

# Humanitarian Outcomes

## Thematic CAP for national disaster preparedness

### Feasibility study

An independent team of professionals providing evidence-based analysis and policy consultations to governments and international organisations on their humanitarian response efforts.

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## Executive summary

This report was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to examine the feasibility of a thematic Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for National Disaster Preparedness and Response Capacity. It ultimately concludes that a CAP is not the most appropriate mechanism. The research process highlighted some important systemic issues, however, and the report moves from its initial focus on the CAP to explore a range of options to improve the coherence and predictability of financing for disaster preparedness. It does so with the caveat that there was not sufficient scope in the study to examine the feasibility of each of these alternatives in significant detail.

The question of how to finance disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster preparedness is an important one. In the past decade a number of international commitments have been made by donor and recipient governments, as well as assistance agencies, to strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to humanitarian crises, including the comprehensive agreement set out in the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in 2005. These commitments have been given added impetus by the recognition that climate change is likely to increase the severity and frequency of disasters.

Many examples show that national disaster preparedness is a life-saving and cost-effective measure. Effective early-warning systems and community-based preparedness measures, alongside national contingency plans and pre-positioned supplies, have repeatedly been shown to reduce the impacts of disasters on populations in affected countries. The study concludes that, despite the broad acceptance of the need for greater investment in DRR, current aid architecture is ill suited to dealing with the issue, primarily as it straddles both development and humanitarian systems.

The wide range of actors in disaster risk reduction ensures a diversity of approaches. Leading agencies in risk reduction and, specifically, disaster preparedness (DP) have overlapping institutional mandates, however and, of particular concern to this study, there is a lack of clarity on the overall leadership for disaster preparedness. At the international level, UNISDR, UNDP, and the World Bank all have financial mechanisms to support their efforts in DRR, and all support preparedness work in line with the HFA. On the humanitarian side, OCHA and a range of UN agencies, the IFRC and national societies, and a strong group of INGOs and their partners also work in this area. Some have a narrower approach to disaster preparedness in the form of “response preparedness” while others have a community-based approach to DRR in which preparedness plays a part, but is often

integrated into broader DRR goals. In theory, most of these actors work in collaboration with the UN Resident Coordinator's office in country, to support national disaster risk management plans and, ideally, through national platforms. In practice, however, coordination is ad hoc and often limited.

The study team analysed financial support made to disaster preparedness activities from 2001 to 2008. It found that preparedness and risk reduction represent a very small percentage of overall humanitarian activity and expenditure. A small number of donors provide the lion's share of support, much of it targeted to the Asian region. The vast majority of humanitarian contributions were channelled through UN agency recipients, while the smallest proportion went directly to affected-state governments. This is likely the result of regulations which preclude the use of humanitarian assistance for directly strengthening national government capacities. The study also found that financing allocations are typically made *after* major sudden onset disasters, rather than as calculated and predictable investments in preparedness in advance of emergencies. Overall, funding falls far short of what many would consider to be good practice.

Recognising the low level of financing and the weak coordination for DRR and disaster preparedness specifically, interviewees universally supported the idea that there is a need for more coherent, predictable financing in the area of disaster preparedness. Whether it should be a CAP mechanism, however, is a more complex question and views were mixed.

While concluding that a CAP is not likely to be the most appropriate option, the report offers a hypothetical structure and process for how such a mechanism might be established. It outlines a set of objectives and gives a definition of preparedness, as well as a common standard and format, to ensure that country-based plans are similar and relatively comparable between countries and regions.

Some key conditions would have to exist for a thematic CAP to be effective:

- It would need to be focused at the national level. Assessment and the identification of projects would need to be nationally and/or regionally located, and have a multi-year strategic perspective.
- It would ideally be government led, and supported by an international partner in country. This could be OCHA (where OCHA has a presence on the ground) and UNDP where OCHA is not present (as reflected in UNDP's mandate to take responsibility for operational activities for natural disaster mitigation, prevention, and preparedness).
- In keeping with a global CAP, regional projects and a regional perspective would be important and coordination mechanisms

would need to be mobilised at the regional level to support the thematic appeals process.

- At headquarters level, the CAP Section of OCHA would most naturally take responsibility for drawing together the final document (including an executive summary and separate regionally based appeals) to be presented to donor governments for multi-year support.

Eligibility for a disaster preparedness CAP would have to be needs based. There is, however, no internationally agreed set of priority countries for DRR financing, and there are no unified criteria for ranking countries according to disaster risk. UNDP, UNISDR, OCHA, and the World Bank use differing ranking systems to prioritise their DRR interventions and each have their limitations. A compromise ranking system and an indicative list of fifty-four low- and lower-middle-income countries which could be eligible is outlined in the report. The CAP could not be imposed, however; each eligible country would determine if such support was needed.

The research found a number of positive aspects to the concept of a global, thematic CAP, including that it draws on an existing mechanism that is already well-known within the international aid community, is flexible enough to allow for a range of actors to be funded by various donors, and takes a needs-based approach.

The study also found, however, that a global, thematic CAP mechanism for disaster preparedness has significant drawbacks. In particular, many interviewees emphasised that limiting an appeal specifically for disaster preparedness runs counter to the logic of mainstreaming DRR into development programmes, with disaster preparedness as an integral part, and addressing the HFA goals holistically. There are also significant resource implications for a global CAP, both in terms of the establishment and management of the mechanism and support for it. The study also found that organisational mandates and coordination mechanisms at global and country levels are currently not ideally suited to supporting a CAP mechanism. Finally, unless a clear niche can be identified, it runs the risk of duplication with other funding mechanisms, including those of ISDR, UNDP, and the World Bank.

The study highlights that before any further efforts to establish a CAP mechanism be pursued, the following objectives would ideally be achieved:

- explicit donor agreement to support a CAP mechanism with multi-year funding; and
- discussion and agreement between the international organisations mandated to undertake DRR as to a clear division of roles and responsibilities regarding disaster preparedness.

Given the identified limitations of the CAP model, the study team investigated a range of possible alternatives, including launching a discrete preparedness component within existing CAPs and revised Flash Appeals. In the long term, however, a better way to provide financial support to DRR, including preparedness, is required. The study found significant interest in the possibility of creating a new fund for DRR similar to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). It offers the advantage of addressing DRR holistically, coherently, and strategically, as well as being a transparent, technically oriented, and country-driven mechanism.

Funding for preparedness and disaster risk reduction is a complex area of the international aid system. Current levels of funding to existing mechanisms suggest the international community is not serious about investing in DRR. However, the growing support for climate change adaptation (CCA) may result in a convergence of interests and overlap between CCA and DRR and may provide a momentum to address DRR. Further debate is needed about what mechanisms are likely to work best; this report aims to inform those discussions with recommendations for short- and long-term options for financing disaster preparedness.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background and objectives of the study

This study was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the period of May to November 2009. It examines the feasibility of a thematic Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for National Disaster Preparedness and Response Capacity and other options to improve the coherence and predictability of financing for disaster preparedness (DP). The request for the study stems from a recognised need for greater investments in disaster risk reduction (DRR) and, specifically, disaster preparedness. This has long been recognised as necessary by disaster-affected governments, donor governments, and international aid agencies.

The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), launched in 2000 at the end of the International Decade of Disaster Reduction, established a global framework to coordinate actions to address disaster risks. In 2003, a group of seventeen major humanitarian donor governments endorsed a series of principles for Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) that included the goal to “Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises . . . .”<sup>1</sup> In 2005, 168 member states endorsed the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which urges all countries to make major efforts to reduce their disaster risk. Member states from the G77, in discussions in the UN on humanitarian assistance, continually underscore the same message.<sup>2</sup> These

1 Good Humanitarian Donorship, Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (17 June 2003). <http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/a%2023%20Principles%20EN-GHD19.10.04%20RED.doc>.

2 UN General Assembly, *Resolution A/63/L.49: Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations* (3 December 2008).

initiatives suggest an international commitment to DRR, a commitment that has been given added impetus by the recognition that climate change is likely to increase the severity and frequency of disasters.

In spite of this, financing for disaster risk reduction has remained inadequate. Governments and donors have committed to integrating DRR into development plans and funding but progress is slow. In the absence of effective development mainstreaming, humanitarian actors have attempted to fill some gaps but they too have struggled to invest enough in DRR, even in the areas of disaster preparedness for which they have clear responsibilities. Those consulted for this study universally expressed that there remained a serious financing gap for DRR, specifically for disaster preparedness, and that both national and international actors could do more given more support.<sup>3</sup>

This report has five sections. Section 1 covers the methodology, scope, and key terminology. Section 2 provides an overview of the international DRR architecture, including key actors, policy priorities, financing trends and coordination. Section 3 examines what a global, thematic CAP on disaster preparedness and response capacity might look like in terms of structure and process and examines the evidence from field analysis in Ethiopia and Bangladesh. Section 4 discusses the feasibility of the CAP and examines a range of other possible options for financing disaster preparedness. Section 5 offers conclusions for further reflection and action. A detailed financial analysis is in Annex 3.

3 See, for example, UN, *Summary and Recommendations: 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction* (2009).

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## 1.2 Methodology

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The research involved both quantitative and qualitative methods, including two field visits, extensive headquarters interviews, financial analysis, and a documentary review.

Field missions to Ethiopia and Bangladesh were conducted in September and early October 2009. Ethiopia offered the opportunity to look at a context with a long history of natural disasters, where drought-related food insecurity continues to have large-scale humanitarian consequences and yet humanitarian aid efforts often face political challenges. Bangladesh is a country in which humanitarian assistance is linked predominantly to the effects of frequent natural disasters, particularly cyclone-induced flooding, and where preparedness efforts are relatively advanced. Both countries offered the opportunity to examine national preparedness programmes and capacities, and their interface with international humanitarian and development systems, both in the context of disaster preparedness and risk reduction more broadly. Bangladesh also offered the opportunity to consider a situation where OCHA has no permanent presence.

The team conducted 131 interviews. Approximately half were undertaken in the field and the rest in regional and headquarters locations. Interviewees were selected based on their knowledge and experience of DRR/DP policy development and programming, as well as the technical areas of donor financing and consolidated appeals processes. Interviewees included representatives of recipient and donor governments; OCHA, UNDP, UNISDR and other UN agencies; IOs (including the World Bank); and NGOs (find a full list in Annex 1).

The financial analysis sought to determine the levels and types of spending by humanitarian donors for disaster preparedness, and to identify changes and trends in these aid flows over recent years. Humanitarian spending data for the years 2001 to 2008 were compiled using the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' Financial Tracking Service (FTS). Analysis was augmented by data from the OECD Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) and individual spending reports from donor agencies. Also examined were financial data pertaining to specific bilateral mechanisms such as ECHO's DIPECHO program, and DFID's pledge that, whenever it provides over £500,000 of humanitarian aid, 10 percent of the funding will be used for preparedness and future mitigation.

The field studies, interviews and financial analysis were complemented by a desk review of relevant literature in Disaster Risk Reduction and specifically in disaster preparedness.

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## 1.3 Caveats

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Supporting disaster preparedness in the international aid system is complex. It cuts across both development and humanitarian work, and also across sectors. As a consequence there are multiple international organisations mandated to work in this area and at present a lack of clarity as to the roles and responsibilities of international development and humanitarian partners. This complexity resulted in something that is more like a pre-feasibility study that aims to lay out the positive and challenging features of different options, the views of different stakeholders, and some possible ways forward. Further discussion is needed between donor and recipient governments and within key international fora about the best way forward.

In relation to determining trends in financing disaster preparedness, there is no single source of compiled funding data on spending by humanitarian donors, nor is there a single shared definition of this spending category. The best available data sources are not completely compatible, and each has weaknesses when it comes to calculating total expenditure for preparedness. In light of this, the financial findings of this report are to be considered as less a precise accounting of preparedness financing than an indication of overall trends in spending on these types of activities in terms of volume, funding channels, recipients/implementers, and geographical distribution.

In relation to the field work, there were a few stakeholders that were not reached during the missions. In Bangladesh, it was not possible to meet with government representatives. Senior officials from both the Disaster Management Bureau and the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management did not accept to meet during the time of the study visit due to ongoing preparations for World Risk Reduction Day. The World Bank was also not consulted in Bangladesh. In both contexts it was not possible to interview local NGOs, other large developmental donors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional development banks.

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## 1.4 Scope and key terminology

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The key objective of the study was to consider the feasibility of a Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for National Preparedness and Response Capacity. In order to shape the research, the study team, in consultation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, identified a list of key questions to examine:

- What are the precedents and incentives for donors to fund disaster preparedness?
- How could a thematic CAP as a tool for organising the “supply” side (donor government financing) of the equation, support improvements on the “demand” side (disaster-affected governments and implementing agencies)?
- Who would the recipients of funding be?
- Which countries would be eligible, and based on what criteria?
- What activities within the remit of disaster preparedness would be funded and how would choices be made between competing priorities?
- How would programmes and financing for preparedness link to and possibly facilitate recovery and reconstruction programmes?
- How would a disaster preparedness CAP, or alternate financing mechanism, relate to other DRR initiatives and financing mechanisms— notably the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction, the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), and UNDP’s support to DRR?

- How could a thematic CAP, or an alternate financing instrument, be managed and administered, including consideration of current and potential capacity within OCHA?
- How would a disaster preparedness CAP relate to other humanitarian financing mechanisms, such as local and regional CAPs, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and national pooled funds, as well as agencies’ own response funds, and bilateral government-to-government funding?
- At the regional level, what would be the options to support regional approaches to strengthen disaster preparedness?

### *A note on terminology*

In this discussion it is particularly important to be clear on terminology. This is partly because the study is examining the relatively new subject area of DRR, which is primarily a development-oriented agenda and, within it, disaster preparedness, which has strong linkages to the humanitarian community. Definitions differ depending on whether you are looking at it from the national, regional, or global perspective. For instance, preparedness activities at the national level are related to strengthening national capacity and ensuring resilience of the affected community to natural disasters, while preparedness in the context of the international humanitarian community aims, as one core element, to strengthen its own preparedness to respond to the humanitarian needs resulting from a crisis.<sup>4</sup> Finally, the study examines this subject matter in relation to a financing mechanism that is very traditionally “humanitarian,” the CAP.

Drawing on guidance from UNISDR and OCHA,<sup>5</sup> where possible, the study uses the following terminology.

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4 OCHA, Funding for Preparedness. Paper prepared on behalf of the Emergency Director’s Meeting (9 March 2009).

5 See UNISDR, *UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction* (2009); ISDR and OCHA, *Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response Guidance and Indicator Package for Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework* (Geneva: UN/ISDR and UN/OCHA, 2008).

**Disaster risk management** is the systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.

**Disaster risk reduction (DRR)** is the concept and practice of reducing disaster risk through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.

A comprehensive approach to reduce disaster risks is set out in the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). Priority Five of the HFA focuses on **disaster preparedness**, which is defined as the knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities, and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent, or current hazard events or conditions. Disaster preparedness includes short-term readiness measures for effective response (e.g., contingency planning including response and evacuation plans, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, personnel training, and community drills and exercises) and longer-term, institutional preparedness (e.g., coordination arrangements, emergency services linked to early warning systems, and public education), supported by legal and budgetary frameworks.

It is important to note that this study did not look at how to assist the international community in building its own preparedness at the global level but, rather, focused on the role of international actors at the national level, in particular their contribution to increasing government and local capacities.

Where relevant, regional-level preparedness is also considered.

**The consolidated appeals process:** a consideration that was raised during the interviews was the specific role of the CAP and the associations that interviewees made with respect to it. The CAP is a

tool with a distinct function within the humanitarian response system. It is typically an OCHA-led process that seeks to channel humanitarian funding on a country (or occasionally regional) basis through an annual, global appeal process.<sup>6</sup> Funding is drawn from major donors' humanitarian funding streams and tends to be earmarked for specific countries and projects. The CAP regulations usually preclude direct funding to recipient governments. Notwithstanding the aims of humanitarian agencies to promote recovery, reduce vulnerability, and achieve coherence with development strategies where possible, the system is guided by humanitarian principles and a "needs driven" premise. The CAP is a key part of an international response architecture which can often be characterised as "state avoiding" and is strongly associated with persistent, complex, often conflict-related crises. The study's basic objective to examine the feasibility of a CAP for disaster preparedness therefore encompasses the divergent instincts of the humanitarian and development systems, as well as the tensions inherent in their basic operational approaches and their means of financing.

Finally, it was beyond the scope of this report to examine the international architecture around climate change adaptation (CCA). It is worth noting, however, that there is significant convergence and overlap between CCA and DRR.<sup>7</sup> Despite this, there has been limited integration of the two agendas, in part due to the differing histories and actors involved in each.<sup>8</sup> Although this report focuses on the architecture and financing of DRR and, specifically, preparedness, it recognises that an effective DRR

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6 In each CAP country, OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator, where present, are responsible for producing a comprehensive, strategic, and prioritised humanitarian plan and corresponding appeal on behalf of UN operational agencies and their partners. All country appeals are launched together at an annual event.

7 Adaptation focuses on long-term adjustment to changes in climate conditions, including the opportunities that this can provide. Many DRR activities fall under the umbrella of climate change adaptation. Whereas DRR addresses risks related to geophysical hazards (e.g., volcanoes and earthquakes), adaptation does not. See T. Mitchell and M. van Aalst, *Convergence of Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation*, a review for DFID (31 October 2008), 3–5.

8 Mitchell and van Aalst, *Convergence of Disaster Risk Reduction*.

system will ultimately be closely linked with climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.

Whilst the focus of the enquiry is a global, thematic CAP, the study first outlines the architecture of the

DRR “system” as it currently functions, including the key actors, policy priorities, financing and coordination, at global and national levels.

## 2 Disaster risk reduction architecture

Within the international system, from the community to the national, regional, and global levels, a range of actors engages in DRR. This includes disaster-affected communities, national and local governments, local civil society groups including national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, donors, coordinating and policy-making bodies, and operational actors. The main international actors are UNISDR, UNDP, the World Bank (GFDRR), OCHA,<sup>9</sup> the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the EC (including ECHO) and other donor governments, and a vast range of other UN agencies and international NGOs (INGOs). In each specific regional and national context, international actors “map” onto indigenous systems which results in highly diverse DRR architecture at the local levels with the result that no two countries are easily comparable.

### 2.1 Key actors and policy priorities

UNISDR is mandated by a General Assembly resolution of 2001, to “serve as the focal point in the United Nations system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among the disaster-reduction activities of the United Nations system and regional organisations and activities in socio-economic and humanitarian fields.”<sup>10</sup> Its core functions include:

9 OCHA and UNISDR are formally linked through the leadership of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Sir John Holmes.

10 See [http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about\\_isdr/bd-ga-resolution-eng.htm](http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-ga-resolution-eng.htm).

- inter-agency and stakeholder coordination for DRR policy development, reporting, information sharing, and support to national efforts, at regional and global levels;
- monitoring the implementation of HFA and reporting on progress (core indicators), including publishing the biennial Global Assessment Report, organising regional platforms, and managing the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction;<sup>11</sup>
- coordinating preparation of policy guidelines for the HFA priority areas;
- promoting national multi-sector coordination mechanisms for DRR (national platforms) and advising UN Resident Coordinators and ISDR system partners.

UNISDR administrates the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction. In 2008 the Trust Fund held just under \$30 million. Based in Geneva, but with a growing emphasis on regional capacity, UNISDR has a staff size of approximately one hundred.

UNDP also holds an important mandate for DRR and has been active in this area for over a decade. In 1998, the UN General Assembly transferred to UNDP the responsibilities of the Emergency Relief Coordinator for “operational activities for natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness.”<sup>12</sup>

11 The second session hosted 152 governments, 137 organisations, and 1,688 participants. It produced a series of recommendations in the form of “areas [ . . . ] considered critical for future progress.” See <http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2009/background/documents/GP09-Chair's-Summary.pdf>.

12 UN General Assembly, *Resolution A/RES/52/12B: Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform* (9 January 1998), para. 16.

UNDP focuses on activities at the country level, including institutional reform, developing and establishing disaster management laws, agreeing on mandates between institutions/ministries, developing civil protection mechanisms, and DRR planning. UNDP also assists in mainstreaming DRR into UN planning and programming processes such as the Common Country Assessment/United Nations Development Assistance Framework (CCA/UNDAF).<sup>13</sup> UNDP spent approximately \$120 million per year between 2006 and 2008 on DRR activities, 65 percent of which was allocated to the Asia Pacific, 19 percent to Latin America and the Caribbean, and only 5 percent to Africa.<sup>14</sup> This breakdown partly reflects the fact that the UNDP DRR team focuses solely on natural disasters, not conflict.

The third significant mechanism in the international system is the World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). Launched in 2006, on behalf of participating donors and other partnering stakeholders, the GFDRR is "a partnership of the ISDR system to support the implementation of the Hyogo Framework."<sup>15</sup> It provides technical and financial assistance to low-<sup>15</sup> and middle-income<sup>16</sup> countries to mainstream disaster reduction in national development strategies and plans to achieve the MDGs. The GFDRR has three tracks: Track 1 consists of financial support to the UNISDR secretariat. Track 2 is directed at mainstreaming disaster reduction and management in country development processes to ensure that risk assessments, risk mitigation, risk transfer, and emergency preparedness are incorporated into all strategic plans and programs. Track 3 supports primarily low-income countries for accelerated disaster recovery. The GFDRR has received approximately \$80 million in contributions since it was established. The World Bank itself has been

the biggest financier, contributing approximately 12 percent. Approximately 75 percent comes from donors' humanitarian budget lines. Donors have stressed that 80 percent of the funds should go towards the needs of low-income countries. Approximately 60 percent is already committed to Africa.<sup>17</sup>

Within the humanitarian community, there are a range of actors engaged in DRR and disaster preparedness, including OCHA, the IFRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and a range of INGOs often working with national partners. Humanitarian actors involved in preparedness for cyclical natural hazards ideally undertake these activities in collaboration with the relevant governments. In complex political emergencies, however, they may maintain more distance from the state. In contexts with different kinds of natural hazards as well as conflict, such as Ethiopia, these relationships can be strained as humanitarian actors both try to work with the government on preparedness as well as to maintain the space for independent humanitarian action where necessary.<sup>18</sup>

OCHA works in many countries to facilitate disaster preparedness efforts. Although its role in this area is still being formulated, there are indications that it will focus narrowly on the area of "response preparedness"; a policy instruction is under production and will be released in early 2010. Part of OCHA's role will be to act as an interlocutor and bring together key organisations that deal with preparedness, including UNISDR, UNDP, and the IFRC. OCHA's formal and informal partnerships will be reviewed and strengthened, including agreement with UNDP on future terms of engagement and collaboration in preparedness. In consultation with UNISDR, OCHA also intends to work with other agencies to reach a "common understanding" of how different parts of the system define disaster response preparedness. OCHA also points to the

13 United Nations Development Group, *Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction into the CCA and UNDAF: A Guide for UN Country Teams* (New York, 2009).

14 Funds for these activities were drawn from country-level funding, UNDP core resources, and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) thematic trust fund.

15 Defined as those eligible to receive assistance from the International Development Association.

16 Defined as those eligible to receive assistance from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

17 See [http://gfdr.org/docs/GFDRRDonorPledgesandContributions\\_15Dec08.pdf](http://gfdr.org/docs/GFDRRDonorPledgesandContributions_15Dec08.pdf).

18 For a broader discussion of this issue, see OCHA, *Funding for Preparedness*. Paper prepared on behalf of the Emergency Director's Meeting (9 March 2009).

CCA/UNDAF Guidelines to mainstream DRR, including response preparedness, and aims to have all relevant OCHA staff trained on their application.<sup>19</sup> UNICEF, WFP, and FAO are other active UN agencies in this area. UNICEF's strategic priorities include integrating stronger risk reduction strategies throughout its programming and developing stronger national capacity in areas such as preparedness and national response. With UNICEF, WFP co-chairs the IASC Sub-Working Group on preparedness and contingency planning. WFP and FAO have considerable experience in pandemic preparedness. All of the UN humanitarian agencies, however, note there is some donor reluctance to stretch beyond traditional humanitarian response mandates into the more developmental area of DRR.

Disaster preparedness is one of four core areas of the IFRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies. The IFRC supports and builds national society capacity in strengthening disaster preparedness planning, building effective disaster response mechanisms, raising community awareness and public education, and disaster mitigation and reduction.<sup>20</sup> The national societies and the IFRC have a strong reputation for developing the capacity of communities in disaster preparedness. The IFRC has stepped up requests for support of its preparedness efforts, launching an appeal for flood preparedness in West and Central Africa in 2008,<sup>21</sup> and, in 2009, launching an “early warning, early action” operation, appealing for support to Red Cross and Red Crescent operations in sixteen countries in the same region.

In June 2007 UNISDR facilitated the establishment of the Global Network of NGOs, with the goal to contribute to the growing global effort to reduce the impact of disasters and build disaster-resilient communities. NGOs working in this area have growing programmes, although all note the challenge in financing their preparedness activities

19 OCHA, *Strategic Framework 2010–2013* (draft, provided September 2009); and OCHA interviews (2009).

20 IFRC, *Strategy 2020: Saving Lives, Changing Minds* (November 2009).

21 The funds were used to stock emergency relief items around the region, train volunteers to inform populations what to do in case of flooding, and place disaster response teams on stand-by for rapid deployment.

in any predictable manner. The focus of many such INGOs is on community-based disaster risk reduction in which preparedness plays a part but is tied up with broader DRR. The US and the UK both have coordination mechanisms for NGOs engaged in DRR. The Emergency Capacity Building Project also helps to coordinate the DRR work of NGOs, including work at the field level. Many NGOs responded positively to the proposed CAP mechanism, but all were wary about UN leadership and stressed there would need to be transparency and equity about the processes of applying and decision making.

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## 2.2 Global and country-level coordination

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At the global level, roles in coordination and policy formulation are not clear. There are overlapping mandates and a lack of clarity regarding some areas of responsibility and accountability. In addition, there is little serious coordination between the leading organisations. Each operates under its own mandate and engages at the inter-agency level on an ad hoc basis. UNDP and OCHA, for example, have shared responsibilities in the areas of disaster preparedness, but have yet to agree on a collaborative approach. A “Joint Work Programme of the ISDR System” was developed for 2008/2009 that reflects some agreed priorities for shared work; however, donors interviewed for this study noted that it was not sufficiently driven by needs at the country level.

An area of operational coordination is the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) project, a partnership between UNISDR, OCHA, and UNDP. It was created in 2007 and relates to all five priorities of the HFA. CADRI provides capacity enhancement services to both the UN system at the country level as well as to governments. Funding, however, is relatively limited and interviewees cited the need for greater institutional engagement in the project.

On the humanitarian side, the main coordination forum for disaster preparedness at the global level is the inter-agency IASC Sub-Working Group on Contingency Planning and Preparedness, currently

jointly chaired by UNICEF and WFP. This body meets quarterly and has produced some important work, including undertaking regional simulations, providing training, and producing the quarterly Early Warning Early Action Report. The IASC Sub-Working Group also produces the Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWS) Web site. While it is seen as an effective means for inter-agency dialogue, particularly regarding chronic and slow onset emergencies, it does not act as a coordinating body at the country level.

At the national level, primary responsibility for DRR rests with national authorities. However, significant challenges have been identified in developing national ownership for DRR strategies and activities. Often national systems suffer the same bifurcation that donors reflect at the international level, whereby disaster management and DRR are not well integrated into ongoing development efforts. As the recent Global Assessment Report on DRR concluded, “In general, the institutional and legislative arrangements for disaster risk reduction are weakly connected to development sectors.”<sup>22</sup> Another report on DRR progress in sub-Saharan Africa noted that “most countries have not established norms for allocating budgets for risk mitigation as part of ongoing development planning.”<sup>23</sup> The DRR and preparedness plans and policies developed by national governments have generally not supported the building of local capacity to the extent that is necessary. There is a widely recognised need to support local-level initiatives and government-civil society partnerships, if DRR efforts are to succeed.<sup>24</sup>

National platforms, advocated for by UNISDR, are intended to be the vehicle to bring together the full range of stakeholders concerned with DRR, harnessing their combined potential to

build resilience to disasters. Stakeholders include government (relevant line ministries and disaster management authorities), NGOs, academic and scientific institutions, professional associations, Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, the private sector, and the media.<sup>25</sup> At present, however, there are only forty-five national platforms in existence.

On the international side, operational coordination of DRR is the primary responsibility of the UN Resident Coordinator’s office. The revised terms of reference of the Resident Coordinator, for example, now include ensuring DRR is effectively incorporated into country-level programming processes such as CCA and UNDAF and initiating and leading international preparedness efforts in support of national efforts, including contingency planning. The RC is also required to establish and leads a Disaster Management Team (DMT) comprising all relevant stakeholders, to steer international preparedness efforts.<sup>26</sup>

The country case studies, below, illustrate the challenges inherent in achieving cohesion between national and international “systems.” In Bangladesh, for example, a coherent system on paper appears to break down in practice into a number of distinct platforms, driven by numerous actors with overlapping mandates and funding streams. These are also loosely grouped along development and humanitarian lines. The clear focal point for bringing cohesion between these systems in CAP countries is the “double-hatted” Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator, nominally the head of both UNDP and OCHA with multiple reporting lines, including one to the Emergency Relief Coordinator.

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### 2.3 Funding for preparedness and risk reduction activities in the international humanitarian system

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The HFA contains a commitment that “states, within the bounds of their financial capabilities . . . should

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22 UN, *Summary and Recommendations: 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction* (2009), 4.

23 Commission of the African Union, UNISDR, and World Bank, *Report on the Status of Disaster Risk Reduction in the Sub-Saharan African Region* (2008).

24 UN, *Summary and Recommendations: 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction* (2009), 5; T. Schuemer-Cross and B. Heaven-Taylor, *The Right to Survive: The Humanitarian Challenge for the Twenty-first Century* (Oxford: Oxfam, 2009), 9.

25 National platforms have also invited bilateral development agencies, United Nations organisations, and the World Bank to participate.

26 UNDG, Terms of Reference for the United Nations Resident Coordinator (2009).

provide for and support . . . the implementation of this Framework for Action in disaster-prone developing countries.”<sup>27</sup> Previous analyses of global funding levels as well as field case studies indicate that there has been significant under-investment in all areas, including preparedness as well as mitigation measures. There are gaps at all levels—local, national, and international.<sup>28</sup> A recent study, for example, found that most national disaster management organisations in sub-Saharan Africa face funding constraints which limit their effectiveness.<sup>29</sup>

DRR financing for most donor governments has traditionally been drawn from humanitarian budgets. A new area of support and systems are still being developed on both the humanitarian and development sides.<sup>30</sup> A number of governments intend that humanitarian budgets will support preparedness and small scale mitigation activities (forestation, small dykes for flooding, etc.) as well as global and regional strategic mechanisms and initiatives on DRR, with the understanding that the development side will support national-level initiatives on DRR. In interviews, some donors with responsibility for humanitarian funding reported frustration that their development counterparts have not assumed sufficient responsibility in this area. This has left the humanitarian side to fill the gaps and to drive the strategic thinking on improving DRR. Because of donor regulations, humanitarian funding often requires shorter timeframes (one year or eighteen months maximum) and flows through international agencies rather than national authorities or national NGOs—requirements particularly ill-suited to DRR programming which, to be effective, demands longer timeframes and direct investments

27 UNISDR, *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters* (World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, 18–22 January 2005), 18.

28 See, for example, UN, *Summary and Recommendations: 2009 Global Assessment Report*; and Schuemer-Cross and Heaven-Taylor, *The Right to Survive*.

29 Commission of the African Union, UNISDR, and World Bank, *Report on the Status of Disaster Risk Reduction in the Sub-Saharan African Region* (2008), i, 25.

30 There are some cases where DRR has been recognised as spanning a wider set of portfolios, prompting some donors to develop entirely new structures that create operational networks between development, humanitarian, foreign, and defence policy personnel.

at the local and national levels. Some donors, such as DFID, have committed to allocating a standard percentage of their humanitarian aid towards DRR activities. The need for more donors to adopt such targets has been echoed in other fora—they can be useful in advocacy efforts seeking donors to make wider commitments to DRR.<sup>31</sup> However, it has also been questioned whether doing so might further reinforce the separation of DRR projects from regular sectoral development.<sup>32</sup>

The study undertook a detailed financial analysis which sought to determine the overall level and types of spending by the international humanitarian community for disaster preparedness, and to identify changes and trends in these aid flows over recent years. This can be found in Annex 3.


The findings suggest that preparedness and risk reduction represents a very small percentage of overall humanitarian activity and expenditure: approximately 2.1 percent of total project allocations and 0.7 percent of total humanitarian funding. Despite such small percentages, these figures represent a significant increase from previous years. Funding for preparedness and risk reduction has, in recent years, received significantly greater attention and financial resources from humanitarian donors. In particular, preparedness and risk reduction has grown at an even faster rate than total humanitarian expenditures, which are at an all time high. On average the number of project allocations has more than doubled, and total funding has more than tripled from 2005 to 2008. Avian flu preparedness received more contributions than all other preparedness and risk reduction activities and sectors combined—roughly \$200 million over three years, according to FTS.<sup>33</sup>

31 For example, in 2009 UNISDR (Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction conference, Geneva, 16–19 June 2009) called for the establishment of clear national and international financial commitments to DRR, for example to allocate a minimum of 10 percent of all humanitarian and reconstruction funding, at least 1 percent of development funding, and at least 30 percent of climate change adaptation funding to DRR.

32 Mitchell and van Aalst, *Convergence of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 8.

33 Most of this was channeled through the Food and Agriculture Organisation, which leads the UN-wide UN System Influenza Coordination (UNSIC) established in

**Figure 1** FTS-reported funding for preparedness and disaster risk reduction, 2001–2008



Source: OCHA FTS (figures are in US\$ as of 19 March 2009, inflation adjusted)

The bulk of this funding has come from a handful of official humanitarian donors (United States, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden, and ECHO). ECHO’s DIPECHO program increased its preparedness funding more than fivefold from 2001 to 2008,<sup>34</sup> as has the UK since 2006,<sup>35</sup> through DFID’s commitment to allocate 10 percent of its humanitarian funding to preparedness. The US government does not use a percentage guideline for preparedness spending but engages in preparedness and risk reduction activities in separate, long running programs on national, regional, and global bases, many of which may not be captured by FTS.<sup>36</sup> From 2004 to 2008 these expenditures rose on average by


September 2005 (see <http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/response.html>).

34 From USD7 million in 2001 to USD48 million in 2008 (Euro-USD exchange rates averaged for each individual year). ECHO, “The DIPECHO Programme,” [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/dipecho\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/dipecho_en.htm) (accessed October 2009).

35 DFID, “DRR 10 Percent Commitments in CHASE,” internal report provided to the study (2009).

36 For instance, USAID’s Program for the Enhancement of Emergency Response (PEER) for preparedness and mitigation in South Asia and the Regional Disaster Assistance Program (RDAP) trainer (training program in the Americas) (“USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Preparedness and Mitigation Programs”). [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/humanitarian\\_assistance/disaster\\_assistance/publications/prep\\_mit/index.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/prep_mit/index.html).

**Figure 2** Humanitarian contributions for DP and DRR\* by region, 2001–2008



Source: OCHA FTS (figures as of 19 March 2009)

\* Excludes contributions for avian flu preparedness

50 percent, and fluctuated from between 5 and 15 percent of total US humanitarian expenditure.<sup>37</sup>

Roughly half of all global preparedness contributions as reported to FTS were targeted to the Asia region and, of all regions, Asia had the highest percentage of its humanitarian funding allocated for this type of activity.

The vast majority of humanitarian contributions for preparedness were channelled through UN agency recipients, while the smallest portion (less than one percent) went directly to affected-state governments. Somewhat in line with this finding, the data suggest that a significant portion of these allocations was targeted at enhancing preparedness of the *international system* (i.e., building preparedness capacity for response within the UN agencies and global clusters) as opposed to national- and local-level capacities for preparedness and risk reduction.<sup>38</sup>

While overall growth in preparedness funding and activity has been significant, it has not followed a steady course. It fluctuates widely from year to year. The data suggest it comes in waves, typically after major sudden onset disasters, reflecting a momentum to boost attention and investment that occurs in the immediate aftermath of crises, and which subsequently wanes. Thus the system lacks any predictability from year to year, and these funding patterns appear to fall far short of what some would consider to be sound and sensible practice in humanitarian aid funding, i.e., a calculated investment in preparedness for and prevention of future emergencies. It has been speculated that even just creating clearer reporting categories would help to increase the legitimacy of preparedness funding and create incentives for donors to demonstrate their efforts in this area.

### 3 A global, thematic CAP

As outlined in the terms of reference, the study considered the feasibility of a global, thematic CAP for disaster preparedness and response capacity. The team also examined a range of other possible options, partly due to the significant challenges that were identified in investigating the feasibility of a CAP mechanism.

Section 3.1 will detail the nature of a possible global CAP, including the criteria for eligibility, management and coordination of the mechanism, and possible donor support. It will also detail findings from the case studies in Ethiopia and Bangladesh. Section 4 will highlight the multiple concerns raised regarding

the feasibility of a global CAP which include the architectural difficulties of supporting a humanitarian financing mechanism in an area of work that should be primarily developmental and requires long-term sustainable support. It will also consider the range of other options to support DP work.

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#### 3.1 A global, thematic CAP for disaster preparedness

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In addition to the broader feasibility of the global, thematic CAP for disaster preparedness, the study team was asked to consider a number of criteria in relation to the development of the CAP mechanism, including the feasibility of

- harnessing and channelling funds for the CAP towards preparedness activities at the country or regional level;

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37 USAID and OFDA annual reports for fiscal years 2001–2008, [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/humanitarian\\_assistance/disaster\\_assistance/publications/annual\\_reports/index.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/annual_reports/index.html).

38 The “international” share of preparedness capacity funding totalled around 22 percent when avian flu allocations were not included and as much as 39 percent when they were.

- allocating funding for the global CAP over longer timeframes than traditional CAPs (which are normally restricted to one year for implementation); and
- using the CAP to support national governments and local civil society as recipients of funding.

Interviewees voiced the need for more coherent, predictable financing for disaster preparedness and DRR more broadly. Whether it should be a CAP mechanism, however, is a more complex question—there were mixed views overall.

Interviewees stressed that the success of a CAP would depend on a range of factors, including explicit donor agreement to support the mechanism, agreement between the international organisations mandated to undertake DRR as to the division of roles and responsibilities regarding disaster preparedness, and a clear set of objectives and criteria for what could be funded in the CAP. They also stated the need to overcome some of the familiar limiting aspects of the CAP overall as a planning, programming, coordination, and financing tool.

### 3.1.1 Thematic appeals

There are very few examples of thematic or global consolidated appeals. The appeal for improving humanitarian response capacity at the international level, otherwise known as the *Cluster Appeal*, launched in 2006, is the most well known;<sup>39</sup> another was affiliated with the cluster appeal on gender mainstreaming. The most relevant to this study are the 2008 *Southern African Region Preparedness and Response Plan*<sup>40</sup> and the *Ugandan Regional Flood Preparedness Appeal*.<sup>41</sup> As noted earlier, the IFRC

39 UN, *Appeal for Improving Humanitarian Response Capacity: Cluster 2006 Revision* (New York/Geneva: OCHA, 2006); UN, *Appeal for Building Global Humanitarian Response Capacity 1 April 2007–31 March 2008* (New York/Geneva: OCHA, 2007).

40 The gender mainstreaming appeal was launched in 2006: IASC, *Five Ways to Strengthen Gender Mainstreaming in Humanitarian Action: An Inter-agency Proposal for Action* (Geneva: United Nations, October 2006). The Southern African appeal was launched in 2008: UN OCHA, *Southern African Region Preparedness and Response Plan* (Geneva: United Nations, February 2008).

41 The humanitarian community and the government drafted a disaster preparedness plan in March 2008 according to

has also recently launched a number of thematic preparedness appeals to support the work of national societies in West and Central Africa.

Perhaps part of the reason there are few thematic CAPs is because there is a general view that CAPs are designed on the basis of need, and needs, including disaster preparedness, should be identified in each sector and incorporated into country-based appeals. It is also acknowledged, however, that disaster preparedness is often overlooked in traditional CAPs and Flash Appeals in favour of supporting “immediate, life-saving” needs. Lessons from the 2008 *Southern African Region Preparedness and Response Plan* confirm that even when designed in advance with specific preparedness measures in place it was difficult to convince donors to invest and, as a result, the preparedness aspects of the appeal were not funded. On the early recovery side, efforts exist to assist stakeholders to consider how to incorporate early recovery requirements in Flash Appeals, although it is not clear how effective the guidance has been in improving donor response to this thematic/cross-cutting area.<sup>42</sup> Some also consider that CAPs are designed for emergency responses which are very contextual and fluid in terms of funding opportunities, as opposed to DRR financing which needs to be more sustainable, predictable and clearly targeted.

### 3.1.2 Structure and composition

This section considers the structure and composition of a possible global, thematic CAP on disaster preparedness.

#### *What form might it take?*

A thematic disaster preparedness appeal would be launched at the global level for donor governments to support. Proposals would be generated at the national and regional levels and a range of countries

HFA Priority Five. Launched in June 2008 it was specifically designed around flood disaster preparedness projects and early warning systems.

42 See *Guidance Note on Early Recovery* (April 2008), and the note on *Including Early Recovery Requirements in Flash Appeals: A Phased Approach* (January 2009).

would be eligible to participate (see section below on eligibility). Given this, one of the most important considerations for the CAP would be having a clear set of objectives and definitions, as well as common standards and formats, to ensure that country-based plans are similar and relatively comparable between countries and regions.

The objectives and definition would ultimately need to be determined by the coordinating agencies; however, as a starting point, the *Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package for Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework*<sup>43</sup> is a useful resource and could act as a guide to determine these criteria. In line with Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework, the CAP would be for *strengthening preparedness for response*. However, rather than supporting this “at all levels,” the CAP could primarily target the national and regional levels.

The CAP could have two objectives:

- increasing capacity to predict, monitor, and prepare to reduce damage or address potential threats; and
- strengthening preparedness to respond to an emergency and to assist those who have been adversely affected.<sup>44</sup>

Specific activities eligible for support could include:

- risk and vulnerability assessments;
- hazard monitoring, forecasting and early warning systems;
- contingency planning processes;
- the stockpiling of equipment and supplies;
- information management and communications;
- the creation and maintenance of emergency services and standby arrangements; and
- personnel training, community drills and exercises, and public education.<sup>45</sup>

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43 United Nations, *Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package for Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework* (New York/Geneva: United Nations, ISDR, and OCHA, 2008).

44 These are taken from United Nations, *Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response*, 1.

45 These are adapted from United Nations, *Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response*, 3 and 17.

The CAP would be focused on the country level, and based on nationally identified priorities. All projects would need to be nationally or regionally located. As important as it would be for country-level plans to be based on a common format and standard, the CAP must be in line with the national DRR strategy and disaster management implementation plan and must utilise the National Platform (where these exist). There will therefore need to be some flexibility as to how requests for support can be formulated.

No support for international preparedness would be drawn from this mechanism. For example, the CAP could not support the internal organisational preparedness needs of an international agency at the headquarters level. Non-government actors, including the UN and international and local civil society groups, would be eligible for funding at the national level. In contexts where state capacity is extremely weak or the political space for independent humanitarian action (including critical preparedness activities) is limited, non-government actors may need to play a more direct role in identifying key priorities and implementing activities.

Building local capacity and empowering communities is crucial to the success of many kinds of disaster preparedness activities. A key aim of a potential CAP should be to support the work of local civil society groups, including partnerships between civil society and governments (especially local governments). This will need to be explicitly emphasised in any guidance produced for the CAP.

As noted above, much of the challenge of supporting disaster preparedness and DRR more broadly in the humanitarian field has been that agencies have been restricted by short, emergency-oriented timeframes to achieve work that takes vastly longer. As a mechanism, the CAP (and guidelines) is not restricted to a single-year time frame.<sup>46</sup> The restrictions depend on the source of funds and the accompanying conditions; for example, most donors have one-year humanitarian funding cycles. A thematic CAP and the projects in it would have to have a multi-year strategic perspective. Ideally,

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46 *Consolidated Appeals Process Guidelines [as endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on 13 April 1994]*.

projects could seek financing for up to three years, or two minimum. The challenges related to the sources of funding are discussed below.

### *Who could be eligible?*

A difficulty in this exercise would be to narrow down the range of eligible countries. If a global, thematic CAP was open to all disaster-prone developing countries, it would potentially be unmanageable and the financing spread too thinly to be of any real impact. Needs-based criteria would have to apply. At the same time, where national governments would be primary implementers of DRR or preparedness, considering other criteria, such as implementing capacity and general governance issues, makes sense.

No internationally agreed upon set of priority countries for receiving DRR financing exists. Neither do unified criteria for ranking countries according to disaster risk. As the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), which maintains one major database (EM-DAT), has noted, “there is a lack of international consensus regarding best practices for collecting these data . . . there remains huge variability in definitions, methodologies, tools and sourcing.”<sup>47</sup> The UNDP,<sup>48</sup> UNISDR,<sup>49</sup> OCHA,<sup>50</sup> and the GFDRR,<sup>51</sup> for example, use differing ranking systems to prioritise their DRR interventions.

47 EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database, <http://www.emdat.be/about>.

48 UNDP selects its priority countries based on a combination of needs-based data, government capacity, and UNDP’s previous engagement with a country.

49 ISDR released a Mortality Risk Index (MRI), launched in June 2009, based on the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), which underpins the *Global Assessment Report: Risk and Poverty in a Changing Climate*. The MRI only covers sudden onset events, grouping countries according to their risk of four sudden onset events: tropical cyclones, earthquakes, floods, and landslides. See [http://www.preventionweb.net/files/9929\\_MRIA3.pdf](http://www.preventionweb.net/files/9929_MRIA3.pdf).

50 OCHA regional offices use the Global Focus Model to classify countries according to hazard, vulnerability, capacity, and the UN role.

51 The GFDRR developed a ranking based on a country’s percent of GDP and percent of the population in areas of risk. This in turn was based in part on “the Identification of Global Natural Disaster Risk Hotspots (Hotspots),” a joint project with Columbia University that last published its list of such “hotspots” in 2005 and is planning another study soon. The GFDRR combined these criteria with other factors, such as a country’s income, its capacity and the past

Each of the rankings of disaster-prone countries has limitations; the research team was not able to conclude that one list or combination of lists is ideally suited for a potential CAP or CAP-like mechanism. An adequate compromise may be to select countries which fulfil the following:

Lower income *or* lower-middle income, as defined by the World Bank *and* fulfil at least one of the following criteria:

- Among the top ten countries according to percentage of the total area at risk;
- Among the top ten countries according to percentage of the population in areas at risk;
- Among the top ten countries according to percentage of GDP in areas at risk;<sup>52</sup>
- Among the top twenty of the UN’s Mortality Risk Index;<sup>53</sup>
- A CAP currently is in existence;
- A context where there has been a Flash Appeal in the past three years.<sup>54</sup>

Table 1 is a sample, indicative list of fifty-four countries which could be eligible, based on the available data for the above criteria.<sup>55</sup> It should be noted, however, that the data for some countries is missing, thereby preventing their inclusion. If such

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engagement of the government on this issue, to determine which countries to fund. See Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, *Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction into the Fight against Poverty: GFDRR Annual Report 2008* (2008), 81; and World Bank, *Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Hazard Management Unit, the World Bank, 2005).

52 The first three criteria were drawn from the World Bank *Hotspots* study, which for the purposes of this sample list was gathered from the *GFDRR Annual Report 2008*. A more recent update of this study may be available soon.

53 The Mortality Risk Index was launched in June 2009 by ISDR and is based on the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT).

54 CAPs and Flash Appeals are launched for complex, major emergencies or crises and natural disasters where the government of the affected country has requested international assistance to cope with a crisis. It seems reasonable that these countries be eligible given national capacities to cope with the crisis have been outstripped, and resources for preparedness would have been drawn upon. Only Flash Appeals associated with natural disasters were included.

55 The data on percent of area, population, and GDP at risk (*Hotspots* data) was taken from the *GFDRR Annual Report 2008*, which seems to have used a more updated version of the data than was available in the 2005 *Hotspots* study.

**Table 1 Eligible countries**

<b>Middle East and Eastern Europe</b>	<b>Africa</b>	<b>Asia and the Pacific</b>	<b>Latin America</b>
Albania	Benin	Afghanistan	Bolivia
Iraq	Burkina Faso	Bangladesh	Ecuador
Kyrgyz Republic	Burundi	Cambodia	El Salvador
occupied Palestinian Territories	CAR	China	Guatemala
Syria	Chad	DPRK	Haiti
Tajikistan	Comoros	India	Honduras
Yemen	Cote d'Ivoire	Indonesia	Nicaragua
	Djibouti	Lao PDR	
	DRC	Myanmar	
	Ethiopia	Nepal	
	Ghana	Pakistan	
	Kenya	Philippines	
	Lesotho	Sri Lanka	
	Madagascar	Vietnam	
	Malawi		
	Mali		
	Niger		
	Mozambique		
	Senegal		
	Somalia		
	Sudan		
	Swaziland		
	Togo		
	Uganda		
	Zambia		
	Zimbabwe		

lists were to actually be used, an attempt should be made to be as thorough as possible in collecting data from all available sources.

Regardless of what list or lists are used, it would be important to have eligibility criteria clearly delineated and fully transparent.<sup>56</sup> The thematic CAP would not be imposed; each eligible country would determine if such support was necessary, supported by the UNCT/IASC country team and international donors.

Eligibility in terms of receiving entities would be intentionally wide ranging. The basic CAP structure is, despite its historical application, well suited for a variety of government, civil society, and international

actors as appealing agencies.<sup>57</sup> In this sense, the CAP mechanism is one of the more flexible tools available, as compared to the CERF, for example, which is restricted to UN agencies and the IOM. The submission of coordinated project proposals would therefore be open to national governments, national NGOs, national societies of the Red Cross movement, UN operational agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and INGOs based in the country. Interviewees expressed

<sup>56</sup> It should be noted that non-CAP funding models might take an approach that would not require such pre-eligibility criteria (i.e., they would not limit those who can apply for funding). These have the potential to be less strictly needs-based, but are perhaps more likely to encourage the development of sustainable DRR and preparedness initiatives. See Section 4.1, "Other options."

<sup>57</sup> The CAP guidelines state that it is a programming process through which national, regional, and international relief systems (including UN operational agencies; and, where appropriate to the situation, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), NGOs, bilateral donors as well as appropriate national and regional structures) are able to mobilise and respond to selective major or complex emergencies that require such a response.

concerns that the UN might dominate a CAP type mechanism and that one way of guarding against this would be to ring-fence a percentage of the funding for national governments and civil society. Civil society projects could potentially be undertaken in partnership with INGOs or the national societies of the Red Cross. One key to success in this scenario is a strong and inclusive national platform for DRR.

#### *How would it be developed, managed and coordinated?*

As a global CAP, coordination mechanisms would need to be mobilised at three levels—national, regional and international.

#### *The country level*

At the national level the process would ideally be convened by the relevant national disaster authority and, as noted above, would utilise the National Platform where these exist.

On the international side at the country level, OCHA and UNDP could act as the lead convening agencies. In contexts where OCHA has a presence on the ground (often those countries where a country-level CAP is already in place), it could be the lead agency in working with the government to bring together relevant state and non-state actors. In non-CAP contexts, UNDP would be the lead—as reflected in its mandate to take responsibility for operational activities for natural disaster mitigation, prevention, and preparedness.<sup>58</sup>

Similar to traditional CAPs, the process would involve more than preparing the appeal document; it would first undertake a joint assessment of disaster preparedness needs, and coordinate a strategic planning exercise which would form the basis of the appeal. Depending on the extent to which a national DRR strategy and disaster management implementation plan exists, the strategic plan would either draw specifically from it, or support

its beginnings. All proposals should be based on a sound analysis and assessment of the disaster risks. Where relevant, they should draw on Post Disaster Needs Assessment and other needs assessment tools.

The strategic disaster preparedness plan should include

- an analysis of the type, frequency, and nature of disasters faced, and the impacts on the population and the country's land and assets;
- an analysis of existing preparedness capacities, both within the national system and those developed by international agencies;
- a breakdown of existing disaster preparedness support from other sources, including bilateral donors, GFDRR, UNDP, CAP, Flash Appeal, CERF, Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF), Emergency Response Funds (ERFs), etc.;
- a clear and prioritised description of preparedness needs, drawn from the needs assessment and having a multi-year perspective (approximately three years); and
- a precise indication of the roles, mandates, and intended involvement of the actors (including the national government, national NGOs, and international partner agencies) involved in implementing the preparedness activities.

The role of OCHA and UNDP in this process would be to assist the government and other relevant organisations in undertaking a joint needs assessment, providing additional capacity to augment that of the field (primarily from regional offices) where necessary, supporting the national coordination structures, and supporting the strategic planning exercise.

The disaster preparedness appeal would be drafted in country, and would be derived from the assessment and strategic plan. To establish the appeal, the main task would be to develop a set of funding requirements based on the strategic plan's components. These components must reflect the prioritised needs of the national disaster management authorities and all activities should be coordinated.

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58 UN General Assembly, *Resolution A/RES/52/12B, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform* (9 January 1998), para. 16.

### *Regional support*

As many disasters cross national borders and affect more than one country simultaneously, the country-based appeal will need to be assessed for complementarity and compatibility at the regional level. For example, some of the early warning systems demand regional cooperation. Ideally a country-based appeal would be founded on prior cross-border and regional agreements of mutual assistance, or would be in a country that is already implementing programmes.

Utilising OCHA and UNDP's increasing regional DRR capacity, the appeals would be received in their regional offices.<sup>59</sup> This process would be either supported jointly by OCHA and UNDP, where the agencies have common regional locations (both have offices in Bangkok for the Asia Pacific, Panama for Latin America, Johannesburg for Southern Africa, and Cairo for the Middle East and North Africa<sup>60</sup>). Additional support in Africa could come from OCHA's other two regional offices (Dakar and Nairobi). Where these are well functioning, the UN's Regional Director Teams would be appropriate vehicles to convene the process of identifying cross-border complementarities between projects, technically supported by OCHA's Regional Disaster Response Advisers and UNDP's Regional Disaster Reduction Advisors.<sup>61</sup>

UNISDR would ideally also be involved at the regional level, supporting UNDP and OCHA. In particular, ISDR could ensure that national plans are coherent with any existing frameworks or guidelines.

Regional mechanisms would also potentially offer important support, particularly in the context of small islands states such as the Caribbean and the

Pacific where regional approaches are increasingly seen as an effective and comprehensive way to address DRR priorities.<sup>62</sup> In other contexts regional mechanisms such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are growing to be potentially important in the area of disaster management, particularly in garnering political cooperation on international assistance issues within their membership.

### *Headquarters support*

The country-based appeals would be pulled together into a draft Regional Disaster Preparedness Appeal and submitted to headquarters.

At the headquarters' level the CAP section of OCHA would manage the global process, which is primarily one of confirming the programmatic quality of proposed actions and the cost efficiency of the proposals, editing projects, and pulling the regional submissions into one document. The CAP section would also request the headquarters of appealing agencies to authorise proposals.

At the time of launching a thematic CAP, donor governments would be presented with one document, which would have a worldwide executive summary of disaster preparedness needs. Regional documents would be published separately.

The in-country planning process would likely take three to six months, and the regional and headquarters processes another three months. Therefore the planning cycle for a thematic CAP would take approximately nine months.

Monitoring and evaluation would be similar to regular CAPs and determined by the individual agency/donor agreements. Where national governments receive support, the Paris principles on aid effectiveness should apply.<sup>63</sup>

59 By the end of 2009, UNDP is committed to having at least one regional disaster reduction advisor in each UNDP regional centre (Bangkok, Panama, Johannesburg, Dakar, and Cairo). These regional advisors provide expert guidance to national disaster reduction advisors based in countries in their respective regions.

60 The two agencies do not cover an identical list of countries in each of these offices, however.

61 A Regional Directors Team (RDT) consists of the UNDG regional directors whose primary role includes oversight and provision of technical support in the common country programming process.

62 DFID and CIDA, for example, are providing support to the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) to strengthen national disaster organisations and build community resilience in support of the regional Comprehensive Disaster Management Strategy.

63 OECD–DAC, *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)* and the *Acra Agenda for Action (2008)*, <http://www.oecd.org>.

### *What are the organisational, human and financial resource implications for establishing the CAP?*

A thematic, global CAP would be a very resource intensive endeavour at multiple levels, particularly when compared with possible levels of funding. At present there is no agreement between the two key organisations, OCHA and UNDP, as to the appropriate roles and responsibilities regarding disaster preparedness work. This would need to occur in advance of any thematic CAP being launched. OCHA faces limited financial, administrative, and technical capacity to take this forward. It would require a clear decision from OCHA management that this is a corporate priority and a corresponding signal from the donor community that financial support would be forthcoming.

In our interviews, staff in the key UN agencies stressed that establishing the normative guidance and supporting headquarters offices in their role in the CAP should not be underestimated, although it is unclear exactly what this might mean in terms of time and resources. In interviews, OCHA staff highlighted that additional staff requirements to support the global CAP would go against the general trend of consolidation. At the field level, OCHA's stretched resources were particularly evident. Finally it was noted that this is not just an issue of headcount—leading disaster preparedness efforts requires semi-specialised staff and training.

In terms of the cost of the CAP, it was far beyond the scope of the research to estimate the overall cost of total global disaster preparedness needs. No such assessment has been undertaken and current reporting on the financing of disaster preparedness is extremely weak. Interviewees suggested that something in the range of a few hundred million (e.g., \$100–300 million) globally would be the minimum amount that ought to be available to make an appeal worthwhile. This is *not* however a figure based on an estimate of total levels of need for international financing on disaster preparedness. Rather it suggests the level of additional contributions needed from the international system

[org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf](http://dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf).

for preparedness. One of the next steps, if a CAP is established, would be to develop a clear process for estimating preparedness needs in various countries (and agreeing on criteria to compare relative vulnerability country-to-country, should full levels of need not be met).<sup>64</sup>

### *Where is the money?*

All interviewees noted that the success of a global, thematic CAP would highly depend on donor government agreement to fully support the mechanism. Donor interviewees had mixed reactions to the idea of a CAP mechanism. Most agreed with the need to find a means to ensure more strategic, predictable, and coherent financing of DRR, and that disaster preparedness is the most obvious area for humanitarian donors to invest in given that support in this area should be aligned to humanitarian response capacities. Donors also noted that it was important to protect humanitarian budgets from taking on all of DRR financing given that the financing instruments are not well suited for long-term support, and that it is important for development actors to take on a larger share of the burden for DRR spending, specifically on prevention and mitigation.

Some interviewees were concerned that a CAP might not attract the necessary support, partly because donors are sceptical that it is the right financing mechanism for an agenda that should be supported by sustainable, developmental mechanisms. Many felt that DRR, including preparedness, should be addressed holistically within development cooperation programmes. Some donors were concerned about duplicating mechanisms, including the GFDRR, UNDP, and the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction, administered by UNISDR. The donors stressed that a CAP might add yet another layer to an already uncoordinated set of mechanisms.

<sup>64</sup> There did not seem to be sufficient evidence to suggest that 10 percent of humanitarian spending (or 1 percent of development spending) is an adequate or truly needs-based target. Targets such as these may tend to be donor driven rather than needs based, despite the fact that donors currently fall far short of them.

Many respondents noted that a three year timeframe is necessary, and some donors, including the US and ECHO, have made significant efforts to lengthen their project timeframes for DRR work supported by humanitarian budgets. But even these donors have only been able to lengthen their timeframes to a maximum of eighteen months to two years. Further lengthening among a broad set of donors would require their governments' consensus on this issue and/or agreement to coordinate with each other at the global level to support projects collectively.

Finally, at least one donor government noted that direct support to national governments would not be possible through its humanitarian mechanisms. Another, ECHO under the DIPECHO programme, can fund projects presented by a partner that works with a government, but not governments directly.

#### *A first step . . . international agreement and a regional pilot*

Given that this mechanism would ultimately involve a partnership between national and donor governments, it might usefully be raised via an international platform to facilitate member state support. The humanitarian segment of ECOSOC might be the appropriate forum for member states and the GHD forum could garner the support of a key group of active donor governments. For international implementing partners, presenting the concept to the IASC, via its sub-working group on contingency planning and preparedness, would be necessary. The term “CAP” might also usefully be played down in presenting the mechanism, called, rather, a “strategic plan for disaster preparedness,” even though it might be modelled and organised on the best practices of a CAP.

Although this would ultimately be intended to be a global mechanism, there would be a need for a staggered “roll out.” This would allow time to establish the mechanism as well as ensure that sufficient donor funding in each region was available. Piloting it in a region with significant experience in DP work might be a useful first step. South East Asia is a possible option in this regard; a pilot project

could run from 2011–2013 from which lessons could be drawn before launching globally.

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## 3.2 Field analysis

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Case studies in Ethiopia and Bangladesh were undertaken to examine the feasibility of a CAP at the country level. The findings were drawn into the global analysis, but each is analysed in more detail below. Both studies reinforced the overall findings that there is a significant need for additional funding, multiple uncoordinated actors are working on DRR, and sustainable financing is difficult to come by largely because of the problematic split between humanitarian and development budget lines and differing abilities and means of engaging with governments. In both cases, there was general consensus that a government-led appeal would be preferable. In neither, however, was it clear which international actor would assist in coordinating the appeal. Both contexts highlighted problems with the CAP model, specifically that where there is a strong government, the CAP and its association with an appeal for external assistance might be resisted. There are ways to address this on a country-by-country basis, as suggested in the discussions on Ethiopia and Bangladesh below. Part of the problem of launching a global, thematic appeal, however, is that it would be important to have commonality of approaches between countries in order for each to be presented at the regional and headquarters level for comparability.

The two case studies differed in specific ways, as described below, and the study team is mindful that they do not represent all contexts.

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### 3.2.1 Ethiopia

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In Ethiopia, there was wide support among those consulted for a CAP, or CAP-like instrument, on disaster preparedness and DRR. It was felt that this area was still under-developed and support was much needed in a context like Ethiopia which receives huge amounts of humanitarian aid but little strategic or long-term investment in DRR. Given the recurring

and often predictable nature of drought cycles, there was thought to be little excuse for not doing more in this area. Government representatives were open and receptive to the idea; many observers noted that the government has made important recent strides in improving its approach to DRR and is generally more receptive to outside assistance in preparedness/DRR than it is for direct humanitarian response. Almost all international agencies said that their ability to do more was limited as donor funding was split into humanitarian and development types. They also provided convincing lists of DRR initiatives they would like to see funded (see below for suggested activities). Donors were generally favourable towards the idea of such a mechanism. Many donors saw the need for much larger and more strategic investments in DRR as a way to save lives and potentially reduce the sizeable humanitarian spending.

All agreed the mechanism should be government owned and led, but held no strong views on which international agency should help to coordinate the planning process and appeal. In part this is because no agency (OCHA, World Bank, or UNDP) was ideally suited. Many noted that the process by which a DRR plan was assembled would provide a key opportunity and should not be rushed (i.e., a wish list of projects hastily assembled). Several observers noted that, due to the particularly constrained space that the UN system has in Ethiopia to work with government on its approach to disaster management, the coordinating role might be better played by a major donor or group of donors. In Ethiopia, donors are generally more able than UN agencies to open space for dialogue with the government in shaping policy and making sure non-government actors are included where appropriate. Notably, OCHA staff in country was not favourable to a preparedness CAP in Ethiopia. They expressed the view that the additional responsibility of coordinating such a mechanism would negatively impact on OCHA's ability to carry out its core mandate of coordinating response. Furthermore, they felt that DRR work should be led by development, not humanitarian, actors and questioned the need for additional DRR investment in Ethiopia.

A CAP—alternatively called a “list of requirements for disaster risk management,” DRM being the term used in Ethiopia<sup>65</sup>—could be envisioned along the following model. A list of priority projects would be selected based on gaps in an existing government plan, which itself would be based on the government's forthcoming DRM policy. The process of compiling this plan might ideally be led by a key bilateral donor, such as USAID or DFID, with input from a range of actors, including World Bank, UNDP, OCHA, and others. This would build on the strategic dialogue donors have developed with the government and ensure non-government actors are included. Additional short-term staffing within donor missions or a seconding arrangement to the government could be used. A second alternative would be for the World Bank/GFDRR to lead the process, with structured input from a few key donors as well as UNDP and OCHA. It was not clear that any of the UN agencies had the necessary relationships or space with the government to be able to lead such a process. The World Bank has slightly more leverage but could benefit from the broader weight of these donors, and requires additional humanitarian expertise.

Given the scale of DRR needs in Ethiopia; the willingness and ability of the government to conceive of and implement large-scale, innovative programmes with donors, such as the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP); and the sizeable amount of funding that may soon be available through climate change adaptation financing (of which DRR/preparedness will form a part), a DRR plan for Ethiopia would do well to think big. If only a small amount of financing from a CAP was available, this should nonetheless be able to fit into a larger and more government-oriented strategic plan. At the same time, it is critical to preserve space for independent humanitarian action, especially given that many disaster preparedness activities, such as early warning and vulnerability assessments, are necessarily closely linked with a response. For Ethiopia, it was concluded that one way to encourage

<sup>65</sup> The term “disaster risk management” is used in Ethiopia to refer to a set of activities that includes disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and response.

this space would be to have donor governments participating in government-led DRR planning processes. Although it is too early to say what would be the priority activities, the main DRR needs in Ethiopia are likely to centre around standardising and harmonising early warning mechanisms; risk profiling and vulnerability assessments; better linking of early warning systems with contingency plans and risk financing mechanisms, including building capacity to do so at the community and district levels; increasing risk financing to allow safety net programmes to expand as needed during spikes, including multi-sector responses other than food and cash; and improving logistics for response, including vehicle fleets and warehousing.

In summary, despite the lack of a clear international agency to help facilitate a planning and appeal process in Ethiopia, the large majority of stakeholders were positive about the potential for the country to take advantage of new financing in this area, regardless of the exact shape of the mechanism. That said, it was widely noted that this process would ideally involve more than a simple cataloguing of projects, but rather be linked to deeper and more sustainable strategies on DRR, which both the government and its international partners are inclined to support. It was also felt that, for a country with such a large and vulnerable population, large-scale funding for DRR was needed if it is to be able to save lives and reduce the need for expensive humanitarian response.

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### 3.2.2 Bangladesh

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Bangladesh is globally acknowledged as being one of the most disaster-prone countries, exposed to a range of natural hazards. The dangers of floods and cyclones are most widely recognised but droughts and earthquakes also pose significant risks in some parts of the country. Global climatic changes and a high and increasing population density exacerbate these challenges.

#### *Disaster preparedness and risk reduction architecture*

Bangladesh has a comprehensive, if complex, government-led system for disaster management, incorporating preparedness, response, and risk reduction. A Standing Order on Disasters (SOD) has been passed into Bangladeshi law and is the official protocol for preparedness and response to disasters, with clearly spelt out institutional responsibilities for functionaries at various tiers of government. At the highest level, three committees bring together ministers, including the prime minister and other senior officials, to formulate and sign policies and to consider technical issues.

The Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM) heads the “operational” disaster management system at the national level and is present at the district level and below. The MoFDM controls three key agencies including the Disaster Management Bureau (DMB), cited most often as the interface for the UN system and its partners. The UN’s development system directly supports the government’s systems in both disaster preparedness and response management, primarily through UNDP/RC’s office. The RC’s office classifies UN support to government in two broad areas: capacity development for disaster preparedness and technical and material support for responding to large-scale disasters.

The majority of capacity-building support comes through the UNDP-supported Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP). UNDP also has its own Disaster Response Facility, which funds response activities. It operates exclusively through national NGOs on the basis that INGOs incur heavy support costs and overheads.

The international system’s “standard” humanitarian structures interface with the government architecture. The UN Country Team in Bangladesh completed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Natural Disasters in June 2009, which refer to the two primary coordinating bodies for disaster response as the Disaster and Emergency Response (DER) group and the UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT).

The DER was set up in 2001 as a mechanism to “complement” the government’s coordination role in emergency response and cites its main concerns as “improving the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency response.” A “sub-group” of the Bangladesh Local Consultative Group (LCG<sup>66</sup>), the DER has been chaired by the Director of the DMB since 2007, having been led by WFP between 2001 and 2007. WFP remains the group’s secretariat and has focused on information management with respect to disaster preparedness. The DER has been the overarching body for the cluster system since 2005. The cluster system is formally convened at times of “declared” emergency, although a few of the clusters function “year round.”

Outside of the UN/government-led system, USAID and ECHO (including DIPECHO) support bilateral NGO (usually INGO) programmes that include elements of disaster response preparedness, recovery, and disaster risk reduction. INGO programmes tend to be geographically oriented and contain elements of bilaterally funded work, as well as implement cooperating agreements with UN agencies. IFRC also has a large programme, independent of government and the UN but coordinating with other DIPECHO partners.

### *Coordination systems*

Notwithstanding the clarity of roles and responsibilities offered by the SOD and other documents, the disaster management system is not generally viewed as cohesive in practice, at least during “non-disaster” periods. Perhaps due to the nature of potential disasters in Bangladesh, i.e., “quick onset” and severe, there was a tendency to view disaster preparedness as a specific technical area requiring specific attention within the realm of disaster management and, more broadly, disaster risk reduction.

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66 The LCG is “a forum for development dialogue and donor co-ordination,” composed of the secretary, Economic Relations Division (ERD), Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, and thirty-nine Bangladesh-based representatives of bilateral donors, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (AsDB), and the UN agencies.

Several respondents did view disaster preparedness as exclusively the government’s domain, i.e., it existed only to strengthen government systems. This coincides with the view of CDMP officers, contracted by UNDP but sitting within government structures and excluding international actors. A number of tensions were noted, including that there is a separate INGO system for predicting and mapping “earthquake risk.”

Many who were on the periphery of the government system also saw the need to strengthen preparedness through the “international” system. As above, the UN system has a clear disaster response structure, linked into government but distinct from it, centred on the UNDMT and the DER group. The largely UN-led cluster system sits under the DER group. The government was reportedly resistant to the use of the term “cluster,” linked as it is to the humanitarian system and humanitarian reform process. The majority of those participating in clusters reported little participation by the government. Clusters were reportedly weak, lacking any obvious training and support (the clear exceptions being WASH and emergency shelter, led by UNICEF and IFRC respectively.) OCHA’s absence was also cited as an issue.

Perhaps the most cohesive coordination structure, composed of a relatively small number of actors with a common sense of purpose, was that of DIPECHO partners. Again this mechanism refers to government standards and the relevant clusters but ultimately sets its own agenda in conjunction with donors and meets independently of either.

The lack of an inclusive national platform to discuss disaster preparedness and risk reduction was consistently raised as an issue. In the absence of OCHA and a “double-hatted” RC/HC to link the “classic” international system to the government, WFP informally played this role, as the chair of the DER forum. There was a strong sense amongst those linked to government and UN Agencies that OCHA was neither “required nor welcome,” but the lack of a mandated actor with the responsibility to bring together national and international systems was telling.

### *The feasibility of an appeal for disaster preparedness*

Overall, whilst a majority declared a need for more disaster preparedness funding and supported the idea of an appeal, the major organisational flaws pose a challenge. In simple terms, a coherent government-led system on paper seems, in practice, divided.

Views were divided on whether or not an appeal should focus on disaster preparedness or look at the issue of DRR more broadly. Again, because of the nature of major disasters in Bangladesh and a sense that, in recent years, disaster preparedness as a specific issue had “lost ground,” a majority could see the benefit of a distinct appeal. Development actors cautioned against establishing an additional financial stream for DRR; the availability of money was perceived as less of an issue that absorption capacity and appropriate allocation through national budgets.

For disaster preparedness, specifically, CDMP saw the need for additional funding and clearly advocated for an appeal led by MoFDM. Other respondents maintained that the relatively new administration would need to be seen to be in control. In particular, some interviewees thought that a UN-led appeal would be particularly unpalatable and that the government could not be seen to be “competing” with INGOs for funding.

UNDP saw a clear lack of funding specifically for preparedness and favoured a government-led

approach, but saw the DER group as the most inclusive forum to lead the appeal. WFP, currently without predictable funding for their role in the DER group, made a strong case for strengthening the forum and using it as the home for such an appeal. They were amongst the group of interviewees who, whilst largely positive about the role played by government in disaster management, felt that (since approximately 2006/2007) donors, concentrating on strengthening government systems, had undermined a specific and essential focus on “inclusive” disaster preparedness, i.e., systems which focussed on “preparedness for response,” inclusive of international actors.

Two INGOs suggested an alternative of increased funding through the DIPECHO programme.

On balance, the current lack of cohesion amongst the actors in DRR would seem likely to undermine the inclusivity of a potential appeal. In a positive sense, however, such an appeal could encourage cohesion amongst these actors. Either the RC’s office or the DER group could play a coordinating role on the side of the international system and advocate for an inclusive appeal with government. Ideally such a process would strengthen a national platform and include the government, which, realistically, would have to lead any appeal. As in Ethiopia, “CAP” and other typically humanitarian terminology would be unhelpful.

## **4 Feasibility of the global, thematic CAP and other options**

As detailed above, a thematic CAP on disaster preparedness is a significant undertaking and there were several major challenges highlighted in launching such an appeal.

On the positive side, introducing a global CAP on preparedness would use an existing mechanism that is already well-known within the international aid community, thus minimising confusion and potentially speeding its setup. It is flexible enough to

allow for a range of actors to be funded by various donors without requiring the establishment of a new secretariat or financing administration. It is also recognised as oriented towards needs-based programming.

However, there remain significant drawbacks to a CAP for disaster preparedness. First, as noted by many of those interviewed, a CAP goes against the notion of mainstreaming DRR into development

programmes and addressing it holistically rather than in a compartmentalised way. A discrete preparedness mechanism might not encourage increased development financing for DRR. Second, potential duplication with other funding mechanisms, including UNISDR, UNDP, and the GFDRR, exists. At present there is scope for a greater emphasis on preparedness via these mechanisms. Encouraging existing mechanisms to increase their focus on preparedness, perhaps working in close conjunction with OCHA, is arguably more efficient than introducing a new, discrete channel for funding.

Third, ensuring donor commitment to financing the mechanism would be a significant challenge. It will also likely continue to be difficult for donors to coordinate and prioritise allocations collectively at the global level, given the lack of incentives to do so. Despite GHD priorities in this area, strategic coordination rarely happens.<sup>67</sup> And whilst there is no inherent reason why the global CAP should not be multi-year and have national governments as appealing entities, most donors' funding is still limited to annual cycles and some donor governments will not fund recipient states directly. In addition, a number of interviewees suggested that connecting a multi-year CAP to a broader risk reduction process, rather than just preparedness, would easily link into those national planning processes that cover all aspects of risk reduction.

The CAP as a model also came under some serious criticism. Despite the improvements noted above, some interviewees see CAPs as inherently flawed, supporting a poorly prioritised list and uncoordinated set of projects, and tending to serve a “UN club” that crowds out non-UN actors. CAPs are often viewed negatively by developing country national governments, that perceive them as driven and dominated by international agencies and that leave them vulnerable to internal criticism for appealing for international assistance. On the opposing side of the critique, some interviewees noted that having national governments in a coordinating role can exclude valuable inputs from international actors and

might raise expectations that they should have more control of country-based CAPs in the future.

Finally, coordination weaknesses at the international level pose a significant challenge to successfully launching a global CAP. As noted in Section 2, there is not a clear international, operational leader to undertake all of the coordination, which means it would have to be shared between OCHA, UNDP, and UNISDR—a recipe for bureaucratic snags. This kind of role-sharing would require agreement at the most senior levels, and corporate prioritisation of an area that has thus far received limited attention.

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#### 4.1 Other options

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As described above, a thematic CAP on disaster preparedness has significant potential, but also serious limitations. This section considers possible alternatives to a CAP, both in the short and long term. Due to the limited scope of this study, it was not possible to fully examine the feasibility of each option, but some initial analysis is presented below.

##### *A joint fund in the model of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund)*

In the long term, establishing a new fund for all DRR priorities, similar to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, might be the most feasible and appropriate mechanism for financing DRR.

The Global Fund is different than other joint funds in that it is not housed within a UN agency or international financial institution, but rather is a partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector, and affected communities. It aims to provide predictable, sustainable financing through a consolidated body that allows countries to appeal to one source. Building on the groundswell of momentum around the fight against AIDS that led to its creation in 2002, the Global Fund has been able to attract large scale funding, approving a total of approximately \$4 billion per year. This large scale is one of the reasons the Global Fund has not had to explicitly limit proposal amounts or severely restrict the number of countries that can apply in any given

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67 Development Initiatives, *Good Humanitarian Donorship Indicators 2008*, [http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/documents/ghd\\_indicators\\_report\\_2008.pdf](http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/documents/ghd_indicators_report_2008.pdf).

year.<sup>68</sup> Countries submit proposals to a technical committee made up of recognised experts in the field, which either accepts or rejects the proposals on technical rather than financial grounds. They need to show that funding can be properly absorbed, which keeps countries from asking for more than they could effectively spend. Guidelines from the Global Fund secretariat ensure that countries involve a variety of stakeholders in the process, including governments, people living with the disease, local NGOs, and international agencies. Funding can be channelled through any type of implementer, be it a local NGO, international agency, or government body.

The Global Fund has been recognised as having advantages over other funding models in that it provides funding in a coherent, strategic way—a “one stop shop”—and makes countries responsible for initiating, designing and vetting their own applications. It is relatively free from the bureaucratic hurdles of UN and IFI funding mechanisms, and at the same time brings together a wide group of stakeholders. It has earned credibility by making decisions based on transparent, technical criteria rather than political considerations, and being relatively insulated from the whims or preferences of its donors. One of the challenges faced by the Global Fund is that some governments lack the capacity to put together quality proposals; around 50 percent are typically rejected. While the Global Fund has ways of encouraging good performance (e.g., through providing feedback on proposals, allowing countries to reapply, and requiring a performance review after the first phase of funding before countries can receive the second phase), it is not designed to be a capacity-building institution. No Global Fund staff is present in recipient countries or regional offices. This is a fundamentally different model than one in which donors (or joint funds) pre-select and actively work with national partners to design programmes to achieve desired results. It has the benefit of empowering national governments and their in-country partners where they are ready and able to tackle a problem. It may not, however, overcome the structural issues this study has identified at country level if there is no other impetus to do so. Such

<sup>68</sup> Certain basic eligibility criteria apply, based on country income level.

an initiative might be strengthened if international actors could provide support to weak national governments during the fund application process and during implementation. A renewed impetus around strengthening national platforms might be an effective means to enable this support.

In theory, it could be possible for a broad set of stakeholders to come together around the need to sharply increase investment in DRR in the same way as was done with AIDS. If this were to happen, a Global Fund-like model would be an important option to investigate. Different types of funding could be provided for the different HFA priority areas in the same way that it is done for each of Global Fund’s three diseases. The key international agencies with relevant mandates and expertise could be involved via a Board of Directors and a technical review panel.

Simply designating an existing entity, such as GFDRR or the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction, to become such a “Global Fund” would in all likelihood not achieve the level of momentum needed to generate the new funding levels required. It also has the disadvantage of housing the effort within either the UN or the World Bank. The UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (administered by UNISDR) is not mandated with the operational capacity to undertake the task, and the GFDRR, as a partnership managed by the World Bank, does not have the requisite expertise in late stage disaster preparedness activities, including connections with a wider range of humanitarian organisations and community-based actors.

One major disadvantage to the “Global Fund” approach is that it may require starting over and replacing existing funding modalities. A significant injection of cash would be required to make this a worthwhile investment. Like any joint fund, establishing a secretariat and developing funding guidelines is a resource-intensive exercise; the Global Fund has around seven hundred staff in its Geneva headquarters, for example. Another possible challenge would be finding a way for a new DRR fund to be sufficiently flexible and responsive with regard to arising preparedness needs—for instance,

if a country had a large emergency one-year into a three-year funding cycle. More importantly, such a global fund would only be as strong as its key donors allowed it to be.

*Direct funding for disaster preparedness towards existing mechanisms (ISDR, GFDRR, UNDP, and DIPECHO)*

Several funding mechanisms for DRR and preparedness already exist. In the immediate short term, and consistent with the longer-term objective of establishing a global fund, the study team found that it is worth continuing support to these mechanisms, while also providing additional funding to encourage them to expand their work on disaster preparedness. Encouraging a shared work programme between the key entities would also be valuable. To ensure that this work was sufficiently integrated with humanitarian response systems, and that programmes drew on relevant expertise, these entities could be encouraged to work closely with OCHA, the IFRC, and other international humanitarian agencies in country. This is particularly important in order to increase the expertise in late-stage disaster preparedness activities such as emergency stockpiling and contingency planning, as well as to increase support to local government and civil society organisations.

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is well placed to channel increased levels of DRR financing in the short to medium term. Its key advantages are strong linkages with national governments, an improving methodology for deciding how to allocate funding between countries, and its knowledge base on a wide range of DRR issues. DIPECHO has also been suggested as a vehicle for increased disaster preparedness funding. As described above, in contrast to UNDP and the World Bank, it focuses on disaster preparedness actions (rather than a set of broader DRR activities) and is well regarded by implementing agencies as very effective in reaching the community level. It also has a strong methodology for financing disaster preparedness activities. The main disadvantage to providing additional funds to DIPECHO in lieu of a CAP is

that it would likely be difficult for non-European donors to contribute. Funding timeframes are also still limited to eighteen months. Lastly, although it has recently been recognised that DIPECHO can do more to support national governments and national plans, this has not been a focus in the past and, institutionally, this is a modality with which ECHO does not have much experience.<sup>69</sup>

*Include a preparedness component in annual CAPs and Flash Appeal “revisions”*

An additional short term option would be to include a preparedness component in the annual CAPs and the revised Flash appeals—seeking 10 percent of the total appeal for preparedness activities, and asking donors to fund 100 percent of the request on every occasion. This has the advantage of not establishing a new mechanism, thus eliminating considerable administrative work. Countries that have already signalled their willingness to receive international support would automatically be eligible for additional disaster preparedness funding. This option is also consistent with the way funding for early recovery is being sought on the humanitarian side. The administrative burden on OCHA would be relatively light as compared to launching a global CAP, and it would be less dependent on the need for coordination between OCHA, UNDP, and ISDR.

A key disadvantage is that many disaster-prone countries in need of additional funding (such as Bangladesh, India, and Colombia) have not had a CAP/Flash Appeal in recent years, in part due to reluctance to appeal for outside assistance.<sup>70</sup> In addition, it would presumably be especially difficult for donors to fund this portion of the CAP if pitted against urgent, life-saving priorities that remained under-funded in any particular CAP. Also, following a Flash Appeal after a major disaster would arguably be reactive rather than preventative. This option is, however, consistent with the way funding for early recovery is being sought on the humanitarian side, and would build on the momentum around “building back better” in helping a country to both recover and

<sup>69</sup> Interviews with ECHO staff, 2009.

<sup>70</sup> See Annex 4 for a list of recent CAP countries.

plan for the next disaster following a major disaster. It could also add new emphasis to an aspect of appeal financing which has historically been poorly prioritised.

The study team looked at two alternative financing mechanisms; however, both have some drawbacks.

#### *Small, multi-donor fund in country*

A small-scale alternative to some of the options outlined above could be for a small group of like-minded donors to choose a handful of disaster-prone countries (perhaps five to ten) in which to establish joint funds. These funds could be managed by one donor (e.g., Norway, or another as appropriate), which could act as the “agent.” Or the enterprise could be treated as a “project” and tendered in each country to a private sector entity. Donors would pool their funding for two or, ideally, three years, which would allow for a more coherent and strategic approach. A national authority and its partners (ideally organised into a national platform) would respond to a call for proposals in a competitive bidding process. A technical committee could be established to assess proposals.

The advantages of this model are that it allows for a more coherent “supply” side, which in turn could promote a more coherent “demand” side. A pooled fund or project like this might actually be *more* coherent than a CAP because it could make strategic decisions about what to fund. National actors would be able to interact with only one donor or agent, simplifying the process and enhancing coordination. Consortia or agencies that had a good footprint and proven capacity in country would be further empowered. The application process would be simpler and require less time, since it would not involve additional structures and bureaucracies at the regional and international levels. Ideally, it could also enable donors with no in-country presence to participate in funding towards disaster preparedness.

The disadvantages of this model are that it is limited in scope and could favour those countries where donors and implementers are already relatively well coordinated. It would also lack support and input

from a mandated international agency, which could make it difficult to replicate in other countries, to learn from experiences, or to compare progress across countries.

#### *Establish a global joint fund on disaster preparedness managed by OCHA*

The study team considered the option of establishing a joint fund similar to CERF, administered and managed by OCHA with an advisory group that could be established specifically for disaster preparedness activities. This would offer similar benefits as a donor-led pooled fund at the country level, in terms of increased coherence. Single-agency leadership would allow monitoring systems and criteria to be set up that could be applied across countries. As with the CERF, an advisory group could set up and oversee a system of global prioritisation. As in all the models, regulations would have to be adjusted so that national governments and civil society would be eligible for funding.

One main disadvantage of this model is that many disaster-prone countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Guatemala, Burkina Faso) have no ongoing OCHA presence. This would make it difficult for OCHA to coordinate the application process and to conduct monitoring. However, it is possible that another agency (such as UNDP) could take on this role in such countries. Another disadvantage is that establishing a new funding institution, with a secretariat, would entail considerable cost. The CERF has a staff of twenty-three for a programme budget of more than \$500 million, for example. Establishing another fund would represent a further expansion of OCHA’s roles and responsibilities, even beyond what a straightforward CAP would entail. Locating a disaster preparedness fund entirely within OCHA not only potentially stretches OCHA into areas where it is less comfortable (such as hazard monitoring or weather forecasting), but also risks further reinforcing the idea that humanitarian actors are primarily responsible for disaster preparedness and wider, related DRR activities. However, one could imagine a joint CERF-like fund that was co-operated by OCHA and an agency with wider DRR expertise, such as UNDP

and/or UNISDR. Such an arrangement would likely involve considerable bureaucratic hurdles. Lastly, a CERF-like joint fund would also require

donors to make considerable investment in disaster preparedness, so as to justify the setting up of additional institutional structures.

## 5 Conclusions

There is a widely recognised need for more and better funding for DRR and disaster preparedness within that. The desire of the donor community to think creatively about ways to make good their commitments under the Hyogo Framework, GHD, and elsewhere to increase support to DRR, and specifically for preparedness, is very welcome.

It has to be recognised however that this is a challenging area for international assistance. The disaster risk reduction “system” is still very much in development. Roles, mandates, and responsibilities at the international level, particularly in the area of disaster preparedness, are not clear. The international system is fragmented, with multiple mandated agencies leading their own work, and with a range of INGOs engaged in programming with partners at the community level. The level of reported financing for DRR is very low, although financial reporting has not been prioritised and neither of the two international financial tracking systems fully captures DRR spending. Where trends can be discerned in relation to humanitarian budgets, there is a worrying tendency for fluctuating allocations to correspond to post-emergency interventions. Such patterns do not live up to the commitments made at Hyogo, and are equally unlikely to address more recent goals, such as halving the number of deaths from natural hazards by 2015.

Part of the challenge is that DRR is still a new arrival in international aid. Policies and programming are still being established in national governments, agencies, and the donor community. Investments in staffing expertise are becoming a priority, and an important global dialogue has developed, aided particularly by the work of UNISDR and its partners.

At the same time, the DRR agenda has quickly risen up the policy agenda due to its relationship to the much broader and more politically sensitive issue of climate change. This study therefore comes at an important time. There is a growing and positive momentum to address the DRR agenda. An opportunity now exists to capitalise on the political appetite and shift the rhetoric of “saving lives and saving money” into meaningful action.

A proposal to assist the humanitarian community to support disaster preparedness is an important step. It needs to recognise the limits of humanitarian responsibilities and capacities in the area of DRR, and acknowledge the need for a more coherent approach to supporting preparedness at the national level—with longer timeframes and a focus on national ownership as critical elements. Every interviewee, in the field and at regional and headquarter locations, highlighted that finding a solution for disaster preparedness financing would be welcome.

The study investigated the strengths and weakness of the CAP model. There were some significant positive findings. In particular, the CAP is in many ways the most flexible mechanism to convene around, attracting a wide range of humanitarian donors and an increasing number of non-UN international and national actors as appealing agencies. The interviews, field analysis, and documentary review suggest, however, that a CAP mechanism also has serious limitations. In short, it is an old model, with some familiar and persistent problems. In particular, the CAP was designed as part of a bifurcated aid architecture and therefore is conceptually oriented towards accessing support from humanitarian donor

portfolios, despite the fact that disaster preparedness could also be supported by the development community as part of its wider work on DRR. A more inclusive financing mechanism, permitting both humanitarian and development funding, might be a more inclusive means to encourage sustained investment. The CAP also doesn't address the myriad of persistent "supply side" problems, such as weak ability on the part of donors to coordinate and prioritise allocations collectively, or to provide multi-year funding to recipients. The fact that any successful CAP on preparedness would require multiple-year funding also raises the question: Why then not link it to broader risk reduction goals, rather than just preparedness? Finally, coordination weaknesses at the international level pose a significant challenge to successfully launching a new financing mechanism. These will not easily be overcome by the introduction of a CAP, which will almost inevitably be seen by development actors as a humanitarian mechanism, for humanitarian actors to deliver on, to address humanitarian goals.

The study concludes that at this stage there is insufficient justification to recommend the launching of a global CAP for disaster preparedness and response capacity; however a number of the other options are promising and the study recommends that they should be examined.

A long-term, sustainable, and innovative option would be to create a new fund for DRR similar to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. It offers the advantage of addressing DRR holistically, coherently, and strategically, as well as being transparent, technically oriented, and country driven. It is also accessible by a wide range of UN and non-UN actors. Like all options for consideration, it requires harnessing much more significant level of financing than have currently been allocated towards DRR, but perhaps unlike the others, this mechanism would potentially catalyse greater support, and force the existing DRR

actors to come together and form a more strategic programmatic approach to their work.<sup>71</sup>

In the short term, financing existing mechanisms, but requiring a much stronger emphasis on the life-saving goals of late-stage preparedness activities would also be valuable (and consistent with the possible longer-term goal of establishing a global fund). In addition a more coherent work programme between the key international actors would facilitate more coordinated and predictable financing.

Finally, the launching of a discrete preparedness component within existing CAPs and revised Flash Appeals would also be a way to deliver preparedness support relatively quickly and cost effectively with limited disruption of the current DRR architecture. This option is consistent with the way funding for early recovery is being sought on the humanitarian side. On the downside, it is reactive rather than preventative and a very serious effort would need to be made on the part of donors to prioritise an aspect of appeal financing which has historically been poorly prioritised.

The complexity of financing DRR and, specifically, preparedness within the international aid system—particularly for an issue which cuts across development and humanitarian divides and across sectors—is significant. This complexity means that further debate is needed between donors, affected states, and key international actors about the most appropriate ways to move forward. Donors of both humanitarian and development assistance bear a particular responsibility to work together to ensure that this dialogue is taken forward in a more comprehensive way. This report provides a starting point which examines the possible options for financing national disaster preparedness and proposes some immediate and longer-term options for consideration.

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71 It would also need to be considered in light of the possible outcomes from the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen in December 2009 and the possibility of a new fund for climate change adaptation being established.

# Annex 1. Interview list

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## Headquarters and regional interviews

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Prafulla Mishra, Deputy Director of Programmes, International Rescue Committee, Kenya,

Jennifer Nyberg, Disaster Risk Management Focal Point, Emergency Operations Services, FAO

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# Annex 3. Financial analysis: Funding for preparedness and risk reduction activities in the international humanitarian system

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## Summary

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- Preparedness and risk reduction represents a very small percentage of overall humanitarian activity and expenditure: approximately 2.1 percent of total project allocations and 0.7 percent of total humanitarian funding.
- However, these figures represent a significant increase from previous years. Funding for preparedness and risk reduction has grown at an even faster rate than total humanitarian expenditures, which are at an all-time high.
- On average from 2005 to 2008 the number of project allocations more than doubled, and total funding more than tripled.
- The bulk of this funding came from a handful of official humanitarian donors (four DAC member governments and ECHO).
- Roughly half of all preparedness contributions were targeted to the Asia region and, of all regions, Asia had the highest percentage of its humanitarian funding allocated for this type of activity.
- The vast majority of humanitarian contributions for preparedness were channeled through UN agency recipients, while the smallest portion (less than 1 percent) went directly to affected-state governments.
- While overall growth in preparedness funding and activity has been significant, it has not risen steadily, but fluctuated widely from year to year. The data suggest it comes in waves; typically after major sudden-onset disasters a boost in attention and investment occurs and subsequently wanes.
- With contributions at well under 10 percent of total humanitarian flows, and lacking any predictability from year to year, these funding patterns appear to fall far short of what some

would consider sound and sensible practice, i.e., calculated investment in preparedness for and prevention of future emergencies.

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## Methodology and caveats

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The financial analysis sought to determine the overall level and types of spending by the international humanitarian community for disaster preparedness, and to identify trends over recent years. To this end, humanitarian spending data for 2001 to 2008 were compiled from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' Financial Tracking Service (FTS). This timeframe enables comparison of funding trends prior to and post adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action. Analysis was augmented by data from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and individual spending reports from donor agencies. Also examined were financial data pertaining to specific bilateral mechanisms such as ECHO's DIPECHO program (established in 1996), and DFID's pledge that, where it provides over £500,000 of humanitarian aid, 10 percent will be used for preparedness and future mitigation.

## Challenges

There is no single source of compiled data on preparedness spending by humanitarian donors. Nor is there a single shared definition of this spending category. The best available data sources are not completely compatible with each other, and each has weaknesses when it comes to calculating total expenditure for preparedness. The OECD DAC database now includes a category for "disaster prevention and preparedness," but this sits within its humanitarian spending line, and figures are only available for the years 2005–2007. Preparedness

activities funded through other categories of ODA are therefore not captured. (This is an important caveat because some donors have made efforts to mainstream DRR within their development program sectors, in which case DRR activities/expenditures would not be visible either in DAC or FTS datasets.) In FTS, the most comprehensive database for global humanitarian funding contributions, there are no set categorizations for these types of program expenditures: some donors don't distinguish between disaster preparedness (DP) and broader disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities. In addition, one or both may be included alongside more traditional response activities in a single allocation. For these reasons, the figures from FTS, OECD DAC, and key individual donors are presented separately and compared for similarities in patterns and trends.

For the FTS data, the analysis filtered 31,524 separate humanitarian allocations reported from 2001 through 2008 to identify those designated for program activities specifically devoted to, or largely composed of, disaster preparedness or risk reduction, as stated in their project descriptions. This likely failed to capture some spending that was either not included in the FTS project descriptions or was not reported to FTS by the donor, perhaps having been categorized as development, rather than humanitarian, assistance. In addition, unusually high spending levels (and questionable comparability) warranted special treatment for two sets of activities: Iraq preparedness and contingency planning in 2003, and avian flu preparedness in 2005–2008. In instances where including these cases would have resulted in skewed findings on general trends, the analysis controlled for (excluded) these expenditures or highlighted them within the figures.

In this light, the findings are to be considered as less a precise accounting of preparedness financing than an illustration of overall trends in spending on these types of activities in terms of volume, funding channels, recipients/implementers, and geographical distribution.

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## Detailed findings

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### **An increased number of humanitarian project activities address preparedness and risk reduction.**

A review of funding allocations reported to FTS between 2001 and 2008 show that the number of projects designed to address preparedness and future risk reduction (as either the sole or one of the primary objectives) has more than doubled in the past four years, as compared to the previous four. The number rose from just seven projects in 2001 (0.3 percent of total projects) to 95 by 2008 (2.1 percent). The peak of preparedness allocations came in 2006, driven by a surge of contributions for avian flu preparedness. On average, the number of separate allocations for preparedness and DRR has nearly doubled (a 95 percent increase) each year since 2001.


### **Funding for preparedness and risk reduction has increased overall, and as a portion of humanitarian allocations.**

Although it was not possible to merge the figures from the different data sources, all suggest the same trend: Preparedness and risk reduction has in recent years received significantly greater attention and financial resources from humanitarian donors. According to FTS data, total funding for preparedness has more than tripled from the period 2001–2004 to 2005–2008, and the percentage of total humanitarian funding going to these activities nearly doubled (from 0.1 percent in 2001 to 0.7 percent in 2008). The three years of data from OECD DAC show an even greater rate of increase (an average annual rise of 353 percent from 2005 to 2007).<sup>1</sup> ECHO's DIPECHO program increased its preparedness funding more than fivefold from

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
<sup>1</sup> The DAC records \$7.68 million in 2005 which rose to \$131.36 million in 2008.

**Figure 1: Number of separate funding allocations (project grants) for preparedness and risk reduction activities**



Source: OCHA FTS (figures as of 19 March 2009)

**Figure 2: FTS-reported funding for preparedness and disaster risk reduction, 2001–2008**



Source: OCHA FTS (of 19 March 2009, inflation adjusted)

2001 to 2008,<sup>2</sup> as has the UK since 2006,<sup>3</sup> through DFID’s commitment to allocate 10 percent of its humanitarian funding to preparedness. The US government does not use a percentage guideline for preparedness spending but engages in preparedness and risk reduction activities in separate, long-

running programs on national, regional and global bases, much of which may not be captured by FTS. From 2004 to 2008 these expenditures rose on average by 50 percent, and fluctuated from between 5 and 15 percent of total US humanitarian expenditure.<sup>4</sup>

2 From US\$7 million in 2001 to \$48 million in 2008 (Euro-USD exchange rates averaged for each individual year). ECHO, “The DIPECHO Programme,” [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/dipecho\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/dipecho_en.htm) (accessed October 2009).

3 DFID, “DRR 10% commitments in CHASE,” 2009 internal report provided to the study.

Although the DAC and FTS figures are not comparable—because of the reporting differences

4 USAID, OFDA annual reports for FYs 2001–2008, [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/humanitarian\\_assistance/disaster\\_assistance/publications/annual\\_reports/index.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/annual_reports/index.html).

mentioned above, and the fact that they represent different compositions of donors—during the years 2005–2007 DAC donors reported a combined total of \$188 million for DP/DRR and the FTS analysis yields a total of \$258 million.

As illustrated in Figure 2, avian flu preparedness received more contributions than all other preparedness and risk reduction activities and sectors combined—roughly \$200 million over three years, according to FTS.<sup>5</sup>

**Despite these increases, preparedness remains a very small percentage of total activities and funding in humanitarian assistance.**

At just 2.1 percent of individual project allocations and 0.7 percent of total funding (FTS figures), preparedness and risk reduction still appear as a miniscule slice of humanitarian assistance efforts. Increased attention and deliberate efforts to boost preparedness in humanitarian funding has not spread beyond the small number of donors that are especially active in this area, and who aim for a 10 percent set-aside for preparedness out of their humanitarian response allocations.

**The majority of the reported preparedness funding came from a small number of official donors.**

According to FTS’s accounting of humanitarian expenditures for preparedness and risk reduction, DAC donors contributed 86 percent of the total, and of these the largest single government donors were the United States, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, and Sweden. Non-DAC donors contributed 4 percent, while international financial institutions<sup>6</sup> and multilateral trust funds/pooled fund mechanisms<sup>7</sup> made up only 2 percent apiece. The remaining 6 percent came from a variety of sources, mostly in the form of NGO and UN agency re-allocations of carryover and un-earmarked funds. FTS may not

5 Most of this was channelled through the Food and Agriculture Organisation, which leads the UN-wide UN System Influenza Coordination (UNSIIC) established in September 2005 (<http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/response.html>).

6 This includes contributions by World Bank and Asian Development Bank.

7 Sudan Pooled Fund and UNDP Trust Fund for Avian Flu.

have fully captured outlays from nongovernment donors. However, the broad trend is clear: Reported preparedness funding, for the time being, comes from a small number of donors.

**Asia receives the bulk of preparedness funding.**


Bearing out anecdotal information that emphasized the prominence of DP and DRR activities in Asia, the data show that most humanitarian preparedness and risk reduction contributions are targeted to that region. Since 2001, countries in the Asia region have received roughly 51 percent of all reported contributions. Interviewees cite fewer civil conflicts and more stable/capable government partners, compared with African countries, as a factor. Disaster preparedness and risk reduction are more advanced in the Latin America/Caribbean region and presumably more built in to national government budgets, resulting in fewer aid contributions needed from the international community.

**UN agencies are the primary channels for preparedness and risk reduction contributions.**

A review of the FTS data shows that reported preparedness funding has overwhelmingly gone through United Nations agencies as opposed to governments of affected states or to nongovernment/Red Cross entities. The UN’s share of this funding, at more than 91 percent, is higher than the overall percentage of FTS-reported contributions seen channelled to the UN (84 percent in 2008 when including contributions to the CERF and Pooled Funds, which are channelled through UN agencies). This may on the one hand reflect UN capacities for global and regionally-based humanitarian preparedness programming, but may also indicate a paucity of efforts to identify alternative partners.

Somewhat in line with this finding, the data suggest that a significant portion of these allocations was targeted at enhancing preparedness of the *international system* (i.e., building preparedness capacity for response within the UN agencies and global clusters) as opposed to national and local level capacities for preparedness and risk reduction. The “international” share of preparedness capacity


Figure 3: Humanitarian contributions for DP and DRR\* by region, 2001–2008



Source: OCHA FTS (as of 19 March 2009)

\* Excludes contributions for avian flu preparedness

Figure 4: Humanitarian contributions for DP and DRR by recipient, 2001–2008



Source: OCHA FTS (as of 19 March 2009)

funding was about 22 percent when avian flu allocations were not included and as much as 39 percent when they were.

**Funding for preparedness has fluctuated, indicating a lack of sustained and systematic investment.**

Although the growth in humanitarian assistance has followed a more-or-less steady upward trend over the past several years, no such pattern is reflected in preparedness and risk reduction contributions. The long-term trend has been upward, and some key major donors such as the US, UK, and ECHO have

demonstrated steady increases. However, overall DP/DRR contributions have peaked and slumped, with more activity in the immediate aftermath of natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004/2005) followed by a subsequent drop. While a few key donors have consciously allocated 10 percent (or more) of their humanitarian funding for preparedness activities, this practice is by no means widespread. Speculation is that creating clearer reporting categories would help to increase the legitimacy of preparedness funding and create incentives for donors to demonstrate their efforts in this area.

## Annex 4. Eligible countries for a disaster preparedness CAP, using sample criteria

Country	Low Income	Lower middle income	Percent of population at risk *	Percent GDP in areas at risk **	Percent of total area at risk ***	2007 Flash	2008 Flash	2009 Flash (as of October)	CAP 2009 (as of October)	Top 20 of Mortality Risk Index	Number of criteria met
Bangladesh	yes		87	87	71					1	5
Guatemala	yes	yes	92	92	53					8	5
Madagascar	yes		56			yes	yes	yes			5
Nepal	yes		97		80	yes	yes				5
Pakistan	yes	yes	40			yes		yes		10	5
Philippines	yes	yes	85		50			yes		12	5
Afghanistan	yes		46					yes		7	4
Bolivia	yes	yes	37			yes	yes				4
Burkina Faso	yes		62			yes	yes				4
Colombia			85	87	21					3	4
Costa Rica			85	87	52					19	4
Dominican Rep.			96	96	87	yes					4
Tajikistan	yes		38				yes		yes		4
Vietnam	yes		89	89	33						4
Albania		yes		89	86						3
China		yes	50							2	3
Djibouti		yes	32				yes				3
DRC	yes								yes	20	3
El Salvador		yes	95	96	89						3
Haiti	yes		48				yes				3
Honduras		yes	57				yes				3
India		yes	48							4	3
Indonesia		yes	67							5	3
Jamaica			96	96	95						3
Kenya	yes		63						yes		3
Kyrgyz Republic	yes		51				yes				3
Malawi	yes		95		71						3
Mozambique	yes		2			yes					3
Myanmar	yes						yes			6	3
Nicaragua		yes	68			yes					3

(Continued)	Low Income	Lower middle income	Percent of population at risk *	Percent GDP in areas at risk **	Percent of total area at risk ***	2007 Flash	2008 Flash	2009 Flash (as of October)	CAP 2009 (as of October)	Top 20 of Mortality Risk Index	Number of criteria met
Peru			42			yes				11	3
Somalia	yes		53					yes			3
Togo	yes		39	61							3
Uganda	yes		27					yes			3
Yemen	yes						yes	yes			3
Algeria			49							16	2
Benin	yes		39								2
Burundi	yes			96							2
Cambodia	yes		31								2
C/AR	yes							yes			2
Chad	yes							yes			2
Comoros	yes									18	2
Cote d'Ivoire	yes							yes			2
DPRK	yes					yes					2
Ecuador		yes	73								2
Ethiopia	yes		69								2
Ghana	yes					yes					2
Iraq		yes						yes			2
Lao PDR	yes							yes			2
Lesotho		yes	51			yes					2
Mali	yes		29								2
Niger	yes		76	92	83						2
Rep. of Korea											2
Senegal	yes		53								2
Sri Lanka		yes							yes		2
Sudan		yes							yes		2
Swaziland		yes				yes					2
Syria		yes					yes				2
Turkey			83	73							2
West Bank and Gaza		yes							yes		2

(Continued)	Low Income	Lower middle income	Percent of population at risk *	Percent GDP in areas at risk **	Percent of total area at risk ***	2007 Flash	2008 Flash	2009 Flash (as of October)	CAP 2009 (as of October)	Top 20 of Mortality Risk Index	Number of criteria met
West Bank and Gaza		yes						yes	yes		2
Zambia	yes					yes					2
Zimbabwe	yes							yes	yes		2
Angola		yes									1
Antigua and Barbuda		yes									1
Armenia		yes									1
Azerbaijan		yes									1
Barbados				80							1
Belize		yes									1
Bhutan		yes									1
Cameroon		yes									1
Cape Verde		yes									1
Congo, Rep.		yes									1
Cuba							yes				1
Dominica				68							1
Egypt		yes									1
Eritrea	yes										1
Gambia	yes										1
Georgia		yes									1
Guinea	yes										1
Guinea-Bissau	yes										1
Guyana		yes									1
Iran		yes									1
Jordan		yes									1
Kiribati		yes									1
Kosovo		yes									1
Liberia	yes										1
Maldives		yes									1
Marshall Islands		yes									1
Mauritania	yes										1

(Continued)	Country	Low Income	Lower middle income	Percent of population at risk *	Percent GDP in areas at risk **	Percent of total area at risk ***	2007 Flash	2008 Flash	2009 Flash (as of October)	CAP 2009 (as of October)	Top 20 of Mortality Risk Index	Number of criteria met
	Micronesia		yes									1
	Moldova		yes									1
	Mongolia		yes									1
	Morocco		yes									1
	Namibia							yes				1
	Nigeria		yes									1
	Papua New Guinea		yes									1
	Paraguay		yes									1
	Rwanda	yes										1
	Samoa		yes									1
	San Marino				67							1
	Sao Tome and Principe		yes									1
	Sierra Leone	yes										1
	Solomon Islands		yes									1
	Tanzania	yes										1
	Thailand		yes									1
	Timor-Leste		yes									1
	Tonga		yes									1
	Trinidad and Tobago					67						1
	Tunisia		yes									1
	Turkmenistan		yes									1
	Ukraine		yes									1
	Uzbekistan	yes										1
	Vanuatu		yes									1

#### Notes

**Bold** indicates that a country would be eligible under the sample set of criteria provided here. Data for GFDRR taken from 2008 annual report (for 2008–2010). CAP data taken from OCHA Web site.

Only flash appeals associated with natural disasters are listed here.

\* Percent of population in areas of risk: Only the top ten are listed.

\*\* Percent of GDP in areas at risk: Only the top ten are listed.

\*\*\* Percent of total country area at risk: Only the top ten are listed.

# Humanitarian Outcomes

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