills, such as irrigation techniques for vegetables, methods for cultivation on steep slopes, and petty commerce. Residents, many of whom had family members who had been refugees, were in general positive about the returnee presence.

133. There was little evidence of any increase in social tensions or any negative impact on relations with receiving communities as a result of the cash grant. Any pressures (such as the number of children in classrooms) appear to result from the presence of higher numbers of people rather than the cash grant. In the evaluation survey, only 9% reported some community or social tensions as a result.

134. A number of interviewees in fact stated that cash had a positive impact, smoothening relations with host families and enabling returnees to avoid becoming a drain on the resources of their relatives and communities. Some returnees were able to move on from host families more quickly as a result of the cash, thus avoiding overstaying their welcome. By enabling the purchase of transport from the commune to the colline, it has also helped avoid the pressure on communities occasioned by returnees being forced to remain in the commune until they had marshalled the resources for their onward travel.

135. It was reported that the system of distribution through COOPEC, by enabling the money to be withdrawn in stages and thus making it less visible, helped to limit jealousy as well as reducing pressure on the returnees to share their cash. One interviewee pointed out that when food or NFIs are sold on the market, this is much more visible, and everyone in the community is aware that the vendor has cash. Some envy was nonetheless reported, and some returnees reported receiving pressure from the chef de colline for a 'pot of wine' in order to be proposed for shelter assistance.

136. The cash was also generally seen as having brought benefits to the broader community, for example, where it was used to pay for labour to clear a field. Traders cited the benefits of having more money circulating in the market, and reported that their daily income had increased markedly after the cash grant was introduced. They pointed out that this had a trickle-down effect, as they in turn had more money to spend on commodities and labour.

137. Some interviewees, including a group of chefs de collines in Ruyigi Province reported that the cash grant had a positive impact in avoiding conflict, especially around land. It also enabled families to support themselves while the CNTB was examining their cases. In enabling some returnees to buy land, it has also diffused conflict and enabled solutions to be found, for example in cases where a family member had sold the land of a returnee.

138. Some frustration and resentment was nonetheless expressed by returnees who had returned prior to July 2007, and therefore did not receive the cash grant, and also by spontaneous returnees and deportees (who continue to receive the food and NFI package only). One interviewee described spontaneous returnees (of whom he was one) as 'the victims of the cash grant' as not only did he not receive it, but he also experienced the resultant price rises. However, the frustration expressed appeared to be directed more at UNHCR than the cash grant recipients.

139. There was some anecdotal evidence of price rises linked to higher demand and more money on market. Fish, mattresses and bananas were just some of the commodities reported to have increased significantly in price, however in the absence of a price monitoring system in returnee areas, this is difficult to confirm. Prices rises should also be viewed against a backdrop of an increase in annual inflation in Burundi to 24.5% in 2008, up from 8.3% in 2007, owing to high crude oil and commodity prices.⁴¹

140. It nonetheless appears that there were particular increases in the price of animals such as goats, which are seen by returnees as a form of savings, whilst in the meantime providing fertiliser. In one location, the price of goats was reported to have doubled. Increases in land process were also reported (estimates ranged from increases of 20% to 100%), with some returnees believing that this was a deliberate tactic as the vendors were aware that they had access to capital.

141. The experiences of 1972 returnees were however somewhat more complex. Some reported that there had been real suspicion of the 1972 returnees, who were seen essentially as foreigners, and even referred to as 'sorciers' (witches, a phenomenon associated with Tanzania). One interviewee suggested that more preparatory work should have been done with receiving communities in Makamba, where fears that the 1972 returnee would try to take their land and homes were circulating.

142. One group of 1972 returnees reported that on their first night, stones were thrown at the temporary shelter were they were sleeping. There were also reports that the limited return package for the 1972 group, and in particular the absence of food, created something of a burden on the local community. Nonetheless, these tensions should not be overstated and in general it appeared that relations between the 1972 returnees and other community members were also relatively good.

Impact on gender relations

143. The April 2007 concept note stated that 'to the extent possible' women would be 'designated as administrators of the cash grant'. However, the default model eventually implemented was that the account would be placed in the name of the head of household, although a spouse or adult child could also withdraw the cash at the COOPEC office provided that he/she was in possession of the account passbook. In Ruyigi it was reported that there was a system by which agreement could be reached at the transit centre that the account would be opened in the name of a wife or adult child, but this appeared to be used primarily in cases where the head of household was disabled or otherwise incapacitated. Female heads of household

⁴¹ ISTEERU report, April 2009 cited in *Burundi's Q1 average inflation rises to 19.8%* Reuters, 30 April 2009.

reported no particular difficulties in opening the account in their own names or accessing the cash.

144. In general, both men and women reported that decisions on how the cash would be spent were made either by the husband (42% of survey respondents reported this) or jointly (37%). Interviewees (including women) were divided on whether the account should be placed in the name of a female spouse, or at least co-managed. There were a small number of anecdotal cases of men who had spent all the cash on alcohol, and some reports of men in polygamous marriages who had abandoned wives they had married in exile.

145. In general, however, women interviewed reported that such behaviour and disputes in general within families largely pre-dated the cash grant, or were not caused by it. The evaluators nonetheless concluded that it would be more appropriate to formalize the co-management of the cash grant by having both spouses formally listed as account holders, albeit that either should be able to withdraw the cash.

146. Some returnee women highlighted that the NFI and food components of the return package played an important role in providing assistance direct to women and children. It was pointed out that items such as clothing, kitchen sets, sleeping mats, blankets and food are of direct benefit to all family members, and that it is unlikely that all would be prioritized for purchase if all assistance was given in cash.

6. Efficiency, effectiveness and monitoring

Distribution procedures

147. The existence of an experienced micro-lending institution with branches throughout Burundi—the National Federation of Cooperatives in Burundi (FENACOBU)—was a critical factor in the success of the cash grant programme. In a country of only 28,000 square kilometres, FENACOBU has 86 branches and is experienced in securely moving even small amounts of money and stayed operational throughout the war.

148. One UNHCR staff member estimated that '80% of the success of the cash grant programme was due to FENACOBU'. At the early stages of the project, when FENACOBU asked to charge interest on money it had advanced for the project, UNHCR briefly considered other implementing partners, including NGOs. It concluded that none could have set up a similar operation as quickly, safely and cheaply.

149. Returnees were generally able to obtain the remaining 80% of the cash grant within two weeks of arriving in their home commune. A few problems were reported, but these were not major or systemic, and they were usually resolved through intervention by Ligue Iteka, UNHCR or COOPEC agents themselves.

150. These included returnees having to wait up to one month to receive their cash when it had to be transferred to another province (e.g. when a person decided to go to a different province or had come via Makamba and wanted to go up north); returnees arriving at the wrong COOPEC branch and having to be directed to the correct one; and limited liquidity in at least one branch meaning that returnees could only withdraw part of their funds for a few weeks. Among the 1993 group, 91% said they did not have any problems with the disbursement. Focus groups with 1972 group returnees did not reveal any major problems.

151. Given COOPEC's good coverage throughout Burundi, transport times to the closest branch were generally not onerous. Returnees with whom the evaluation team spoke in Ruyigi and Makamba did not raise this as a problem; however, it should be noted that the areas visited were not the most remote ones. Ligue Iteka monitors in Ruyigi did identify several communes where no COOPEC office was present, meaning that the nearest branch was up to 50 kilometres away.

152. The household survey for this evaluation did not specifically ask how long people had to travel or how much they had to pay to get to the COOPEC branch. However, 91% of people surveyed said they had no problem with the distribution process, with only 2% saying they had an 'other' problem which could have been transportation.

153. Ligue Iteka did ask in the course of its monitoring how long people had to travel to get to COOPEC, and the data seem to indicate that as of June 2008 the most common travel time was between 1-2 hours, with around 11% having to travel

between 5 and 24 hours.⁴² A joint WFP-UNHCR report suggested up to one-third of households may have had to travel long distances to receive the cash grant, but was imprecise on what constituted a 'long distance'. It also found that some returnees had to pay 3,600 Burundian francs (\$3) in travel costs, which if true on a wide scale could explain why people tended to take out their cash in only one or two instalments.⁴³

154. Special procedures were put in place for unaccompanied minors. A UNHCR partner, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), individually followed up with each minor to ensure that he or she was reunited with their family (or placed in another appropriate setting), providing transportation for the minor all the way to the 'colline' as needed. At this point, the entire 100% of the amount allocated for the child was transferred to the family's account. This approach appeared to work well, with no major problems reported.

155. COOPEC charged fees to each returnee household account, identical to those for other cooperative members. These fees were in addition to bank fees charged to UNHCR as part of the project overhead (see 'cost effectiveness' sub-section below). If a household withdrew all of their money in the same calendar year as they returned, these fees should have been 6,600 Burundian francs. This consisted of a 2,000 deposit to become a cooperative member, a 2,000 cost to purchase a deposit book ('carnet'), a 200 cost to purchase an account sheet ('fiche'), and a 2,400 annual fee.⁴⁴

156. Thus for an average household of 5 people, the total amount received should be 48,680 per person, or around \$41 at current exchange rates. An individual returning on his or her own would receive \$36.50. Information distributed by UNHCR and its partners, however, usually referred to the amount as 50,000 Burundian francs, with only some mentions of the 6,600 in fees. One leaflet erroneously referred to a 2,400 closing fee in addition to the 6,600 in fees. Several returnees from the 1972 group also mistakenly thought they would receive \$50, not 50,000 Burundian francs.

157. In the household survey and the focus groups, returnees generally said they had few problems receiving their cash grant. This is a truly impressive achievement. The fees were a source of some confusion, however, and the fact that they were not more carefully and consistently explained to returnees may have contributed to some instances where greater fees seem to have been charged by COOPEC agents.

158. Ligue Iteka monitors told the team of a few instances where COOPEC agents had charged additional fees or solicited personal payments, such as in Gisuru where around 50 households were affected. Ligue Iteka was able to intervene and ensure that the problems were remedied; however it is unclear whether this problem was ever raised formally with FENACOBU senior management and it appears that that none of the agents concerned were formally sanctioned for these incidents.

⁴² There are, however, some questions regarding the reliability of this data (see paragraph 123).

⁴³ UNHCR and WFP, 'Rapport d'évaluation des distributions du paquet retour et du cash grant au repatriés', mission conjoint, June 2008, p.7.

⁴⁴ There is also a minimum balance requirement of 2,400 and a 2,000 account closing fee, but the latter is recovered from the 2,000 membership deposit.

159. Data from the household survey further raises questions about the scale of problems with inconsistent fees. One question asked how much returnees had received, and from their answer it was possible to calculate the likely fee levied. Just under half of the people seem to have been charged the correct fee, 6,600 Burundian francs. But 25% of those surveyed seem to have been charged 9,000 francs. Whilst this may have been due to the account being maintained over a period spanning two calendar years (and so resulting in an additional year's annual fee), this seems unlikely to account for the relatively large percentage of recipients concerned.

160. Around 12% seemed to have been charged 10,000 francs, while another 10% seem to have been charged a different amount over 6,600; 8% also reported being charged fees of less than 6,600 francs. It seems difficult to imagine why so many returnees would misremember such a precise number and it appears that incorrect (and usually higher) fees were charged in a sizeable number of cases, at least in the six communes examined. Greater clarity and consistency of messaging around the total amount one can expect to receive would probably help prevent this type of incident.

Security

161. Contrary to initial fears, remarkably few security incidents associated with the cash grants took place. The short trial phase at the outset of the programme helped to allay such concerns. The greatest credit for the lack of violence should be given to Burundians themselves, who have welcomed back tens of thousands of their compatriots with remarkable patience and peacefulness.

162. Two aspects of the distribution process also played a key role: the 20-80 split and the use of COOPEC branches. Because returnees only had 20% of the total cash amount upon return to their 'colline' (some of which would have been used up for transport and other purchases), they were less attractive to thieves. And the timing of when they received their next segment, and how much they received, was entirely at their discretion. The COOPEC branches tend to be well-integrated into local towns, and returnees could mix in with other customers—although the presence of large waves of returnees during periods of high return was likely quite conspicuous.

163. The previous experience of COOPEC in money transfers in insecure environments, as well as their use of police and military guards at branches in some areas (paid for by UNHCR), seems to have played a useful and appropriate role, although the evaluation did not look at this aspect in detail. It certainly seems possible that security incidents would have been more likely had the money been distributed by an aid agency with less experience in handling cash.

Recycling and corruption

164. Very few instances of returnees seeking to get another cash grant ('recycling') were reported. This was attributed to the thorough registration that was done in the camps for the 1993 group and eventually in the old settlements for the 1972 group. It is not possible to say to what extent the use of biometric data may

have played a role in preventing recycling, but it is perceived by many UNHCR staff to have made a positive contribution in this regard.⁴⁵

165. Although cash can sometimes be more prone to 'skimming' by elites, other kinds of diversion and corruption at the procurement and transport stage do not exist with cash as they do with in-kind assistance.⁴⁶ Overall, corruption was not found to be a major problem observed in the distribution of the cash grants in Burundi.

166. For the very few such incidents that were identified, the active role played by Ligue Iteka monitors in this regard was a positive mechanism to help address these. While (as discussed above) the household survey data indicated that higher fees may have been charged in some cases, this does not necessarily indicate corruption on the part of those responsible for the distribution. Rather, it points to the need for greater clarity within the relevant organisations regarding the exact fees to be charged, as well as consistent external messaging to beneficiaries.

Monitoring

167. The cash grant programme benefited from extensive monitoring by Ligue Iteka, a Burundian NGO funded by and working closely with UNHCR. From the outset, a well-designed two-page questionnaire on the cash grant was added on to existing monitoring which covered protection and overall reintegration issues. With eventually 26 full-time monitors on motorbike, together covering all of the major areas of return, Ligue Iteka was able to achieve truly impressive coverage, interviewing 14,000 returnee households in 2008. The one important area omitted by the survey was information on the availability and prices of key goods (and whether the cash grants had an impact on these at a local level). It would be useful to include this in monitoring programmes in future cash grant operations.

168. Ligue Iteka monitors actively follow up on individual cases within their area, involving UNHCR as necessary. As described above, this played a key role in quickly resolving any distribution problems with the cash grant, as well as other problems. They are also able to inform UNHCR of any disturbing trends that require attention, doing so through Ligue Iteka coordinators based in the three major UNHCR offices of Muyinga, Ruyigi and Makamba.

169. Most insight regarding overall trends, however, has been gleaned from information shared orally from field monitors, or from manually looking through the paper forms. What has so far been missing is any reliable electronic analysis of the extensive data collected from the thousands of households interviewed. Problems with the data seem to be both substantive and systemic. Substantively, the data seen by the evaluation team contained inconsistencies which suggested that either many Ligue Iteka monitors have been not filling in large portions of the questionnaires or the data inputting or outputting mechanism is not be functioning properly. For example, some questions seem to have been answered by only a few dozen respondents while others were answered by hundreds. It is not clear why some

⁴⁵ An assessment of the use of biometrics in UNHCR field operations was commissioned by DOS in 2008 (forthcoming). See also note 18 above.

⁴⁶ P.Harvey, *Cash-based responses in emergencies*, Humanitarian Policy Group report 24, London: Overseas Development Institute, p.5.

questions would be answered so much less frequently than others. Portions of individual subsets of questions also appear to be much less frequently answered in a way that is not logical.⁴⁷ These inconsistencies make it difficult to draw conclusions from the data with any confidence.

170. There are also systemic issues concerning how often and with whom the data is shared. Until April 2009, Ligue Iteka and UNHCR staff based in the field offices could not analyse the data themselves, but relied on a Bujumbura-based UNHCR database manager to do so. Additional problems with the functioning of the database have at times delayed this reporting for several months (e.g. Ligue Iteka in Ruyigi reported that they could not access the data from January to May 2009). Those charged with analysing the data have also struggled to make sense of it, for the reasons described.

171. As of mid-May 2009, Ligue Iteka staff in Makamba were able to output the data themselves (albeit with the same puzzling inconsistencies), a positive development. But the protection and cash grant monitoring database remains a powerful tool for understanding reintegration trends that has yet to be fully tapped into. Such information could be used in real-time to adjust programming and policy, and might, for example, have provided the evidence base to support earlier advocacy in support of changes to the assistance package following the reintegration problems experienced by the 1972 group.

Cost effectiveness

172. The evaluation sought to gauge the cost effectiveness of the cash grants as compared with other interventions, such as food and non-food item distributions. However, one important conclusion of the evaluation is that each component of the return package played a unique and important role, and it would not have been advisable to substitute one for the other. Thus, comparisons of cost effectiveness should be handled carefully.

173. The goal of a cost effectiveness analysis is to compare the prices of goods and services purchased in local markets compared to the cost for an aid agency to deliver similar items. With cash, it is of course not possible to control what people purchase. It is also not easy to predict what people will buy, or even to measure this after the fact. In some contexts, particularly during droughts or other emergencies, cash is used primarily as a substitute for food. In these cases it is possible to compare the costs incurred to the agency delivering the items to those incurred by the beneficiaries using cash. However, in Burundi, the cash was specifically designed to allow people to purchase a range of goods, particularly for those from the 1993 group who also received NFIs and monthly food rations.

⁴⁷ For some individual questions, there is data for part of the question but not others. For example, question 5.1 asks how people spent the cash grant and gives them seven options to choose from: transport, bought land, rented land, etc. On the data output sheet, each possible answer is divided into 'yes' and 'no'. But whereas (for one sample) 391 people said 'yes' to transport and '97' people said no, making 488 total responses, for the 'bought land' subset of the question, only 181 total responses were recorded. Thus it seems that data is either being inputted or outputted incorrectly. It is not clear how someone could have answered only part of this question, since as long as at least one response is ticked, blank boxes should be interpreted as 'no'.

174. Given the incredible range and diversity of items purchased, including difficult-to-distribute goods like land, it is clear that it would have likely been impossible for an aid agency to deliver the same items, and certainly impossible to do so in the proportion required (or desired) for each individual. The nimbleness of cash is one of its central advantages.

175. It is still very much possible – and necessary – to delineate the costs of the cash grant programme, however, and to compare this roughly with the costs of delivering the NFIs. This can be done by looking at overhead and transport costs and the overall scale of the programme. Exchange rates, inflation, price changes, and other costs to recipients have all been covered in previous sections.

176. As a portion of the overall budget, overhead costs for the cash grant programme (represented by charges paid directly from UNHCR to FENACOBU) constituted only 2.3% for 2008 and 3.5% for 2009. Adding in the fees that the returnees paid themselves, this percentage is 4.9% for 2008 and 6% for 2009. These are low percentages, given that most international NGOs would generally require at least 7% for headquarters-based overheads alone (not including country-level staff and administrative expenses).

177. Overhead costs for FENACOBU included some FENACOBU salaries as well as bank fees (the two largest expenses), diesel, security services, office furniture, vehicle maintenance, and other transport costs. In 2008, these costs amounted to just \$65,000 to pay for the distribution of \$2.8 million in cash. By contrast, transport alone for NFIs is estimated to at 15% in 2009. This does not include additional overhead costs for NFIs including storage, security, staff costs, or costs connected to procurement.

178. As noted above, returnees clearly appreciated having the food and NFIs in addition to the cash grants, and said that even if an equivalent amount of cash was substituted, they would have preferred to keep their food and NFIs. But what if an even greater amount of cash was provided? This question was not asked. It is worth noting, however, that it would be necessary to conduct a more detailed analysis of the cost of each item on the local versus international market, taking into account any savings by UNHCR from negotiating prices or buying in bulk.

179. UNHCR currently pays just \$2 for a bucket and \$10 for a unit of plastic sheeting, for example, prices which would likely be much higher for an individual returnee. It may also not be possible for returnees to obtain the same quality items and there could be intrinsic benefits to distributing in-kind goods that outweigh even the higher costs. This question needs further exploration.

180. It was outside the scope of this study to analyse the potential costs (to beneficiaries and aid agencies) or appropriateness of substituting additional cash for food. If food security continues to be a major problem in Burundi, both for returnees and the general population, the government could explore the possibility of predictable cash-based mechanisms to help the most vulnerable people or to helping people respond to shocks (i.e. social protection programmes), while at the same time taking steps to boost local production. If this were pursued, the lessons gathered here could prove useful.

181. The overhead charged by FENACOBU also included around 200 Burundian francs (\$0.16) per recipient in 'bank fees', or around \$10,600 total for 2008. These were in addition to the fees of 6,600 Burundian francs per household, paid directly by the returnees themselves. It was not clear to the evaluation team why two separate fees were necessary. Thus FENACOBU was able to recoup its costs not only through the overhead covered by UNHCR, but also from fees paid by the returnees. Its total overhead in 2008 consisted of around \$71,000 in bank fees taken from the returnees' accounts and \$64,000 in distribution costs charged to UNHCR, for a total of around \$136,000 in overheads.

182. As an organisation that is profit-making but with a social mission, FENACOBU was motivated to participate in the cash grant programme in part for the potential earnings, such as through microcredit or investment of savings deposits, as well as for more altruistic reasons. FENACOBU reported that because the majority of returnees withdrew their money within just a few months and did not seek microcredit, it was not able to earn much, however. It views the cash grants as making only a minor contribution to its overall portfolio.

183. The increase in overheads for the cash grant programme from 4.9% in 2008 to 6.0% in 2009 is due mainly to the smaller number of returnees planned for this year, hence a less efficient scale. Overall, the large scale of the programme undoubtedly contributed to its efficiency, but not overly so, since COOPEC's distribution structures were already in place. Food, NFI and cash-based reintegration interventions are all likely to have similar scales, assuming similar percentages of returnees are targeted.

7. Conclusion

184. The introduction in 2007 of cash grants as a key component of the return package for refugees returning from Tanzania to Burundi has made an extremely positive contribution to the reintegration of almost 150,000 returnees. Those who returned from the refugee camps, the vast majority of whom had left Burundi in 1993, benefited from a comprehensive package of food and non-food items that allowed them to use the cash for productive investments in livelihoods, such as the purchase of small parcels of land, agriculture or livestock.

185. Those who returned from the old settlements (the 1972 group) faced more complex reintegration challenges, and the initial decision to adopt a cash and transport-only return package for this group limited its effectiveness, leading to a higher tendency to use it for immediate consumption. The progressive expansion of the return package to include the same food and NFIs as those issued to the 1993 group nonetheless reflected a laudable flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, albeit that this measure could arguably have been taken earlier.

186. In the Burundi context, the timing of the introduction of cash, and the message that this component of the return package would be time limited, in combination with other factors, had the effect of revitalising the voluntary repatriation process and encouraging returns. However the reason for this appears to have been more linked to the fact that it met genuine reintegration needs rather than operating as a 'carrot' which in itself attracted returnees.

187. There is no way of knowing how the trajectory of the return process would have developed had the cash grant been introduced earlier, for example at the outset of the voluntary repatriation operation, after the elections in 2005, or at the time of the shift to promotion of returns in 2006. Most interviewees were of the view that cash should have been included earlier, and that if it had, the voluntary repatriation operation might well have been completed sooner.

188. The positive conclusions reached in this report, combined with similar findings from experience in other repatriation operations, would suggest that cash grants have earned their place as a standard instrument in the tool box for UNHCR-assisted voluntary repatriation operations. This does not mean that cash is a panacea, nor that it is appropriate in all situations.

189. A clear finding of this report is that design of return packages (including a decision on whether or not to include cash) should be based on forward-looking assessment which identifies the key challenges returnees are likely to encounter upon return and seeks to provide them with the means to address these.⁴⁸ In Burundi, by the time the cash grant was introduced, the challenges to reintegration were

⁴⁸ The assessment should inform the development of clear objectives for the cash component of the return package. For example, is it designed to cover transport costs, enable the purchase of shelter materials, or contribute to long-term reintegration? How much is needed and what other forms of assistance is it designed to complement? Potential risks, such as security of beneficiaries and partners, fraud, or conflict with receiving communities, should be identified and addressed in the programme design.

primarily socio-economic rather than protection-related. The transition towards stability was clearly under way, and security had greatly improved. Cash was correctly identified as a flexible means of addressing such socio-economic challenges, providing a valuable means for meeting essential needs in the interim period whilst returnees re-established their homes and productive capacities.

190. The Burundi experience would suggest that cash should not be held in reserve as a card to be played at an appropriate moment, but should rather be seen as an integral part of a broader support package to facilitate the return and reintegration process, and not as an exceptional measure which is intrinsically different in nature to the rest of the assistance package. In the Burundi context, cash worked best when it was combined with other forms of assistance. Cash alone will only rarely be appropriate and at worst, may give the impression that UNHCR is seeking to 'purchase' returns.

191. A further critical factor in the success of the cash grant was that it formed part of a much broader strategy to address reintegration needs, including an extensive and much-appreciated shelter programme, strategic engagement on land issues, support for the development of government capacity to coordinate reintegration activities, and engagement of a broad range of partners to develop an integrated response to the challenges facing the 1972 returnees.

192. The introduction of the cash grant can also be viewed as having made a positive contribution to securing ongoing protection space in Tanzania, and demonstrating UNHCR's responsiveness to the changing dynamics of the voluntary repatriation and reintegration process. Whilst the cash grant should preferably be seen as an integral component of a broader support package, in the Tanzania / Burundi situation, the timing of its introduction helped to demonstrate UNHCR and donor willingness to address a downturn in returns at a time when the situation in Burundi appeared to be improving. Critically, however, the cash grant was much more than a gimmick to incentivise returns – based on a thorough assessment of gaps in initial reintegration support, it met a real need, whilst at the same time enabling the continuation of a managed return process.

193. The high level of donor and government support for the programme is also in part attributable to the significant efforts made by UNHCR to engage the donor community and government representatives from the outset of the process. A number of donors and government staff participated in the JAM, which provided an important opportunity for a constructive dialogue on key reintegration challenges and for achieving a shared vision of what was needed to address these.

194. One donor referred to the 'intense process of reflection' in which UNHCR and its partners engaged before embarking on the cash grant programme. Meetings of the Tripartite Commission also provided an important forum to review the cash grant and locate it within a broader formal policy framework. The close cooperation between the UNHCR offices in Tanzania in Burundi, both of which were actively engaged in the development and implementation of the programme, should also be highlighted.

195. Experience in Burundi also demonstrated the importance of finding the right partner. The involvement of FENACOBU and its implementing arm, COOPEC, was of inestimable value to the cash grant programme, and some questioned

whether it would have been possible to deliver the programme without their involvement. With an existing network of branches in almost all communes of return, and a long track record of expertise in microcredit and handling cash, they provided an extremely cost-effective means of distributing the cash grant which avoided security and other problems. FENACOBU was known to UNHCR as an implementing partner on microfinance projects, and provided a channel which linked returnees to an existing service within the community.

196. Identifying the right partner (which may be a private institution, a bank or even a network of money traders, as in Afghanistan) will generally be a critical component of a successful cash grant programme. A number of interviewees also stressed the key role played by the registration system in Tanzania which limited the potential for 'recycling' and other forms of fraud, and served as a strategic planning and budgeting tool.

197. UNHCR engaged in a substantial mass information programme in Tanzania, and many refugees highlighted the importance of 'go and see' visits and 'sensibilisation' through visits by Burundian authorities and others to the refugee camps in Tanzania. The Burundi experience has highlighted the importance of consistent messaging on the nature and level of assistance to be provided to returnees, and detailed and accurate information on the cash grant.

198. There may also be scope for a more dynamic preparation process in countries of asylum, which would encourage returnees to reflect individually and collectively on the potential uses of the cash grant, including through microcredit opportunities and small-scale cooperatives. This should go beyond a one-way transfer of information, and could form part of a broader programme of psycho-social preparation for the challenges of return.

199. In Burundi, there was a comprehensive protection monitoring system in place, implemented by a national partner in close coordination with field offices, which was quickly adapted to incorporate an additional cash grant monitoring component, using a custom-designed monitoring form. This proved extremely valuable in enabling the identification of problems associated with the distribution mechanisms and enabling periodic snapshots of the impact of the programme which informed reporting to donors and other partners.

200. As in many return operations however, the processing and analysis of the data gathered was nonetheless weak, and there has been a gap in analysing trends in the reintegration process over time. This is an area which should be strengthened in future operations, with an approach that combines individual interviews with returnees with a broader analysis which looks at the broader impact of the cash grant and includes elements such as the availability and price of key commodities in local markets.

201. The voluntary repatriation operation for Burundian refugees in Tanzania is now in its final stages, and is anticipated to be completed by the end of 2009. Assistance for return will be phased out accordingly. Nonetheless, despite an announcement that the cash grant would be discontinued for those 1993 refugee who had not registered for return by 30 April 2009, the response to this deadline was relatively limited. This in itself suggests that the cash grant alone is not instrumental in shaping decisions to return. It also continues to provide the impression that

UNHCR sees the cash grant as an 'optional extra' rather than an integral part of the return package which enables basic needs to be met.

202. Whilst it is still too early to draw lessons from the phase-out of the Burundi cash grant operation, the evaluators nonetheless questioned the rationale for phasing out the cash assistance separately from, and earlier than, the rest of the return package. Whilst it may be correct that cash is perceived as the most attractive element of the return package, and that the prospect of its discontinuance might therefore act as a spur for those who have decided that they will return at some point, an important reason for this perception is that the cash grant is in fact the most useful component of the package for addressing critical reintegration needs. With this in mind, perhaps this should be the last part of the package to be phased out, rather than the first?

Annex I: Terms of Reference

Evaluation of the Impact of Cash Grants in Burundi

1. Introduction and Background

1.1. On 10 June 2007, UNHCR introduced cash grants of 50,000 Burundian francs per person for Burundian returnees from refugee camps in Tanzania, thereby significantly increasing assistance under its return programme to Burundi, which had been ongoing since 2002. From May 2008 on, with the start of the organized repatriation of Burundian refugees of 1972 from the old settlements in Tanzania, refugees from these settlements also received cash grants.

1.2. The rationale for the introduction of cash grants was to improve immediate reintegration prospects for the returnees. This was based on the observation made in several assessments that the main challenges for returnees were of a socio-economic nature. UNHCR in its initial concept paper emphasized that measures were needed “that may further promote the sustainability of return. The use of cash grants, in addition to the return package of food and non-food items, is one such measure, which as a temporary time-bound incentive could make a difference in the current transition context of economic recovery.”⁴⁹

1.3. Between 2002 and the introduction of cash grants, some 343,000 Burundians had returned, most of them from camps in Tanzania. After their introduction, another 131,000 Burundians returned (as of 31 December 2008). Return to Burundi from Tanzania is promoted since June 2006.

1.4. While cash grants had a very clear impact on return dynamics in the short term⁵⁰, it is not certain to what degree they may have influenced such dynamics in the long term. Returnee numbers have been on comparatively high levels since, but this was certainly also related to the Tanzanian policy of camp consolidation and closure.

1.5. UNHCR has been monitoring the cash grant distribution process and the situation of recipients once settled in their respective areas of origin. Monitoring data has been gathered from several thousand households by its national NGO partner Ligue Iteka. Key findings include the following:⁵¹

- Returnees use the cash grants to cover a wide range of needs related to their return and immediate reintegration. Main uses include transport, income-generation activities, renting or buying land. Other uses include the purchase of building materials, seeds and fertilizers, food, livestock, etc.
- A small but still significant group among the returnees say that the timing of their return was influenced by the cash grant.
- Few cash grant recipients reported tensions with the community.

49 *Draft Concept Paper on Cash Grants for Returning Refugees to Burundi*. UNHCR Bujumbura, June 2007.

50 With 474 returnees in May 2007, 738 in June, 3,037 in July, and 10,588 in August. It should be noted that this was partly also due to seasonal dynamics.

51 *Monitoring report: Impact and use of cash grants for returnees in Burundi*. UNHCR Bujumbura, 25 June 2008.

- Few security incidents related to the cash grants were observed.

2. Objective

2.1. The objective of the evaluation is to analyse the impact the cash grant had on the reintegration of its recipients, and to assess whether it constituted a cost effective instrument, in comparison with other interventions. It should furthermore examine the distribution mechanisms and procedures. This will help UNHCR, the concerned governments, and the donors⁵² to decide on the use of cash grants in similar operations in the future.

3. Scope of Work and the Methodology

3.1. The evaluation should be based on data collected in a “typical” region of return, i.e. with characteristics similar to those encountered by the majority of returnees. This will be a rural area bordering Tanzania that has received many returnees (> 20 % of original host population of the commune), e.g. in Muyinga or Ruyigi provinces. It should focus on returnees who returned in 2007/2008 from the refugee camps, and who have returned to their community at least 6 months before the interview. A second group of returnees who returned in the first half of 2007 (before the introduction of the cash grants) should also be interviewed. This will help to provide a comparator for determining the impact of the cash grants.

3.2. The methodology developed for the evaluation should include a desk study of available literature, the use of quantitative sampling methods, and qualitative interviews and focus group discussions. Since quantitative data is already available from the returnee monitoring database of UNHCR’s partner Ligue Iteka, the study could focus on qualitative interviews with a substantive number of households, while using the monitoring data for some aspects of the evaluation.

3.3. Interviews should also be conducted with key stakeholders (eg local and central authorities, COOPEC agency responsible for the distribution, UNHCR staff, Ligue Iteka returnee monitors).

4. Issues to Address

4.1. The evaluation team should pay particular attention to the following questions and issues, with a strong emphasis on an impact assessment of the Cash Grant on reintegration, as requested by DFID:

Relevance:

Does the cash grant respond to reintegration needs identified by the beneficiaries? Was the provision of cash regarded as an appropriate method to address these requirements? What importance was attributed to the cash grant by the refugees in their decision-making to voluntarily repatriate? Could the refugees have repatriated and reintegrated successfully without the cash grant or with a reduced amount?

⁵² In particular DFID, which has funded the cash grants in Burundi, including a part of the evaluation. DFID funds cash interventions also in other (non-returnee) settings and is therefore interested to receive more knowledge about the advantages and disadvantages of this instrument.

Efficiency: How efficient was the administrative setup? Were effective mechanisms against abuse in place? Could alternative arrangements be developed that might reduce transaction costs? Are there arguments for changing distribution arrangements (20% in transit centre, 80% in communes, voucher system, saving accounts, etc.)? Was the formula “same amount per family member” appropriate, or would different amounts per age group had an advantage? Did the procedures for distribution take into account needs of specific family constellations (e.g. unaccompanied minors)? Were returnees sufficiently informed about the cash grants?

How cost-effective was the project when taking into account overall costs (incl. security measures at transit centres, administrative cost of UNHCR partner COOPEC, additional fees retained by COOPEC for opening accounts,...)?

Why were existing options for micro credits not used, although they were offered to cash grant recipients by UNHCR’s partner? What options are there to effectively link the cash grant with microfinance or income-generating activities?

Effectiveness: How successful was the cash grant in meeting the essential reintegration needs of returning families? What evidence is there that the cash grant contributed to the sustainability of reintegration? Was the cash grant effective in meeting other needs that would otherwise have presented a problem on their arrival in Burundi? Did the cash grant prevent, as expected, returnees from selling parts of their NFI/food package?

Impact: Was the cash grant used primarily for consumption (to address short term needs) or investment (for longer term purposes)? Could a different use for the same resources have produced greater impact on return and reintegration? What was the impact of the cash grant on the specific situation of landless returnees?

Did the cash grants have negative social consequences, either on the family (e.g. alcohol abuse, polygamy) or community level (social tensions between recipients and non-recipients)? What was the economic impact (price rises in high-return areas)? Were there security incidents which were clearly linked to the cash grants?

Did the cash grants have an impact on the position of women? Who in the household usually had the control over the account? Were there disputes within the family over control of cash resources, and if so how were these resolved?

5. Timing/Inputs required

5.1. The study should be finalized by 10 July 2009. A pre-mission by the international consultant should take place in late April 2009 (dates to be confirmed), and the main evaluation mission from 19 to 28 May 2009. Preliminary findings should be shared with the Branch Office at the end of the main field mission. A draft report should be circulated by 17 June 2009, with a deadline for comments by 30 June, and the report finalised by 10 July 2009. The evaluation team will be expected to consider and take due account of comments received, but is not obliged to incorporate these in the final report. The evaluation will be conducted in accordance

with UNHCR's Evaluation Policy (2002), and the finalised report will be placed in the public domain.

5.2. The evaluation report should consist of:

- An executive summary and recommendations (not more than 6 pages)
- Main text (to include index, context, evaluation methodology, analysis of findings and conclusions (not more than 30 pages). References to be kept to a minimum, footnotes to be used only where absolutely necessary.
- Appendices, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, bibliography.
- PDES basic style rules to be followed (to be provided).

Data collected will be used for the purposes of the evaluation report only, and will not be incorporated in separate research or publications without prior authorisation.


5.3. It is envisaged that the review will be conducted by one international consultant and one PDES staff member, who may be supported by a national consultant. The total time required of the international consultant will be six working weeks: five days for preparatory and design work, five days for the pre-mission, ten days for the main evaluation mission, and ten days for report writing, including incorporation of comments. The time required of the national consultant will be approximately five weeks.

02 March 2009

Annex II: Map



UNHCR BURUNDI NUMBER OF RETURNEES PER PROVINCE 01 March 2002 - 30 April 2009



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex III: Evaluation Itinerary

Main mission, 19-28 May 2009

Evaluation of the Impact of Cash grants in Burundi

Tues, May 19	
8:30 am	Arrival Vicky Tennant and Katherine Haver
10 am – 5 pm	Interviews with UNHCR and partners in Bujumbura
	Overnight in Bujumbura
Wed, May 20	
9 am	Depart for Ruyigi (around 2-3 hours)
11 am – 5 pm	Interviews with UNHCR Ruyigi staff and other agencies based in Ruyigi town
	Overnight in Ruyigi
Thurs, May 21	
8 am – 5 pm	Focus groups and individual interviews with community members in a village / town accessible from Ruyigi office. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus group women returnees • Focus group women community members • Focus group men returnees • 3-4 individual interviews, including 1-2 local authorities (e.g. chef de colline, chef de zone)
	Overnight in Ruyigi
Fri, May 22	
8 am	Interviews with Ruyigi-based agencies and/or local authorities, COOPEC, Ligue Iteka, and/or focus group with local traders.
1 pm	Depart for Makamba (around 2-3 hours)
	Overnight in Makamba
Sat, May 23	
8 am	Visit ‘peace village’, e.g. Gitara (5-10 minutes away) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1-2 focus group(s), depending on time • 2-3 individual interviews, including local authorities
12 noon	Visit Makamba transit centre, where refugees should be arriving (1993 group).
	Interviews with returnees at temporary accommodation

	centres (Gitega I or II). Overnight in Makamba
Sun, May 24	
	Rest in Makamba
Mon, May 25	
8 am - 5 pm	Focus groups and individual interviews with community members in a village / town accessible from Makamba office. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus group women returnees • Focus group women and/or men community members • Focus group men returnees • 3-4 individual interviews, including 1-2 local authorities (e.g. chef de colline, chef de zone) • Focus group with local traders (if time allows) Overnight in Makamba
Tues, May 26	
8 am	Interviews with Makamba-based agencies and/or local authorities, COOPEC, Ligue Iteka, etc.
12 noon	Depart for Bujumbura (2 hour trip). Overnight in Bujumbura
Wed, May 27	
8 am - 5 pm	Interviews in Bujumbura (government, donors, UN agencies, NGOs, rest of UNHCR interviews) Overnight in Bujumbura
Thurs, May 28	
8 am - 5 pm	Debriefing with UNHCR in Bujumbura
Fri, May 29	
1:30 am	Departure Vicky Tennant and Katherine Haver to airport (KQ 475)

Annex IV: List of interviewees

Government of Burundi / civil servants

Cyriaque Nshimirimana (Governor, Ruyigi Province)
Therence Ntahiraja (Governor, Makamba)
Cyriaque Kabura (Principal Advisor to Governor, Makamba Province)
Fabien Yamuremye (Director, Projet d'Appui au Rapatriement et a la Reintegration des Sinistres)
Celestin Sindibutume (Director General for Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Displaced and Repatriated Persons, Ministry of Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender)

NGOs / partners

Ildephonse Nsabimana (Ligue Iteka)
Oscar Niyonzima (FENACOBU)
Lambert Nahigombeye (COOPEC)
Hermes Ntiranyuhura (Ligue Iteka)
Richard Gahunga (Ligue Iteka)
Yves Rutwe (GTZ)
Asmelash Ayale (GTZ)
Valentin Kabandilwa (IRC)
Jean-Bosco Ndayiragije (COOPEC)
Kanuni Phocas (Ligue Iteka)

UN agencies

Moira Fratta (UNICEF)
Emmanuel Twagirumukiza (WFP)
Deo Mboninyibuka (WHO)

UNHCR

Gloria Sagarra
Ahmed Baba Fall
Bo Schack
Anas Roudie
Edouard Madebari
Sophie Muller
Tony Tumagu
Cleve Massamba
Fidellis Swai
Monique Bankibirwira
Pantaleon Nimubona
Lydia Gebrekristos
Friederike Adlung
Andreas Kirchhof
Cheikh Tidiane Pouye
Paul Ndaitouroum
Valentin Tapsoba
Mary-Jane Meierdiercks-Popovic
Yacoub El-Hillo

Annex V: Survey form

**ENQUETE MENAGE DU HCR SUR
LES CONDITIONS DE VIE DES RAPATRIES**

Enquêteur		Cash ou non cash ?	
Date		Commune	
Colline		Zone	

Avant de commencer, vérifiez qu'ils ont reçu un paquet retour du HCR. Expliquez que :

- L'objectif de l'enquête est d'aider le HCR à comprendre comment fonctionne ses programmes.
- L'interview pourrait prendre 40 minutes.
- Les réponses ne sont pas destinées à planifier une aide dans le futur, et de ce fait les gens sont priés de répondre sans arrière pensées (spéculation).
- L'interviewé répond au nom du ménage, et non à titre personnel / individuel.
- Toutes les questions sont ouvertes. L'enquêteur coche la réponse correspondante dans les listes.

QUESTIONS POUR TOUS LES RAPATRIES

1. **Nom :** _____ **Chef de ménage ? (oui ou non)** _____
2. **Sexe :** _____ 3. **Age :** _____
3. **Quand est-ce que vous avez fuit le pays ?**

Wahunze ryari ?

- 1972
 1993
 Autre

4. **D'où est-ce que vous êtes retourné (le pays de refuge)?** _____

Wahungutse uva he ? (Mu kihe gihugu)

5. **Quand ? Mois :** _____ **Année :** _____ [NB. Seulement prendre 2005 – maintenant]

Ryari ? Ukwezi

Umwaka

6. **Est-ce que vous vivez séparément avec certains des membres de votre ménage (qui vivaient avec vous dans le pays de refuge) ?**

Hari abantu bo mu muryango wawe mwari kumwe mu buhungiro *mutakibana* ?

- Non
 Oui – ils sont restés à l'étranger. Combien ? _____
 Oui – ils sont revenus mais repartis. Combien ? _____
 Oui – ils sont à Bujumbura. Combien ? _____
 Oui – ailleurs au Burundi. Combien ? _____

7. Quelles sont à ce jour les deux sources principales de revenu pour votre ménage ?

Ni igiki nyamukuru kibabeshejeho ?

- Agriculture
- Petit élevage
- Petit commerce
- Petit métier dans l'artisanat
- Employé salarié (enseignant, infirmier, aide infirmier etc.)
- Journalier (agriculture)
- Argent envoyé de l'étranger par un proche
- Argent envoyé de l'intérieur du pays par un proche
- Autre

8. Combien d'argent (cash) gagnez-vous en moyenne par mois ? _____

Mugereraniye, muronka nk'amafaranga iki ku kwezi ?

9. Est-ce que vous devez de l'argent à quelqu'un ?

Hari ideni mwoba mufise ?

- Oui, une institution de microcrédit.
- Oui, à un individu (famille, ami etc.)
- Non
- Si oui, combien ? _____

10. Qu'est-ce qui vous a influencé dans votre décision de retourner ?

Ni igiki catumye mufata ingingo yo guhunguka ?

- Les amis / la famille, qui rentraient aussi
- L'approche de la saison culturelle
- La sensibilisation des autorités Burundaises
- Le rétablissement progressif de la paix et de la sécurité au Burundi
- La fermeture des camps / l'annonce de la décision du gouvernement Tanzanien
- La fermeture des écoles secondaires
- Le paquet retour (vivres et non-vivres)
- Les 'cash grants'
- Autres

11. Qu'est-ce que vous avez amené avec vous lorsque vous êtes rentré ?

Mwahungukanye iki ?

- Petits bétails
- Outils agricoles
- Ustensiles de cuisine
- Les matériaux pour la construction des abris / maisons
- Les meubles
- Le moyen de transport (vélo etc.)
- Autres

12. Combien de l'argent avez-vous amené avec vous ? _____

Mwahungukanye amahera angana iki ?

13. Quels sont les autres choses que vous et votre ménage avaient le plus besoin dans les trois premiers mois suivant votre retour ?

Ni ibihe bindi bintu mwari mukeneye kurusha ibindi mu mezi atatu ya mbere ?

- Vivres
- Vêtements
- Meubles, les choses pour la cuisine etc.
- Loyer
- Contribution pour la famille d'accueil
- Achat d'une maison
- Matériaux pour réparer ou construire une maison
- La main d'œuvre pour construire une maison
- Louer un champ pour cultiver
- Acheter un champ pour cultiver
- La main d'œuvre pour cultiver
- Les outils agricoles
- Les semences / engrais
- Les petits bétails
- Transport
- Soins de santé
- Frais de scolarité
- Fonds pour commencer un petit commerce
- Taxes communales
- Paiements de pot de vin
- La dot
- Les funérailles
- Remboursement des dettes
- Autres

14. Aviez-vous un terrain à cultiver à votre retour?

Mwari mufise aho murima igihe mwahunguka ?

- Oui – loué
- Oui – dont je suis propriétaire ou appartenant à la famille
- Non

15. Avez-vous maintenant un terrain à cultiver ?

Ubu ho murafise aho murima ?

- Oui – loué
- Oui – dont je suis propriétaire ou appartenant à la famille
- Non

16. Pensez-vous que vous allez rester dans ce village / localité ?

Mwibaza ko muzoguma hano nyene muba ?

- Oui
- Non
- Je ne sais pas

17. Pensez-vous que vous allez rester au Burundi ?

Mwibaza ko muzoguma mu Burundi ?

- Oui
- Non
- Je ne sais pas

18. Avez-vous vendu votre ration alimentaire ?

Mu mfungurwa babahaye, hari izo mwoba mwaragurishije ?

- Oui – toute la ration
- Oui – plus de la moitié
- Oui – moins de la moitié
- Non
- Je ne sais pas

19. Avez-vous vendu votre paquet non-vivres?

Mu bikoresho babahaye, hari ivyo mwoba mwaragurishije ?

- Oui – tout le paquet
- Oui – plus de la moitié
- Oui – moins de la moitié
- Non
- Je ne sais pas

20. Quelle est la partie de l'assistance du HCR qui vous a été le plus utile (vivres, non-vivres, cash grant ou abri) ?

Mu mfashanyo wahawe na HCR (infungurwa, ibikoresho, amahera, ibikoresho vyo kwubaka), ni ibihe vyakugiriye akamaro kurusha ibindi ?

- Vivres
- Non-vivres
- Cash grant (si reçu)
- Abri
- Je ne sais pas

21. Dans l'ensemble est-ce que le paquet retour vous a-t-il aidé à avoir ce dont vous avez besoin pour recommencer votre vie ?

Muri rusangi, imfashanyo waronse yoba yaragufashije gusubira kumenyera ubuzima bwo mu Burundi ?

- Oui
- Non
- Un peu

22. Avez-vous reçu du HCR un 'cash grant' ?

Woba wararonse imfashanyo y'amafaranga ya HCR ?

- Oui
- Non

QUESTIONS POUR CEUX QUI ONT RECU DU CASH

23. Combien d'argent avez-vous reçu en tout? _____

Yose hamwe, waronse angahe ?

24. Quand avez-vous reçu la deuxième tranche (aller à la COOPEC) ?

Mois _____ Année _____

Kuri COOPEC watanguye kuyatora ryari ?

25. Avez-vous tout retiré de la COOPEC en une fois ?

Wayakuriyeyo yose icarimwe ?

- Oui
- Non
- Si non, en combien de tranches l'avez vous fait ? _____

26. Est-ce que l'information relative au cash grant était-elle claire pour vous ? (c à d quand, comment, combien etc.)

Boba baragusiguriye neza ibijanye nayo mafaranga ?

- Oui
- Un peu claire
- Non, pas du tout
- Je ne sais pas

27. Si vous n'aviez pas reçu le cash grant, seriez-vous quand même retourné à la même date ?

Iyo mumenya ko mutazonka ayo mafaranga, mwari gutahira ico gihe nyene ?

- Oui
- Non
- Je ne sais pas (indécis)

28. Qui dans votre ménage décide sur la gestion du cash grant ?

Ni nde mu muryango atunganya ikoreshwa ry'ayo mahera ?

- Le mari
- La femme (mariée)
- La femme (chef de ménage)
- Un autre membre de la famille
- Décidons ensemble

29. Après avoir reçu la deuxième tranche, en combien de temps l'argent de cash grant était-il dépensé en totalité ?

Aho muyakuriye muri COOPEC, yaheze haciye igihe kingana iki ?

- Moins d'un mois
- Entre 1 et 3 mois
- Plus de 3 mois
- Je ne sais pas

30. A quoi avez vous affecté le cash grant ?

Ayo mafaranga mwayakoresheje iki ?

- Vivres
- Vêtements
- Meubles, les choses pour la cuisine etc.
- Loyer
- Contribution pour la famille d'accueil
- Louer un champ pour cultiver
- Acheter un champ pour cultiver
- La main d'œuvre pour cultiver
- Acheter un terrain pour construire une maison

- Achète d'une maison
- Matériaux pour réparer ou construire une maison
- La main d'œuvre pour construire une maison
- Les outils agricoles
- Les semences / engrais
- Les petits bétails
- Transport
- Soins de santé
- Frais de scolarité
- Fonds pour commencer un petit commerce
- Taxes communales
- Paiements pot de vin
- La dot
- Les funérailles
- Remboursement des dettes
- Aider les autres (familles, voisinage)
- Autres

31. Dans l'ensemble, est-ce que le cash grant vous a-t-il aidé à avoir ce dont vous avez besoin pour recommencer votre vie ?

Muri rusangi, ayo mafaranga waronse yaragufashije gusubira kumenyera ubuzima bwo mu Burundi ?

- Oui
- Non
- Un peu

32. Avez-vous pu trouver (acheter) tout ce dont vous aviez besoin (ou presque) au marché local (localement) ?

Mwarashoboye kuronka(kugura) ivyo mukeneye vyose hafi yaho muba ?

- Oui
- Non
- Je ne sais pas

33. L'introduction de cash grant a-t-il eu des conséquences quelconques sur vous-même ou la communauté (tensions sociales) ?

Hari ingorane zoba zarashitse zivuye kw'itangwa ry'ayo mafaranga ?

- Oui
- Non
- Je ne sais pas

34. Comment jugez-vous la procédure de déboursement (remise, retrait) de cash grant ?

Hari amahinyu canke ingorane mubona mw'itangwa ry'ayo mafaranga ?

- Pas de problème
- Très grande distance à parcourir pour arriver au guichet de la COOPEC la plus proche
- Je n'ai pas reçu la totalité
- J'étais inquiet pour ma sécurité ou la sécurité de ma famille
- Je ne maîtrise les procédures (de retrait)
- Le pot de vin
- Autre

35. Avez-vous exploité des possibilités de microcrédit avec la COOPEC ?

Mwoba mwaragerageje gusaba ingurane zo kwiteza imbere muri COOPEC ?

- Je n'ai jamais entendu parlé
- Je ne fais pas confiance à cette organisation
- Je ne sais pas comment fonctionne le microcredit
- J'avais besoin de plus d'information
- Je n'ai pas de projet pour utiliser cet argent
- Autre

Remerciements.

Commentaires généraux ou remarques de la personne interviewée :

Annex VI: How the 1993 group spent the cash grant, according to the household survey

Expenditure	Category	No of respondents	% of respondents
food	food	103	69%
seeds or fertiliser	agriculture	100	67%
material to repair or construct a house	shelter	55	37%
labour to construct a house	shelter	54	36%
to buy land	agriculture	46	31%
clothing	clothing	44	29%
to rent land	agriculture	41	27%
to buy land for constructing a house	shelter	39	26%
health care	health	28	19%
agricultural tools	agriculture	25	17%
other	other	23	15%
small animals	livestock	23	15%
labour for farming	agriculture	22	15%
rent for a house	shelter	17	11%
transport	transport	15	10%
commerce / small business	business	7	5%
to help others	social	3	2%
debt	debt	2	1%
school fees	education	2	1%
furniture, kitchen items	household	2	1%
paying local officials (corruption)	anti-social	2	1%
contribution to host family	shelter	1	1%
dowry	social	1	1%
to buy a house	shelter	0	0%
funeral	social	0	0%
communal taxes	social	0	0%
Total respondents	--	150	